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Abstract 
The objective of this research is to provide a comprehensive assessment of income- 
related equity in health and health care in Hungary and to explore the value of using a 
quality of life instrument, the EQ-5D, in this application. Cross-sectional analyses were 
performed based on data from post-transitional period, covering the years of 1999-2000, 
including the Hungarian Household Budget Panel Survey, Informal Payment Survey, and 
the National Health Monitoring Survey. The concentration index method was applied for 
the measurement of income-related inequity in health and health care. The overall 
Kakwani index for the health care finance system was -0.0181 indicating a slightly 
regressive overall structure. The regressive impact of direct, indirect general taxes, and 
the fixed component of health insurance contributions was almost fully offset by the 
slightly progressive income-related social insurance contribution component and the 
highly progressive income taxation. Important income-related inequalities exist in the 
health status of Hungarians. The relationship between income and health is revealed by 
the negative values of the ill-health concentration index, which was -0.2128 for the EQ- 
5Dindex. The decomposition has revealed that problems with pain/discomfort are the 
principal contributor to income-related health inequalities in Hungary. Thirty-nine 
percent of inequality can be explained by this dimension alone. This finding has a major 
implication for health policy-making by highlighting the potential role of pain 
management programmes. Health inequity index for GP and inpatient care show that 
people in lower income groups use proportionally more health care of these types of 
services than would be predicted by their health status. On the other hand, positive values 
of the HI index for outpatient specialist and dental care indicate inequity favouring the 
rich. A significant part of income-related inequity in delivery of care turns out not to be 
directly linked to income but to other social, economic and geographical characteristics 
that are, however, associated with income level. 
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PART I. MOTIVATION 
Chapter 1 
Motivation and introduction 
While the improvement of the overall level of health of the population continues to be a 
high priority, there is an increasing concern about the distribution of health within the 
population and the fairness of health care systems. 
Extensive empirical evidence has been accumulated that mortality and morbidity are not 
randomly distributed among the population but systematic differences exist between 
socioeconomic groups and geographic areas. The clear relationship between 
socioeconomic status and health have become a continuous concern among public health 
researchers and policy-makers, and has been discussed in a number of publications, 
government reports, and textbooks (for example, Evans 2002; Mackenbach 2002; 
Acheson Report - Independent Inquiry 1998; Wilkinson 1992,1996,1997; Mackenbach 
et al. 1997; Doorslaer et al 1993; Black Report 1982). 
In addition to inequalities in health among the population, a connecting concern is the 
fairness of health care systems. Equitable health care systems may prevent a widening 
gap in health between the least and most advantaged socio-economic groups and help 
each individual to fully participate in society. In response to a need to address this 
concern, equity has recently become an important aspect of the evaluation of health care 
system performance. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1993,2000) played a pioneer role in 
exploring and measuring equity characteristics of health care systems. They argued that 
equity of health care systems can be assessed based on at least two main characteristics: 
(a) equity in the finance of health care reflect the extent to which payments towards 
health care are related to ability to pay rather than to the use of medical services; 
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(b) equity in the delivery of care, on the other hand, reflect the extent to which 
individuals in equal health needs receive similar treatment regardless of their socio- 
economic characteristics, such as their ability to pay for health care. 
In general, this dual interpretation of equity in health care is widely accepted today, 
although some debates exist over the details of interpretation and measurement issues. 
Despite the rapid increase of studies on the measurement of equity in health and health 
care, relatively little attention is devoted to addressing the question as to why bother at all 
about equity in health and health care. 
The first part of this chapter discusses the motivation of the thesis in terms of the 
continuing concern about equity in health and health care, and the justification to address 
inequity. The second part introduces the increasing responsibility of international 
organizations over equity in health, and the future challenges they highlight for their 
member countries. This is followed by the discussion of the lack of information about the 
nature and extent of inequity in health and health care in Hungary, and an explanation for 
the need to generate useful data to support health policy makers to promote equity. The 
final part summarizes the objectives and the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Why bother about equity in health and health care? 
When discussing the various concepts about the need to address equity in health and 
health care, it is important to make a distinction between the terms "inequality" and 
"equity". The term "inequality" has a descriptive (or positive) nature and refers to the 
magnitude of variations in the population in terms of level of health status, access to 
treatments or in terms of contributions paid for health care. "Equity", on the other hand, 
has a normative content and carries a value judgement of what people regard fair. 
Accordingly, not all inequalities are necessarily regarded inequitable. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that several of the arguments for reducing inequalities 
are not purely based on the concept of fairness. Based on empirical findings or logical 
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arguments, some researchers argue that reducing inequalities can in fact improve overall 
efficiency in health care and society in general. 
Ap% proaches to the justification of reducing inequalities do vary to a great extent in terms 
of whether they follow a purely moral or a more prudent argument, and whether they are 
more philosophically based or empirically driven. The aim of the remainder of this 
section is to review various approaches to the justification of reducing inequalities in 
health and health care. 
Alleyne et al (2000) distinguish three major reasons for bothering about inequalities in 
health: moral considerations, social instability, and a human capital argument. Other 
authors, such as Wall and Owen (1999), build on Wilkinson's relative income's thesis in 
their justification for reducing health inequalities. A more recent approach is based upon 
public choice theory and calls for the collection of evidence on public preferences on 
inequality aversion to feed policy decisions (Murray et al. 2000, Dolan 2003). 
(a) Moral considerations 
Moral arguments about inequalities have in common that, although some rational 
reasoning is always part of these approaches, they are primarily based on a natural sense 
of fairness in terms of equality of opportunities. Alleyne et al (2000) build their argument 
on Sen's theoretical approach on essential freedoms and mechanisms through which other 
freedoms can be enjoyed. They argue that it would not be morally justifiable not to allow 
all human beings to enjoy health that enables them to enjoy other freedoms. This 
argument is somewhat similar to Rawls's first principle of justifying the entitlement of 
every individual to the so called "primary goods" that enable them to enjoy the most 
extensive basic liberty and equal opportunity of participation in society (Rawls 1973). 
Other authors use moral arguments to distinguish inequalities that are unfair from those 
that are fair. Woodward and Kawachi (2000) argue that inequalities are unfair if poor 
health is the consequence of unequal opportunities or unequal distribution of risk factors 
within the population. On the other hand, some argue that certain types of inequalities, 
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such as giving priority to the young over the old in access to health care based on the 
"fair innings" argument are indeed equitable (Williams, 1997). 
(b) Rational reasoning about inequality reduction 
Social instability. Alleyne et al (2000) highlight that inequalities in health may be a cause 
of social instability. Likewise the differences between countries that contribute to the 
instability of the world, inequality in health or in access to care can be seen as a threat to 
the more favoured ones. People in general do not usually regard health as an achievement 
but they regard it almost as a right to be as healthy as others and to have access to the 
means of being so. 
Human capital and its role in tackling poverty. A more pragmatic consideration is that 
health is one of the ingredients of human capital that is essential to other aspects of 
development. Unequal access to measures that lead to the formation of human capital 
inhibits the reduction in poverty. Improvement of health status and the reduction of health 
inequalities are more and more recognized as essential parts of tackling poverty. 
Relative income thesis. A somewhat related argument is the relative income thesis 
published by Wilkinson (1992,1996,1997). Wilkinson observed that in countries with 
relatively high socio-economic inequalities (measured along income level) the average 
level of health tend to be lower than in those countries with more equal societies. This 
hypothesis first seemed to be supported by both international cross-sectional and national 
historical data. Furthermore, Kaplan (1996) and Kennedy et al (1996) confirmed the 
validity of the relative income thesis based on data from different states of the USA. 
However, the relative income thesis has been challenged shortly after its publication. 
First, Judge (1995) criticized Wilkinson on the selectivity of the choice of income 
inequality measures and countries involved in the analysis. Later, empirical evidence was 
provided that the real impact of income inequality on the level of health has been 
previously overestimated or the relationship never even existed (Osler et al., 2002; 
Shibuya et al., 2002; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002; Muller, 2002). 
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"Relative health thesis. " Interestingly, the WHO's World Health Report's (WHO, 2000) 
ranking of countries based on the measure of overall health inequalities health (measured 
by child survival by the age of five) also highly correlated to the ranking of countries 
based on average health (measured as disability adjusted life expectancy, DALE). 
According to my own calculations, the Spearman's rank correlation between average 
health and health inequalities was 0.912 (p<0.01). This extremely high level of 
correlation suggests that smaller inequalities in health are associated with higher level of 
average health. However, as the WHO did not take demographic, social and economic 
factors into account in the measurement of health inequalities, it is not possible to identify 
a direct cause-consequence relationship. If a causal relationship exists then tackling social 
inequalities in health (for example, by improving the health of the most disadvantaged 
groups) can be associated with a benefit in terms of the overall health of the population. 
Empirical evidence on societal preferences about inequity aversion. A yet not widespread 
approach of justifying the need to pursue equity in health and health care is surveying 
representatives from the public on their preferences regarding equity. Murray et al. 
(2000) surveyed a group of members from the general public and another group of 
representatives of WHO employees about their views on an equitable health care finance 
system. They found that the majority of respondents preferred a system in which higher 
income individuals pay more towards health care than lower income individuals. In 
another survey with over a hundred members of the English population, Dolan (2003) 
looked at whether people are willing to give up efficiency in terms of overall health in 
order to achieve greater equality in health. Indeed, he found that people were willing to 
sacrifice a year from average life expectancy to achieve equality between the life 
expectancy of social classes. As part of the thesis work, I also collected data on 
individuals' preferences on health inequality aversion in Hungary. As later described in 
more details (Chapter 8), a group of public health care workers were asked to express 
their preferences between programs that improve overall health and/or reduce inequalities 
in health. Indeed, results reflected a view of the median respondent that a sacrifice in 
improvements in overall health is worthwhile if social inequalities in health can be 
reduced. In summary, early evidence suggest that social preferences might reflect a need 
to achieve greater equity in health and health care. 
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Growing international concern about equity and need for comparative data. As 
international concern over equity in health and health care grows, there is a need to 
provide empirical data for respective countries. Data on equity in health and health care 
can be used in comparing and evaluating health care system performance and as input 
data for recommendations on new health policy programmes. 
While moral and rational arguments towards reducing inequalities in health and health 
care are important components of developing policy interventions in individual countries, 
the role of the international environment is at least that important factor. Hungary as a 
smaller country in a transition period is eager to look for well-established models, and the 
guidance and approaches represented by international organizations can influence internal 
policy development. The following section provides a summary of the role of selected 
international organizations in health equity issues. 
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1.2 Growing international concern about equity in health and 
health care 
International organizations have recently gained an expanding role in the analysis and 
promotion of equity in health and health care. Depending of their actual role and 
objectives, these organizations can play a role in funding research on equity, develop 
methods to measure and monitor equity, and provide recommendations to their member 
countries on strategies to design and implement policies, so that greater equity in health 
and health care can be promoted. 
The special importance of international organization in promoting equity, as compared to 
individual researchers or academics, is that they have more direct influence on 
governments of their member countries, who in turn have the actual tools to tackle 
inequalities. Three organizations, of which Hungary is part of, are discussed in this 
section: the World Health Organization (WHO); the European Commission (EC)1; and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
1.2.1 The World Health Organization 
The World Health Organization has been traditionally concerned for equity in health. 
Since the 1980s, this concern has been reflected in a number of WHO publications that 
included reference to equity, such as The concepts and principles of equity and health by 
Whitehead (1990), Policies and strategies to promote equity in health by Dahlgren and 
Whitehead (1992), Measuring socioeconomic inequalities in health by Kunst and 
Mackenbach (1994), Health2l - health for all in the 21st century (WHO 1998) and the 
recently published World Health Report 2000 (WHO 2000). 
I Hungary joins the European Union in May, 2004. 
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In the strategy outlined by the WHO's publication, Health2l - health for all in the 21st 
century (1998), target one has been defined as achieving equity in health: "By the year 
2000, the differences in health status between countries and between groups within 
countries should be reduced by at least 25%, by improving the health of disadvantaged 
nations and groups. " 
This statement reflected the view that equity is best interpreted as equality in health 
status. Kunst and Machenbach highlighted that "socioeconomic inequalities in health can 
be defined as differences in the prevalence or incidence of health problems between 
individual people of higher and lower socioeconomic status ". The reason for reducing 
inequalities is not only because these inequalities are "unfair" but also because "reducing 
the burden of health problems in disadvantaged groups offers great potential for 
improving the average health status of the population as a whole ". 
Until the publication of the World Health Report 2000 (WHO 2000), the WHO have not 
specifically adapted an official approach how inequalities and reduction in inequalities 
should be defined and measured. Kunst and Mackenbach had pointed out though that 
there was a great need for standardized measurement tools and more empirical analysis 
on equity. They suggested the use of regular monitoring systems based on interview 
surveys and registries. They recommended to measure health both in terms of mortality 
and morbidity and to measure socioeconomic status by three main indicators: 
occupational status, education, and income level. To measure morbidity, the 
recommended tools included perceived health, disability status and quality of life 
measurements. For measuring the association between socioeconomic status and health 
status they recommended the use of relative and absolute inequality indices. 
An influential and much debated publication of the WHO with reference to equity was 
the annual World Health Report published in 2000. The World Health Report 2000 had 
the objective to evaluate and rank the performance of health care systems of its 191 
member countries. The report examined goal attainment of the health care system in 
relation to health care expenditures per capita. Goal attainment in health care included 
five aspects: 
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1. Good average health of the population: Life expectancy weighted by level of 
disability (Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy, DALE). Disability is calculated 
such that years lived with illness count less than 1, and less the more burdensome 
the illness is. 
2. Equity in health: Equality in probability of surviving the first 5 years of life in 
children within the overall population. 
3. Responsiveness to legitimate non-health expectations in the population: Index 
covering respect for patient's dignity, confidentiality, patients' autonomy, prompt 
attention, quality of amenities, access to social support networks, freedom to 
choose provider. 
4. Equity in responsiveness. The more subgroups that are treated with less 
responsiveness than the majority, and the greater these subgroups are, the lower is 
the country's score on equity in responsiveness. 
5. Fairness in financing. Defined as proportionality between a household's total 
expenditure on health care (taxwise and out of pocket) and its permanent income 
above subsistence level (defined as total private expenditure plus direct tax 
payments minus expenditure on food). 
The fact that three of the five aspects of the performance the evaluation system (equity in 
health, equity in responsiveness, and fairness in financing) included reference to equity 
issues, gave a clear message about the increasing responsibility of health policy-makers 
over equity. Each country was ranked based on performance along the five indicators and 
an overall rank was also assigned based on overall performance. Japan was ranked first in 
average health, Chile in equity in health, the USA in responsiveness to non-health 
expectations, the United Arab Emirates in equity in responsiveness, and Colombia in 
fairness in finance. France was indicated as the best health care system based on overall 
performace. Hungary was ranked as 62,40,62,58,105-106 in the five goal achievement 
indicators respectively, and 66th in overall performance (WHO, 2000). 
The World Health Report 2000 prompted a great deal of criticism and controversy mainly 
for its pointlessness in its goal of ranking countries (Williams, 2001) and for the - lack of 
complete - data and deficiencies in methodology used (for example, Shaw 2000, Wolfson 
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and Rowe 2000, Braveman et al 2001, Navarro 2001 Szwarcwald 2002). Most of these 
criticism focused on the limitations of the WHO's underlying concept of measuring 
equity in health in terms of overall health inequalities (as presented by Murray et al 1999 
and Gakidou et al 2000) while failing to measure social inequalities that are more 
important from equity perspective. However, no one has really doubted the role of the 
WHO and its World Health Report 2000 in emphasising the importance of equity in 
health care and generating debate and further research in the area. It has also highlighted 
the potentials in improving the Hungarian health care system in terms of equity, and 
achieving more fairness in financing health care in particular. 
1.2.2 The European Commission and the ECuity project 
In the European Union, the organization of health care systems is still largely the 
responsibility of individual member states. Although long-term plans exist about the 
harmonization of social policies, including health care, the speed of this process may well 
depend on other factors, such as the speed of the economic integration of Europe. 
Some general objectives of public health have already been defined in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, but more specific aims and joint EU actions are to be pursued in the future. The 
European Commission has recently published its plan to adapt a programme of 
"Community action in the field of public health: 2001-2006" (EC, 2001). This plan has 
amongst its objectives the improvement of sharing information and knowledge about 
health care systems of its member states, responding rapidly to health threats, and 
addressing social and economic determinants of health. While respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity and the responsibility of Member States for the organization and delivery of 
health care, the EC programme takes a broader view on public health, including tackling 
the factors underlying disease. 
The programme addresses equity to an important extent. It includes the objectives of 
improving information and knowledge for the development of public health in order to 
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optimise health status, strengthen efficient health systems, conduct effective health 
interventions, and to "develop methods to tackle health inequalities". The programme 
also aims to address health determinants through (interdisciplinary) health promotion and 
disease prevention actions and "by means of measures to achieve equity in health". 
Amongst health determinants to be addressed are listed lifestyle-related, environment- 
related, and social, and economic health determinants. 
More specifically, the programme aims to develop methodology for benchmarking and 
linking strategies to identify health inequalities using data from the Community health 
information data; review and identify obstacles to access to health services across internal 
borders in the EU and develop guidelines; develop strategy for analysing and addressing 
the impact of social and economic factors on health; and define and disseminate good 
practice on actions and policies related to reducing inequalities (EC 2001). 
Apart from introducing action plans to improve strategies to tackle inequalities in health 
and health care, the European Commission has already played a role in funding research 
in the health equity field. Through its Biomed programme, the EC has funded the 
"ECuity Project", with the aim to analyse the level of inequalities in health and equity in 
health care within European and other developed countries. Under the leadership of 
Doorslaer and Wagstaff, the equity project has concentrated on three main areas: 
1. Inequalities in health. One of the aims of the ECuity Project was to compare the 
levels of inequalities in health in the European countries and to establish the role of 
economic factors in accounting for (a) cross-country differences in health inequality 
and (b) intra-country health variations. 
2. Equity in the finance of health care. Another objective of the project was to examine 
the fairness of financing health care by examining whether payments for health care 
are proportional to people's ability to pay. Countries with varying financing mixes 
(such as taxes, social insurance, or private sources, e. g. private insurance or out-of- 
pocket payments) have been compared. 
3. Equity in health care delivery. The third main research question of the project was to 
investigate whether people in equal need of health care are treated the same, 
21 
irrespective of how well-off they are, and whether the degree to which this is true 
vary from country to country. 
Indeed, the ECuity Project has lead to significant methodological advances towards a 
more convenient analysis of equity in health care and generated substantial empirical 
evidence on the level of equity in health and health care in a number of European and 
other developed countries (as described in Chapter 5 in more details, these studies 
included, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993,1994,1997,1999,2000, Kakwani et al. 
1997, van Doorslaer and Koolman 2002, Doorslaer and Jones 2003, etc). 
Hungarian data have not been analysed as part of the ECuity Project, as it was the case 
for other Central European countries. The production of comparable data is of particular 
importance in the light of the objectives of the EC to measure and tackle inequity in 
health and health care. 
1.2.3 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The OECD groups 30 member countries with a commitment to support governance in the 
public sector and in corporate activity. Based on its country surveys, statistics, and 
reviews, the OECD advises policy-makers to adopt strategic orientations and select 
policies that work. 
The Health Policy Unit of the OECD is devoted to the systematic collection of data on 
health status and health care systems in member countries and is involved in conducting 
health policy analysis. Their policy analysis work mainly examines the performance of 
OECD health systems and the causes of variation in performance across countries. The 
OECD's explicitly stated objective is to evaluate the performance of health care systems 
"against efficiency and equity objectives" (OECD, 2003). 
In fact, previous OECD economic papers on comparative analyses of health care systems 
(for example, OECD 1992, OECD 1994, OECD 1996) or more recent country level 
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reports (for example, Orosz and Burnes 2000, Docteur et al. 2003) did address the issue 
of equity in health care to some extent. However, the sections on equity analysis in these 
publications have been generally limited to the brief discussion of equity in terms of 
entitlement to health care or utilization of health care. The evaluation of health care 
systems in terms of equity in payments for health care, equity in actual access to health 
care, or achievements in terms of reductions in inequalities in health status got generally 
less or no attention. The low emphasis on equity in the OECD's publications might be a 
result of a lack of availability of local data together with a lack of published guidance 
how OECD's analysts should incorporate equity aspects in the evaluation of health care 
systems. Its key database product, the OECD Health Data, also lacks any indicator or 
other information on the level or nature of inequity in its member countries. 
A recent OECD publication, however, attempted to develop a guidance on indicators for 
the evaluation of the performance of health care systems, including some 
recommendations on evaluating equity in health care (Hurst and Jee-Hughes, 2001). The 
report has identified five different dimensions of equity: 
" health, 
" health outcome, 
" access, 
" responsiveness, 
0 and finance. 
In addition, the report highlights that disparities can be monitored across many population 
groups, including: 
9 age, 
9 gender, 
" ethnic group, 
" income, 
9 and geography. 
The report does not give further details, such as definition of the 
identified equity 
components or specific recommendations on how analysts should measure 
them. 
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A new initiative, the OECD Health Project, which was launched in 2001, may lead to 
more empirical research on equity in health and health care. The OECD Health Project 
has amongst its objectives the detailed analysis of equity issues, including the distribution 
of health status. As part of the initiative, the OECD commissioned a multi-country 
analysis of equity in access to health care. Relying on external experts, a study is being 
carried out to gather more empirical evidence on equity in access to physician visits and 
hospital stay in selected OECD countries. This initiative is underway now and will 
expand the earlier analysis of Doorslaer et al. (2000) on equity in access to health care in 
the OECD countries, and will include Hungary. 
1.2.4 Summary of the role of international organizations in promoting 
equity in health and health care 
Although their actual role and history differs to a great extent, the three international 
organization reviewed here had in common that they placed an increasing emphasis on 
equity in health and health care. Currently, the approaches of these organizations seem to 
vary in terms of the aspects of equity they emphasize, definitions used, and the preferred 
methodology to the measurement of equity. 
Selectivity can be observed across the international organization in emphasizing one or 
another aspect of equity in health and health care. The WHO has traditionally been 
concerned about inequalities in the health status of the population. However, its approach 
reflected in the recent World Health Report 2000 also highlights the importance of equity 
in the finance of health care and in responsiveness regarding non-medical expectations. 
Equity in access to health care is not, currently, considered in the WHO's evaluation 
criteria. The EU, in contrast, has been traditionally concerned for access to health care 
and now its new public health programme also has amongst its objectives the 
measurement of social and economic determinant of health and tackling inequalities in 
health. Although equity in payments for health care is not explicitly mentioned in the EC 
policy documents, the ECuity Project, which was funded by the EC, did pay attention to 
this aspect of equity. The OECD publications have mainly focused on equity in terms of 
entitlement to and utilization of health care. 
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Some of the differences in approaches may be partly explained by that international 
organizations often rely on individual experts and their specific experiences and opinions. 
Internal and external experts used by the different international organizations may 
suggest different ways of measuring equity in health and health care. For example, while 
the WHO relied upon the expertise of Mackenbach, Murray, and Gakidou; the ECuity 
Project and the recent OECD studies adapted the methodology developed by Doorslaer 
and Wagstaff. Consequently, individual countries that are members of several 
international organizations can receive different information about equity based on 
different data sources and methodologies from international organizations. As a result, 
individual countries have an increasing need to develop their own expertise in the 
evaluation and interpretation of complex information on equity, and using this 
information in policy-making. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that information provided by international organizations 
may not be sufficient to inform health policy of an individual country. Multi-country 
studies often need to consider trade-offs between using accurate data sources and 
extending the analysis to large geographical areas. Some studies seem to prefer collecting 
data from all its member countries and limit data analysis to what is available, while 
others prefer to limit the data collection to those countries from which reliable and 
informative data are available. The WHO's World Health Report, for instance, took the 
approach of covering all its member countries at the expense of limitations in using real 
data from a substantial number of countries. This has lead to results that are highly 
criticised for being flawed and unsuitable to inform policy-makers. On the other hand, the 
ECuity Project or OECD studies have focused on using more accurate data sources and 
more established analytical tools but could only cover a limited number of countries. In 
the case of Hungary, only the WHO estimated some equity indices, while no alternative 
information is available. According to several publications, however, the WHO measures 
of equity are substantially flowed, not comprehensive, and are unsuitable to inform policy 
makers (Richardson et al 2003, Nord 2002, Wagstaff 2002). Research on the 
comprehensive evaluation of equity in health and health care in Hungary is an important 
need today. 
UPIWRSfTY 
OF YORK 
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1.3 Motivation to study equity in health and health care of 
Hungary 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s when the socialist system collapsed, Hungary has 
been undergoing major changes in society and economy. Transition from a socialist 
system towards a market economy lead to significant changes in the public sector, 
including health care. One of the key focuses of the transition period was the preparation 
of Hungary for joining the EU. This process involved harmonization with the EU law and 
also the adaptation of principles based on which the EU builds its policies. Within the 
light of these characteristics of the transition period, the evaluation of the performance of 
the health care system in terms of equity is important for several reasons. 
Up till today, the evaluation of the health care system of Hungary has mainly 
concentrated on efficiency aspects but little research has been done on equity. The lack of 
commitment to the measurement of equity in health care was a key feature of the socialist 
period. At the heart of the political rhetoric was the claim that every citizen had the right 
to have access to comprehensive and free health care services. On the other hand, no data 
collection system was set up to monitor equity in practice. It was not regarded "politically 
correct" even to question the presence of equity. The claim about equity was taken for 
granted rather than being based on empirical evidence. Interestingly, a similar view was 
held in the UK during the early years after the establishment of the National Health 
Service (NHS). It was not regarded "friendly" to even question the equitable nature of the 
NHS as it was so widely believed that the NHS operated on the principles of fairness. 
Perhaps, the only acknowledged aspect of equity to look at was regional inequalities in 
health and health care. Consequently, early work by health economists in Hungary (e. g. 
Orosz 1994, Boj an 1994) focused on regional inequalities. 
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, the presence of social inequities in access to 
health care was widely perceived in Hungary. A popular joke about access to health care 
in the past can well illustrate how people perceived the equity characteristics of the 
system. While health care was officially declared to be "high quality, free, and available 
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to all", according to the joke only two of these three characteristics could be fulfilled at 
one time. If it was free and available to all then it was not regarded to be of high quality. 
If anyone wanted to access high quality care then it was not available for free but at an 
expense of informal payments. Finally, if health care was high quality and free then it 
was most probable only accessible at distinguished health care providers offered for 
people belonging to privileged political groups or professions. 
An understandable expectation of the majority of the population was to achieve higher 
efficiency and fairness through reforms and joining the EU. Instead, the transition period 
proved to be rather difficult for many and challenged the sustainability of the existing 
public services. The health care system has been undergoing continuous reforms that first 
affected the finance of health care services, then ownership structures, and health care 
delivery arrangements. While most evaluation of reforms focused on efficiency and 
sustainability, no or little evidence has been collected on the equity aspects of the current 
health care system. 
Without a good understanding of the current nature and causes of inequity in the current 
health care system it is difficult to address existing inequities and plan future health 
policies to promote greater equity. To provide a full picture of any potential inequities in 
the health care system, a comprehensive equity analysis of both the finance and the 
delivery sides of the health care system is needed. In addition, the understanding of 
inequalities in health status among population can help identify those subgroups where 
targeted policies can potentially improve health care and health and reduce overall 
inequalities. 
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1.4 Objectives of the thesis 
The main objective of the thesis is to provide a comprehensive assessment of income- 
related equity in health and health care in Hungary. Cross-sectional analyses were 
performed based on survey data from post-transitional period, mainly covering the years 
of 1999-2000. Results from this period may serve as baseline data for longitudinal 
analyses on changes in equity in health and health care in future studies on equity. 
The aim was to provide a complete evaluation of equity in the health care system by 
assessing both fairness in the finance and delivery of health care. The evaluation of 
fairness in the finance of health care focused on the assessment whether individuals with 
different income level pay for health care in proportion to their income. The evaluation of 
fairness in the delivery of health care, on the other hand focused on the assessment 
whether individuals receive health care in proportion of their ill health rather than their 
income level. 
Income-related inequalities in health status was also analysed as part of the evaluation of 
equity in the delivery of health care. However, since data on income-related inequalities 
in health status is important information on its own, these results were presented as a 
distinct part of the thesis. 
Instead of providing a single measure on the overall level of equity in health and health 
care, the objective was also to identify the nature, causes, and components of inequity. In 
the finance of health care, the equity aspect of each of those payment methods were 
evaluated that play a role in funding health care in Hungary. This analysis can help 
policy-makers to identify those payment methods the burden of which fall 
proportionately more on population sub-groups with lower income level. This 
information, in turn, can be useful in introducing reform initiatives to achieve more 
fairness in the finance of health care. Similarly, the analysis of equity in the delivery of 
health care also went beyond the calculation of an overall equity index. A detailed 
decomposition analysis was performed to identify what factors contribute to income 
related inequity in the delivery of health care. The objective of this analysis was to 
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contribute to the understanding to what extent income level itself determines one's access 
to health care, and to what extent other factors that are linked to income level, such as 
geographical location, play a role in inequity. 
A methodological objective of the thesis was to explore the feasibility and opportunities 
in applying a health-related quality of life measure, the EQ-5D, in the analysis of income- 
related inequity in health and health care. A potential advantage of the EQ-5D in this 
application is its ability to identify a unique health inequality profile of the population 
along the five quality of life dimensions it captures. Such information is useful in better 
understanding how income determines inequality along specific quality of life domains, 
which in turn can help decision-makers to better target health care interventions. The 
results of this analysis can also be interesting internationally as EQ-5D population 
surveys are available in many countries and may be used to explore the nature of health 
inequalities within and across countries in the future. 
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PART II. BACKGROUND 
Chapter 2 
Review of the health care system in Hungary 
For the analysis of equity in the Hungarian health care system, it is important to provide 
an up-to-date review of the characteristics of the health care system itself. Some of the 
information about the health care system is directly needed for the measurement of 
equity. For example, data on the share of different payment methods in funding health 
care is incorporated in the measurement of equity in health care finance. Other types of 
information may be needed in the interpretation of results. For example, the 
understanding of the system of provider incentives or entitlement to care is helpful in the 
interpretation of results on equity in delivery of health care. This chapter provides an 
overview of the Hungarian health care system, including the basic organisation structure, 
finance and delivery of health care, recent reform steps and current challenges to ensuring 
equity. 
2.1 Organization of the health care system 
The Hungarian healthcare system operates on a comprehensive, centralized, compulsory, 
employment-based national health insurance scheme that provides close to universal 
coverage both in terms of treatments and in terms of population. 
The organizational structure of the Hungarian health care system has changed 
significantly during the last decade during the transition process from a formally socialist 
block country to a Newly Associated State to the European Union. 
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2.1.1 Health care system and the transition period 
As a socialist block country, Hungary had an integrated type of health care system before 
the transition period. A comprehensive range of health care services were offered to the 
population free of charge at the point of delivery. The system was financed out of general 
taxation. Services were provided by salaried employees in mainly publicly owned 
hospitals and general practices. Health care providers were financed by annual budgets 
received on a historical basis. Management and resource allocation was controlled 
centrally by the Ministry of Health. An extensive informal payment system has emerged 
since the 1960s. Small official private sector supplemented the publicly dominated 
system. Private providers included few specific treatments such as those provided by 
small dental surgeries, or publicly employed doctors in out of office hours, or some of the 
GPs who operated private surgery. Table 2.1 summarizes the most important differences 
between the health care system before and after the reforms. 
Table 2.1: The main aspects of the health care reforms 
OLD SYSTEM NEW SYSTEM 
FUNDING General state revenues Mainly social insurance 
ENTITLEMENT Universal Shift to contribution-based 
but near universal coverage 
FINANCING 
PROVIDERS 
Fixed budget Mixed finance methods 
Reforms have been gradually implemented after 1989. Main changes included the 
establishment of earmarked funding of health care through social health insurance, cash- 
limited finance of health care providers, and the introduction of performance-based 
finance methods. 
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Organization of the health care system after the reforms 
Today, the responsibility over the health care system is shared between the Ministry of 
Health, the Health Insurance Fund, the Ministry of Finance, and the local governments. 
Overall health policy is determined by the government with the Ministry of Health in 
conjunction with the Health Insurance Fund proposing and implementing reforms. 
Reforms on the financial aspects of the system (such as payment rules, central budget 
contributions to health care, and annual budget of the Health Insurance Fund) are 
proposed and drafted by the Ministry of Finance in consultation with the Health 
Insurance Fund and are decided and promulgated by the parliament. The management 
and supervisory structure of the Health Insurance Fund has changed several times. 
Currently the Ministry of Health, Family and Social Affaires supervise the Health 
Insurance Fund Administration, with the exception of budgetary issues, which are still 
supervised by the Ministry of Finance. The general director of the National Insurance 
Fund is nominated by the Minister of Health, but appointed by the Prime Minister. 
The Ministry of Health operates the National Public Health and Medical Officer 
Service which is, in turn, responsible for the licensing, accreditation and supervision of 
healthcare providers in addition to its traditional health surveillance, immunization 
logistics, (e. g. supplying vaccines), environmental safety, food and water safety, health 
promotion, hygiene, school health services and epidemiology functions. The local 
governments are normally the owners of the health care provider institutions, such as 
hospitals, outpatient clinics, and (until very recently) general practices. In this function, 
local governments are responsible for the everyday management of health care 
institutions and for the finance of their maintenance costs. Running costs of health care 
providers are financed and monitored by the national Health Insurance Fund and its 
network of 19 County Health Insurance Fund Offices (Orosz and Bums, 2000). Figure 
2.1 illustrates the detailed structure of the Hungarian health care system. Flows of 
services are shown as solid lines and flows of finance as broken lines. 
Figure 2.1: The Hungarian health care system: finance and provision of services 
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Z2 Finance of health care 
As Figure 2.1 illustrated, both raising revenues for health care and the finance of 
providers are based on a mixed system. This section first describes how health care is 
funded in Hungary, before summarizing the main methods of financing providers. 
2.2.1 Raising revenues for health care 
As the Hungarian health care system operates on a social insurance scheme, the majority 
of revenues are raised through compulsory health insurance contributions paid by 
33 
employers and employees. Table 2.2 describes the three components of the health 
insurance contributions and the payment rules in 2002. 
Table 2.2: Payment rules for health insurance contributions in 2002 
Component of contribution Payment rule 
For active (non pensioners) individuals 
Income-related contribution paid by the 11% of gross salary 
employer 
Income-related contribution paid by the 3% of gross salary 2 
employee 
In-kind related contribution (company care) e. g. 25 % of the compulsory care tax, 
for the employer) 
Fix component (EHO) paid by the employer 4500 HUF per month from 20023. 
to the Health Insurance Fund 
For pensioners, who are employed 
Income-related contribution paid by the 11% of gross salary 
employer 
Fix component (EHO) paid by the employer 4500 HUF per month from 2002. 
to the Health Insurance Fund 
Income-related contribution paid by the 0% of gross salary 
employee 
Largely due to the complex organizational structure of the health care system, finance of 
health care is not exclusively raised through the health insurance system. The 
identification of finance sources is a complex task due to multiple sources of information. 
My calculations are summarised in Table 2.3. These data do not capture cash transfers 
(e. g. maternity-related benefits) made by the health insurance fund. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the share of each payment method in generating revenues for health care. 
2 There was a ceiling above 1.9 million HUF (approximately 7661 Euro), which 
has been removed 
from the financial year 2001. 
3 This fix contribution is 18.2 Euros (exchange rate 1 Euro=248 HUF). The fix health 
insurance 
contribution is reduced to 3450 HUF (13,9 Euros) 
in 2003. 
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Figure 2.2: Share of different finance methods in total health care revenue 
Private payments 
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23% 
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insurance contributions 
44% 
As Figure 2.2 shows, 61% of revenues for health care are raised through the health 
insurance system and 39% are raised through other finance sources. 23% of funding 
comes from general taxation. General taxation includes four main components: value- 
added taxes (VAT), excise taxes, corporate taxes, and personal income taxation. The 
major part of private payments are generated through drug co-payments and a small part 
includes informal payments for the use of public health care and formal payments for the 
use of private care. 
Since informal payments are an important element in Hungarian health care, it is 
important to understand its characteristics. Giving informal payments, also called as 
"under-the-table" payments or gratuity money, to health care providers is a wide-spread 
practice in Hungary. Informal payments can be regarded as unofficial and unregulated co- 
payments made by the patients typically after the receipt of a health care intervention. It 
is typically a direct out-of-pocket cash payment made by the patient to the physician and 
other medical staff. However, in-kind payments, such as giving gifts is also common. 
Although informal payments are traditionally made voluntarily, there are beliefs that 
health care providers commonly expect that these payments are made. Informal payments 
have been a feature not only of the medical profession in Hungary but they have been 
quite wide-spread in professions in the service sector. 
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Fix component of 
health insurance 
contributions 
17% 
Due to its potential adverse impact on equity, a better understanding of the history and 
role of informal payments is important. Similarly to the Former Soviet Union countries 
and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Ensor 2000), the presence of informal 
payments has been a key feature of the Hungarian health care system. Due to its informal 
nature, very little empirical evidence exists. 
In the late 90s, however, more open discussions have started about informal payments. In 
1998, the government of Hungary set up the Informal Payment Committee to analyze the 
situation and to suggest ways of eliminating informal payments from the system (Report 
on Informal Payments, 2000). The report explicitly described the informal payment 
system from a historical and sociological perspective. A chapter by Toth looked at 
informal payments from a sociological perspective and concluded that the emergence of 
the whole informal payment system was mainly due to the fast introduction of a general 
social insurance scheme replacing a mainly direct payment system after the second World 
War. Furthermore, having a large proportion of doctors coming from the working class 
has changed the medical ethics substantially. Baläzs discussed informal payments within 
the context of society and medical ethics. According to him, the emergence of informal 
payments was in close relation to the low respect of the medical profession within the 
society. At the same time, the strict hierarchy within the medical profession enabled 
doctors to reinforce informal payments. Bondär and Bordas examined the economic 
aspects of informal payments in the report. They argued that informal payments would 
exist until doctors can differentiate in the services they provide. Differentiation in 
services may include better quality of care or shorter waiting lists. They advised that 
several methods should be simultaneously used to eliminate informal payments. These 
included better incentives through official payments, better quality control in care, legal 
tools and the introduction of formal co-payments. Although the report highlighted several 
important aspects of the informal payment system and increased the transparency of its 
public discussion, it failed to come up with an agenda to eliminate problems and lacked a 
political will. The committee was dismissed in 1999 without replacement. 
In 1999 the TARKI Social Research Centre (Bognär et al., 1999) conducted a general 
population survey about the size and nature of the informal payment market. The original 
purpose of the survey was to explore if there was a need in Hungary for formal private 
health insurance as an alternative to the current informal payment system. According to 
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the results, the estimated amount of informal payments were 30 billion Hungarian Forints 
(HUF), which corresponded to 4,6% of total health care expenditures Results also 
revealed that informal payment is more widespread in gynaecological, surgical hospital 
services, than internal medicine or mental services. Informal payments are also less 
frequent in outpatient specialist services (e. g. diagnostic services). The amount of 
informal payment also varies significantly by specialty groups. According to the survey, a 
GP home visit involves about 3-3.5 Euros, a gynaecologist after child delivery 40-78 
Euro, while a cardiac surgeon receives about 117 - 197 Euros for an operation4 (Bognär 
et al., 1999). Despite their relatively low share in health care expenditures, informal 
payments may have important impact on efficiency and access to health care. 
2.2.2 Health care expenditures 
With the exception of private payments, it is not possible to specify the share of each type 
of revenues in the finance of particular health care services. The reason for this is that 
revenues (such as the various components of general taxation) are not labelled with 
respect to their use for health care. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the share of each type of health care from the total expenditures. 
Primary care account for 11 % of in-kind health care expenditures, whereas specialist care 
(outpatient specialist, inpatient acute, or inpatient chronic care) account for 48%. A large 
proportion of in-kind benefits include pharmaceuticals (3 9%). 
4 Exchange rate used was 1 Euro = 248 HUF 
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Figure 2.3: Relative share of in-kind health care services in 2001 
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Finally, table 2.4 illustrates that while the GDP of Hungary has been gradually increasing 
in the last couple of years, health care expenditures as proportion of the GDP have 
decreased slightly (Orosz, 2001). Expenditures on pharmaceutical were the only 
exception that could follow the growth of the GDP. 
Table 2.4: Trend in health care expenditures as percentage (%) of the GDP 
1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Primary, secondary and tertiary 
care 
3.9 3,4 3,3 3,2 3 3 2.8 
Pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices 
1.4 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,4 1.4 
Investments 0.6 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3 0.3 
Other 0.6 0,8 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,6 0.7 
Total public 6.5 6,3 5,9 5,6 5,6 5,4 5.2 
Private out-of-pocket 
expenditures (including 
pharmaceutical co-payments) 
0.8 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,3 1.3 
Total 7.3 7,5 7,2 6,9 6,8 6,7 6.8 
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2.2.3 Financing health care providers 
Financing providers in Hungary is based on a dual structure: running costs of health care 
providers are financed by the Health Insurance Fund, while the maintenance costs are 
supposed to be paid by the owners of providers, i. e. usually the local government. 
The main experience with this dual financing system is that revenues of health care 
providers for maintenance are very low. This is mainly due to the scarce resources of 
local governments. Large part of the investments is financed by the central government 
directly to the providers. The allocation of investments is not determined by any formula 
or explicit priority setting. 
The finance of the different levels of health care provision is based on a mixed system. 
Table 2.5 summarizes the key finance methods with respect to the various health care 
providers. 
Table 2.5: Finance of health care providers 
Health care service Methods of finance 
General practitioners Weighted capitation from 1992 and fixed allowance depending on the size 
and location of the practice, plus fee-for-service for certain preventive 
activities and a case payment for attending non-registered patients. Capitation 
payments are adjusted to the age structure of the patients, the qualifications of 
the family physicians. 
Home care and spa Fee-for service 
Outpatient care Fixed budget and fee-for-service point system (each activity has a point 
value. The actual value of the points is calculated in the following way: all 
the points sum up nationally and the monthly budget divided by the total 
points. ("floating" or relative point systems) 
Community specialist Yearly fix global budget and partly fee-for-service point system 
care (mental health 
services, pulmonary and 
STD service) 
Acute hospital care DRGs (or HDGs Homogenous Disease Groups) 
Chronic hospital care Weighted per diem (complexity adjustment) 
(including rehabilitation) 
Few tertiary care services CASE BASED 
(such as transplantation) 
Certain public health care Fix budget 
tasks 
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From table 2.5, it can be seen that Hungary adopted various finance methods, including 
the American origin DRG system in the acute inpatient care, the German point system in 
the outpatient care, the per diem base system in the case of the chronic inpatient care 
which was operated for example in Canada or Japan. These finance methods have in 
common that they are all "performance-based" and reflect the "money follows the 
patient" principle. 
In order to avoid escalation of expenditures due to the introduction of the new payment 
methods, Hungary started to operate a cash-limited (relative) financing system (using 
capped budgets for inpatient and outpatient care). This means that the actual fees for 
health care provision depend on both the available budget and the total number of 
services provided in a certain period of time. All provided services are aggregated at the 
country level, and the available budget is divided by the volume of services (sum of 
provided units), which finally gives the financial value of one provided unit. The 
available budget is then allocated among providers according to the volume of their 
health care provision. In this floating fee or point payment system, if there is an increase 
in the provision of services then the budget is divided between an increased volume of 
health services, and therefore the fee after a particular provided service would be smaller. 
This floating point system is used for reimbursing outpatient and acute hospital services 
as well as diagnostic imaging, diagnostic laboratories, and renal replacement therapy. 
Importantly, the introduction of the performance-based reimbursement methods has lead 
to the increased provision of services. Particularly in the acute inpatient care, there is a 
strong incentive for hospitals to admit patients and report as serious diagnosis as possible 
in order to maximize the income of the hospital. This phenomenon, which is also known 
as the "DRG creep", has been present in the health care system and resulted in the 
devaluation of the value of one unit health care provision. The positive consequence of 
this payment incentive on equity in the delivery of health care is that providers face an 
immense pressure to provide health care to everyone in need. 
This incentive structure may partly offset the impact of informal payments on inequity in 
the access to health care. Although there is a widespread belief that making informal 
payment is necessary to have access to certain health care services, the actual impact of 
informal payments on equity is not well understood yet. 
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2.3 Delivery of health care 
2.3.1 Health care providers 
In Hungary, health care is provided at three main levels of care: primary care (general 
practitioners), outpatient specialist care, and inpatient care. 
General practices can be owned and/or organized on a private basis or can be operated by 
the local government. Citizens have free choice about the GP they want to register with. 
Individuals are free to change their GPs, but choice is very limited in rural areas, and GPs 
have the right not to accept patients living in districts other than the one in which the 
practice is located. Consultations with GPs are free of charge but informal payment to 
doctors is regular. 
General practitioners enjoy clinical autonomy, which includes the freedom to prescribe 
and the freedom to refer patients for diagnostic tests or consultations with specialist 
hospital departments. No budgetary restrictions limit GPs, however, an information 
system has been developed by the Health Insurance Fund to monitor variations in drug 
prescription rates among different practices. 
General practitioners can refer patients to a hospital or outpatient clinic for specialized 
diagnosis or treatment. The strict referral system has been relaxed, however. In the case 
of certain diseases (such as mental disorders, sexually transmitted disorders, 
dermatological and gynaecological problems) GPs' referral is not necessary. Due to the 
scarcity of some highly specialized services such as diagnostic imaging (CT/MRI, 
ultrasound exams), angiographies, coronarographies, psychotherapy, hip replacement, 
etc. waiting lists exist in hospital and outpatient care settings. 
Despite several policy efforts to increase the preventive and gate-keeper role of primary 
care, health care in Hungary is still hospital based. There are excess capacities in acute 
hospital care and oversupply of specialists, which in combination with a performance- 
based finance system results in high health care utilization of hospital level care. 
Social care is not clearly separated from health care services. A significant part of the 
chronic inpatient services are substituting social services. New and more specialized 
institutions such as nursing homes and respite homes are to be created in the future by 
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both local municipalities and private providers (including charity organizations). Private 
medical care has a small complementary role to the mainly public system, offering a 
better choice of doctors, avoidance of long queues in the surgeries, better privacy of care, 
and a better doctor-patient relationship as no inconvenient feelings of informal payments 
are present. 
In addition, the ratio of the privatized health care providers (in terms of ownership of 
practice) has been gradually growing. Today, 87 % of the GPs are micro-enterprises. 
Outpatient specialist services are also increasingly run by one-person micro-enterprises or 
by small groups of specialists (for example in the form of an ltd. ). Most of these 
enterprises have an outsourcing contract with the local government or the main health 
care provider of the given catchments area. More than two third of the haemodialysis 
providers are owned by private owners (mainly affiliates of multinational private 
providers), and the majority of the CT and MRI services are run by private companies. In 
2000,98 % of pharmacies, about 90 % of homecare providers, and around 70 % of dental 
service providers had private owners. The structure, ownership, contracting conditions 
and management responsibilities of public (contracting with the public insurance 
company) hospitals are planned to be regulated by a new, comprehensive act parallel to a 
new act on the legal status of health professionals (working hours, contracts, employment 
rules, etc. ). The aim of the new legislation is to support the regional cooperation of the 
county and town hospitals, to have a better control on the health expenditures and 
guarantee the care of patients. 
Another new initiative is the introduction of quasi-managed care organizations in the 
Hungarian health care system. The so far mainly experimental managed care 
organisations started to operate from 1999 in Hungary. The National Insurance Fund 
(NIF) calculates a hypothetical age and gender adjusted capitation budget that the 
providers would receive under a real managed care system. In practice, the NIF pays 
providers as in the rest of the country. If there is a surplus, the quasi-managed care 
organization can keep it, and use it for improving the service infrastructure and to reward 
good performance of doctors and nurses. If they run to deficit the Insurance Fund may 
withdraw the managed care status. This structure provides strong incentives to monitor 
and influence patient care pathways. The overall objective of the pilot is to improve 
efficiency and quality at the same time. Presently 7 quasi-managed care organizations 
operate in Hungary. These organizations recruited about half million citizens in 2001 
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(i. e., approximately 5% of the population). The current government plan is to expand the 
pilot to cover two million people (20 % of the population). If these organizations will 
become widespread in Hungary, they can re-shape the current health care system 
2.3.2 Benefits and entitlement to care 
The Hungarian health care system provides an almost complete range of health care 
services free of charge at the point of delivery of care. Exceptions are limited to certain 
treatments, such as particular dental care services, e. g. inlays and crowns, bridges with 
expensive materials, or expansive obstacles and cosmetic interventions. 
The mandatory health insurance package has changed several times in the last few years. 
In 1992 a "full package" was offered to the citizens, in which the preventive care as well 
as the whole range of therapeutic services were covered by public funding. In 1995 the 
occupational health services were taken out, and transferred to the responsibility of 
employers. At the same time, special dental care, the non-medical services of in-patient 
rehabilitation was placed on a co-payment basis. In 1998 a definitive list was set up on 
the services, which are not available in the frame of social insurance. During the last four 
years most of these services were re-included into the insurance package, and 
consequently, there is only a tight room for complementary or private health insurance. 
Payments for out-of-hospital pharmaceuticals and medical devices are, however, shared 
between the Health Insurance Fund and the patients. Public subsidies depend on the drug 
prescribed but vary between zero and 100 percent (and can be 0,50,70,90,100 %). In 
average, about 32% of drug prices are paid by the patient and about 68% paid by the 
Health Insurance Fund. 
Due to the fact that almost a full range of health care services are covered under the 
compulsory scheme, from which opting out is not allowed, currently there is very little 
demand for private health care services or private health insurance. In addition, due to the 
unpredictable morbidity and mortality conditions of some age groups of the population 
(such as males over 45) private insurance companies are not offering even supplementary 
health insurance packages to these high-risk age groups. Act XCVI of 1993 on Voluntary 
Mutual Insurance Funds opened the market for non-profit insurance plans, which is very similar 
to the model of `mutualite' movement. Purchasing voluntary health insurance from mutual funds 
enjoys tax rebate up to a certain limit Since 1994, mutual health funds are allowed to 
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operate. The Supervisory Authority of Financial Services supervises them. There are 
about 30 voluntary mutual health insurance funds, but their role is marginal at the 
moment. These mutual funds had recruited about 61 000 members by the end of 2000 
(i. e. less than 0.5% of the Hungarian population). Most of them are employment-based, 
and tax-favored. The voluntary health insurance fund's health related expenditure was 
less than 1 billion HUF (4 million Euros) in 2000, so their role in healthcare financing is 
limited (about 0.1 % of the total health expenditure) (Schneider, 2000. ). Therefore, 
without any major changes in the health care system of Hungary, the role of private 
health insurance is likely to remain little in the near future. 
Prior to the reforms entitlement for free health care was universal, based on citizenship 
from 1973. After the introduction of the health insurance system entitlement is 
determined by paying contributions. Act LXXX of 1997 on Social Insurance determines 
the entitlement for in-kind and cash benefits, as well as the rules of paying the 
contribution. As a general rule, entitlement for health insurance benefits is linked to 
paying contribution, however certain population groups are exempt such as pensioners 
and the unemployed. However, still almost all the population is covered as the central and 
local government pay the contributions for the insurance of the unemployed and people in 
social need. Pensioners are exempted from payments. The Government pays contribution 
as a bulk sum for the unemployed, people in social need, and the pensioners. 
The coverage is practically universal. About 1% of the population is not covered. They 
usually work in the unofficial market and therefore they are not registered with the Health 
Insurance Fund. They might not apply for free entitlement on social basis at the local 
government, or if they do then the local government is to decide about the eligibility. The 
local government and the social security system gained some responsibility in bringing 
back people who suddenly got outside the health care system. 
The perception of the public about the health care system is not well understood yet. 
Until recently, surveys that measured patients satisfaction with health care showed 
extremely high satisfaction. There was always a suspicion though that these results were 
flawed due to methodological problems (patient filled in the questionnaire prior to 
departure from hospital). Recently, however, a survey showed that only 55.7 % might be 
satisfied with the current health care system. 
5 Resent patients and elderly population 
S The following question was asked: After an average insured individual 16000 HUF contributions 
is paid by the employer. Your contribution could be less or more, What do you chose if you could 
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prefer more the current system, than the rest. The current system is less favorable among 
the young and wealthy groups (lanky, 2000). This result is in the line with the EU 
average (Mossialos, 1997). 
2.4 Recent reform steps and current challenges 
2.4.1 Evaluation of recent and planned reforms 
Since 1989, a number of important changes have been implemented in the Hungarian 
healthcare system particularly in relation to its finance structure. The current Hungarian 
healthcare system at the macro level is very similar to other OECD countries, having 
universal coverage and dominant public funding with about 70% of total health care 
expenditure. Most of the problems are very similar to other European countries, including 
challenges of cost-containment, perverse incentives, lack of efficiency, and quality of 
care. 
The following table provides a brief chronology of reforms since 1987 until today. The 
table highlights the year of the reform steps, a brief description of the reform, and the 
objectives that the reforms intended to achieve. 
Table 2.6: Chronology of health care reforms in Hungary 
Reform steps Aim of the reform 
1987 Experiment on DRG finance launched in 26 Performance-based reimbursement to 
hospitals increase efficiency 
1989 Private practice authorized Market liberalization 
1990 Switch from tax-based funding to compulsory To secure earmarked funding for health 
insurance care and to introduce a split between 
purchaser and providers 
The 1990 Local Government Act changed the Decentralization 
division of responsibilities between central 
government and local government. 
New system of consensus management in hospitals Increase efficiency 
introduced 
1991 Establishment of National Public Health Service Improve public health services 
(responsibility for local hygiene stations transferred 
from local governments) 
determine whether your insurance contribution should be paid to the current (state owned) health insurance 
fund or a private insurance fund, what you would choose? 
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1992 Social Insurance Fund separated into a Pension Increase transparency and accountability 
Fund and a Health Insurance Fund 
Parliament eliminates universal entitlement to Strengthening the insurance system healthcare and defines conditions for eligibility principles 
Insured people are entitled to freely choose their Enhance consumer choice family doctor. 
Family Physician Service is created and capitation- Strengthen primary care services based payment introduced. 
1993 Voluntary non-for profit, mutual health insurance Opening the supplementary health 
funds (supplementary insurance operated by non- insurance market. 
profit institutions) were authorized 
First election of members of Self-Governments of Expand electoral system to health care Social Insurance Fund with employer and employee administration 
representation 
Outpatients care remuneration based partly on a Performance-based finance system to fee-for-service scheme, and acute inpatient services increase efficiency 
reimbursed using DRG. 
1994 New National Health Promotion Strategy is adopted Improve the health of the nation 
by the government 
1995 Hospital capacity reduction program initiated Cost-containment 
1996 Act LXIII of 1996 on norms of hospital capacity Hospital capacity reduction, 18 000 beds 
(15% of bed capacity) were removed 
Decree No. 19/1996. (VII. 26. ) NM of the Minister Quality improvement 
of Welfare on the Minimum Standards of Certain 
Institutions Providing Health Services 
1997 The 1997 Health Act. Public health approach, strengthening 
patients rights 
The 1997 Health Insurance Act Redefine entitlement, and coverage policy 
1998 Abolition of the Health Insurance Self-government Improve efficiency of the administration 
Separated the Ministry of Social affairs and the Provide more attention to social affairs 
Ministry of Health 
1999 Pilot project on managed care launched Financing reform 
2000 Privatization of the practices of GPs Improving efficiency 
2001 New 10 year Health Promotion and Prevention Health promotion 
Program started. 
Hospital and outpatient centers privatization Allow hospitals to transform into public - 
utility companies 
2002 Depreciation costs gradually will be introduced, Improve management 
starting in primary care. 
Publication of the methodological guideline for Improving efficiency and value for money 
economic evaluations in Healthcare 
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2.4.2 Health status of the population 
Another key challenge in health policy-making in Hungary is the remaining need to 
improve the health of the population. The life expectancy gap between Hungary and 
Western Europe started to grow from the early 1960s. In many currently developed 
countries average life expectancy in 1930 was lower at birth than in Hungary, such as in 
Japan (44.8 years) or in Spain (48.4). At the age of forty, life expectancy in Japan was 
25.7 years, while it was 29.1 years in Hungary (Orosz, 1994). After the mid-1960s, life 
expectancy at birth stagnated and later deteriorated. These trends were similar for all 
former socialist countries (Velkova, 1997). Broadly speaking, the health status of the 
Central and Eastern European countries was similar to that of the population of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Preker, 1995). The probability of survival of a Hungarian 
men between age 3 5-65 was slightly worse in 1994 than in 1920 (Mortality Studies, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1996). The widening gap in life expectancy and 
mortality between East and West was particularly striking in middle-aged adults. In the 
communist countries, death rates for males aged 45-48 years increased, with 7 percent in 
the GDR, and 131 percent in Hungary between 1965-1989, while they decreased in the 
highly industrialized countries. The risk of death between 15-59 year old men in the late 
1980s was higher in Hungary than in Zimbabwe (Preker, 1995) Furthermore, the life 
expectancy of Gypsies in Hungary is estimated to be ten years less than the Hungarian 
average (Biro, 1996). In Hungary, women also showed increasing mortality rates during 
the last two decades (Watson, 1995), although these figures improved slightly from the 
late 1990s. 
2.4.3 Equity in health and health care in Hungary 
In addition to the improvement of the health status of the population, another important 
challenge is promoting greater equity in the Hungarian health care system. While equity 
has several important dimensions, it is only its geographical aspect about which detailed 
empirical evidence exists in Hungary. The reason for this is that the new provider finance 
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system requires the reporting of each treatment provided to individual patients. The 
permanent living area of patients is recorded in the National Health Insurance Fund's 
database and hence detailed utilization data can be calculated by geographical locations. 
On the other hand, social or economic characteristics of patients are not recorded. There 
is little evidence on social, and income-related inequalities in health or health care 
finance in particular. Consequently, there are beliefs about inequalities without hard data 
to support them. 
Data collection on social inequalities would be particularly important in the light of new 
legislations, such as the new Act on Health (Act CLIV of 1997 on Health) or the new 10- 
year health promotion programme (Decision of Parliament 46/2003. ). 
The new Act on Health requires the equal treatment of individuals with different social 
background characteristics: "Each patient shall have a right, within the frameworks 
provided for by law, to appropriate and continuously accessible health care justified by 
his health condition, without any discrimination... 
Healthcare shall be considered ftee from discrimination if, in the course of delivering 
healthcare services, patients are not discriminated against on grounds of their social 
status, political views, origin, nationality, religion, gender, sexual preferences, age, 
marital status, physical or mental disability, qualification or on any other grounds not 
related to their state of health. " 
Furthermore, the new health promotion programme published in 2003 (Decision of 
Parliament 46/2003. ) aims to achieve greater equity in terms of social inequalities in 
health status. 
Inequalities in health and health care by the income level of individuals is a particular 
concern. There is evidence to suggest that income inequalities have been growing during 
the transition period. Comparatively low income inequalities during the socialist era 
(especially the sixties and seventies) reflected a fairly high level of social security. 
During the transition, the poor disproportionately suffered. According to the EBRD 
Transition Report, income inequalities have been increasing, with a Grin coefficient 
increasing from 0.30 in 1992 to 0.34 in 1997 (EBRD 2001). Since, there is substantial 
evidence on that increasing socio-economic inequalities are reflected in increased 
inequalities in health status, it may be the case that inequalities in health status also 
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increased during the transitional period. An important implication for the Hungarian 
healthcare system is that there is an urgent need to measure (and tackle) income-related 
inequalities in health status, and in the finance and delivery of health care. 
50 
Chapter 3 
Literature review on concepts on equity in health and 
health care 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical basis for the analysis presented in 
the thesis. For this reason, the review of concepts on equity in health and health care 
focuses on literature linked to health economic approaches. Health economics literature, 
have applied general theories of justice to health care when discussing equity. This 
section provides a summary of these theories based on a literature review. The theoretical 
review is followed by the description of definitions and concepts of equity in health care. 
3.1 Distributive and procedural justice 
As Olsen (1996) argues, theories of justice can be distinguished according to that if they 
put emphasis on distributive or procedural issues. Distributive justice focuses on possible 
distributive outcomes in the society. Equity is discussed in terms of a state at a specific 
time independently from the process that can lead to this particular state. On the other 
hand, theories of procedural justice discuss that procedures themselves leading to certain 
distributive outcomes can be just or unjust independently from the nature of the particular 
outcome. 
The arguments of Nozick are based on discussing the way in which a certain situation is 
achieved. Nozick (1974), for example, defines a system of just acquisition. He argues that 
individuals are entitled to that what was acquired justly. This implies that the final 
distribution of goods and services among individuals is less important. Theories based on 
these arguments, therefore, necessarily lead to the conclusion that state intervention into 
distribution is incompatible with procedural justice. As a result, they support the idea of a 
minimal state. 
In summary, it can be said that theories based on distributive justice have more influence 
on applied science than those based on procedural justice. The reason for this is that the 
latter does not provide practical implications for current policy-making. The dominance 
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of distributive approaches, such as utilitarianism and egalitarianism, is clearly present 
despite the fact that they are often criticised for disconnecting from historical aspects of 
society. 
3.2 Utilitarianism 
Most probably utilitarianism has had the largest impact on social theories in economics 
for many decades. The routes of this theory can be found in the early 18th century and are 
associated with the names of Bentham and Mill. This theory is based on the assumption 
that human well-being depends on pleasure and pain and that these can be cardinally 
measured with the amount of "utils". The main principle of the theory is to reach the 
"greatest happiness of the greatest number". According to the utilitarian approach, 
optimal distribution of goods is determined by the efficiency criteria rather than equity 
considerations, suggesting that there is a trade-off between the two. Utilitarianism can be 
associated with those health policies which aim to maximize the health (or utilities gained 
from the improvement of health state) of a population. In priority setting, this aim can 
either be stated explicitly or implicitly through different priority setting tools. Such an 
explicit priority-setting tool is the application of QALY league tables in the delivery of 
health care. 
3.3 Rawls and Harsanyi 
Although utlitarianism has had a dominant role in economics, some alternative theories 
were developed about distributive issues. One of the most important examples was the A 
Theory of Justice by Rawls published in 1973 with the aim "to work out a theory of 
justice that represents an alternative to utilitarian thought generally and so to all of these 
different versions of it "(Rawls 1973). 
Rawls's theory of justice is grounded in the traditional concept of social contract 
developed by philosophers like Rousseau, Locke, and Kant. The theory of social contract 
is based on the idea of looking at how a group of individuals in a certain situation would 
create a future society, if they were to do so. The 'original position' that Rawls describes 
is, however, not based on a historic situation but takes place in a non-historic hypothetical 
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situation. The assumptions of this situation and the process how individuals under these 
conditions would create rules regulating a just future society will be introduced in this 
section. 
In the so-called 'original position' the participating individuals have very limited 
information about themselves, their positions and roles in the future society. 
According to Rawls the basic features of this hypothetical situation are as follows: 
"no one knows his place in society, class position, his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength.... ' And not even knows 'his 
conceptions of the good or his special psychological propensities... " Because of the lack 
of information, individuals have to create the main rules and basic arrangements of the 
future society under a very special situation that Rawls calls a situation "behind a veil of 
ignorance". 
These features of this hypothetical situation have at least the following three 
consequences: 
" no bias when creating the rules 
Because of the lack of information about their own circumstances, individuals are to 
disconnect from their own personal interests. 'None is able to design principles to favour 
his particular condition. ' The choices of individuals will reflect their pure belief of a just 
society. 
0 equal parties at creating the rules ('justice as fairness) 
In the original position every individuals relations to each others are 'symmetric' so - as 
Rawls argues that "this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral persons, that 
is as rational beings with their own ends and capable"'. This explains why 
Rawls 
sometimes refers to his theory as justice as fairness. 
" individuals have to face uncertainty 
Another important consequence of the lack of information in the "original position" that 
individuals have to face a high level of uncertainty. 
These consequences will all influence the individuals' preferences about the rules which 
would organise the common society in the 
future. Rawls argues that in the 'original 
position' the following two principles of 
justice would be chosen by individuals creating 
the rules: 
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First: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others". This principle requires equality in the 
assignment of basic rights and duties. Rawls also call them: 'primary goods'. 'Primary 
goods' are defined in a more general meaning and include not only income and wealth 
but also equal liberty, and the equality of opportunity. 
Second: 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are: 
(a) reasonable and are expected to be to everyone's advantage Inequalities are just only 
if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least 
advantaged members of society. This part also reflects the notion that individuals 
themselves who set up the rules wanted to avoid to get into the position of the worst-off 
(i. e. followed the maximin decision strategy). 
(b) 'attached to positions and offices open to all'. 
While the first principle is a more general one and can be found in many previous 
theories, the second one is more original, and made Rawls' theory famous. 
Rawls argues that both parts of the second principle ('everyone's advantage' and 'equally 
open to all') have two natural senses, therefore the principle has four possible meanings. 
'Equally open' can mean that careers are open to talents but also can mean that there is an 
equality of fair opportunity. The term ' everyone's advantage' can be based on the 
principle of efficiency (according to the Pareto criterion) or can be based on the so called 
'difference principle". According to the different interpretation of the terms, the second 
principle can have the following four meaning: 
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Table 3.1: The four interpretations of the second principle (Rawls, Theory of Justice, 
page 65) 
'Everyone's advantage' 
Equality as careers 
'Equally open to talents 
open 
Equality as equality of 
fair opportunity 
inciDle of of iciencv 
I 
Difference D: 
System of Natural Natural Aristocracy 
Liberty 
Liberal Equality Democratic Equality 
The famous Rawlsian 'difference principle' states that a change is just if and only if it 
results in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged 
members of society. This reflects that individuals in the original position follow a 
maximin decision strategy: they try to avoid their worst possible outcome. The 
'difference principle', therefore, reflects a strongly egalitarian conception: an equal 
distribution is to be preferred unless there is a distribution that makes both/all individuals 
better off. 
Another possible interpretation of Rawls' difference principle can be explained with the 
State Preference Theory. Individuals in the 'original position' are uncertain about that 
which individual they will be in future society. Simplifying the situation to a two- 
individual society we can say that there are two possible outcomes (states of world) in the 
future, i. e. becoming individual one (with a utility level one) or becoming individual two 
(with a utility level two). 
The utilitarian approach tries to maximise the total welfare in the society by simply 
adding together the utilities of all individuals. This so called Benthamite utilitarian social 
welfare function is not sensitive to the distribution of utility between individuals. As here 
risk means that individuals do not know which individual they will be in society we can 
also say that the utilitarian welfare function is not sensitive to the risk. However, in the 
Rawlsian case where individuals try to avoid the worst situation - whatever the risk is - 
social indifference curves shows an extremely high level of risk aversion. 
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Harsanyi developed an alternative approach to 'ethical preferences' in which he relaxes 
the strong Rawlsian assumption that individuals are extremely risk-averse. He assumed 
that people have equal probability of being any particular individual in society. 
If there are 'n' individuals in the society then this probability is equal to: 1/n. Harsanyi 
applied the standard utilitarian assumption that individuals (j) are rational and try to 
maximise their expected utility, which is: U (X)= 1/n u (Xi)+... +1/n u (Xn) 
The expected utility maximisation choices therefore take risks into account (as weights to 
the utility level) but the level of risk aversion is not extremely high here. In practice this 
means, that in order to get know the expected utility of an individual we have to find out 
the utilities that the individual associates with the different possible states, and weight 
these by the equal probabilities. It can be also seen that the equation above can involve a 
particular form of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function: W(X) =F [ul(X), .... 
, un(X)]. 
Finally, it can be said that through the relaxation of Rawls's egalitarian 
'difference principle' we can get to a formula which is very similar to a utilitarian social 
welfare function. 
Rawls did not apply his theory of justice to health care specifically but its implications 
can be discussed along the following questions. 
We may consider whether health care is a 'primary good' in the Rawlsian sense or not. 
As it was described, Rawls argued that individuals in the 'original position' would agree 
on providing an equal right to the most extensive liberty for everyone. This principle 
requires the equal access to what Rawls calls 'primary goods'. Although Rawls does not 
list health care as a 'primary good' but as it is obvious that health is an essential 
requirement for equal participation in the society, it should be regarded so. The question 
remains though what level of health care services can be called as primary. 
On the other hand it can also be considered how the 'difference principle' can be applied 
in the delivery of health care? An obvious interpretation of the 'difference principle' to 
the principles of health care delivery is that a health system should favour patients who 
are in the greatest need. A connecting problem is the difficulty of identifying patients in 
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the greatest need. The different interpretations of health need will be discussed later in 
this sections. 
3.4 Egalitarian versus libertarian approaches to health care 
Gillon (1994) gave a description about the application of different theories to health care. 
He distinguished libertarianism which emphasises natural rights and support the idea of 
minimal state, utilitarianism which tries to maximise the sum of individual utilities, 
Marxism which focuses on needs, and the principles of the Rawlsian justice. 
Williams (1994) however finds it practical to make a distinction between libertarian and 
egalitarian approaches (viewpoints) only. Libertarian approach considers health care as 
part of the society's "reward system" with a clear precedence being given to freedom 
over equality wherever the two conflict (Williams, 1994). Emphasis on "entitlement" 
(Nozick, 1974) and provision of minimum standards is also associated with the libertarian 
viewpoint. 
The egalitarian approach, by contrast, regards equality as an extension to the many of the 
freedom actually enjoyed by only the few (Williams, 1994). This viewpoint supports the 
idea of financing according to ability to pay and distribution of health care according to 
need. Table 3.2 gives a summary of different aspects of these viewpoints based on 
Williams (1997). 
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Table 3.2: Different aspects of the libertarian and egalitarian viewpoints on health care 
ASPECTS LIBERTARIAN EGALITARIAN 
Personal Unearned rewards undermine Economic failure does not mean 
responsibility moral well-being social worthlessness 
Social concern Social Darwinism dictates Social mechanisms are referable 
Freedom Freedom is supreme good in itself Freedom might be sacrificed in 
one in order to achieve greater 
freedom in some others 
Equality Equality before the law Equality of opportunity 
Demand Priorities are determined by own Priorities are determined by social 
willingness and ability to pay judgements about need 
Supply Profit motivates the suppliers Ethics is the appropriate 
motivation 
Adjustment Mechanism towards equilibrium Pressure on the providers to cost- 
mechanism effective use of resources 
Success Met demand from consumer side; Improvement in health status of 
criteria profit from provider side the population from the electorate 
side; 
cost-effectiveness from the 
provider side 
3.5 Different concepts and definitions of equity 
In the health economics literature, the principles and the measurement of equity in health 
care, in general, is discussed within the framework of the egalitarian approach, and 
include two main areas of the health care system: 
Q equity can be approached by examining how a health care system is financed, i. e. 
who are the people contributing more to it, and who are the ones contributing less; 
Q on the other hand, it can be also examined who benefits more than others from the 
delivery of health care (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 1993). 
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Equity itself also has two versions. By horizontal equity, it is usually meant that persons 
in equal situation should be treated the same. The vertical version of equity means that 
persons in unequal situation should be treated differently. A specific interpretation of the 
vertical version is the so called Aristotelian version. This principle suggests that people in 
unequal situation should be treated in proportion to the level of inequality. This 
Aristotelian definition, provides a useful tool for discussing health care inequalities in a 
resource limited environment. 
The two versions of equity can be examined in both the finance and the delivery of health 
care: 
Table 3.3 The versions of equity in the finance and delivery of health care services 
Finance Delivery 
Horizontal Egalitarian approach 
Vertical Egalitarian approach 
In practice, health economics literature is looking at the extent to which a health care 
system is egalitarian in the following sense: to what extent vertical equity is present in the 
finance of health care services and to what extent horizontal equity is achieved in the 
delivery of health care services. 
3.6 Equity in the finance of health care services 
Vertical equity in the finance of health care services can be looked at through the 
progressivity of the different finance methods. This measurement is based on the ratio of 
the individuals' payments for health care and their salary. A finance system is regarded 
progressive if the average ratio of payments for health care is increasing with people' 
income. This measurement reflects the Aristotelian version of vertical equity and means 
that even if individuals with higher income pay more for the health care system than 
individuals with lower income the finance system still can be proportional or even 
regressive. 
59 
In practice, health care expenditures are raised from four main type of revenues: 
" Out-of-pocket payments, 
" Private insurance premiums, 
" Social insurance contribution, and 
" General taxation. 
Out of pocket payments and private health premiums are thought to be the most 
regressive payment methods for health care as putting the relatively highest burden on 
low income individuals. Social insurance contributions are less regressive way of 
financing health care. The level of progressivity may even change with the level of 
people's income: it may happen for example that the finance system is progressive at the 
lower income deciles (i. e. by exempting individuals with the lowest income from 
payments such as the pensioners) and regressive at the higher income deciles (by 
introducing a ceiling on payments after a certain level of income). General taxation is 
thought to be the most progressive way of raising revenues for the health care system 
though the actual value of progressivity depends of the structure and weight of different 
types of taxes: for example income and property taxes are usually progressive while 
excise and value added taxes are regarded as regressive payments. 
3.7 Delivery of health care services 
The literature, discussing equity in health care delivery, usually applies the notions of 
utilization, needs for, and access to health care. However, the interpretations of these 
definitions are far from self-evident, and the principles and implications derived from 
them are highly controversial. Culyer and Wagstaff (1992) have reviewed the literature 
on the different interpretations of these terms. 
They argue that utilization of health care is often associated with access to health care 
which is inappropriate as all the further aspects of access to health care are not taken into 
account. First of all, there might be differences in the costs of access to health care which 
may occur when receiving the care. The costs of "entry" and the costs of treatment are 
clearly distinguished. Another interpretation of access can be the maximum attainable 
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consumption of health care services. Naturally, in the c... se of inequalities, the maximal 
feasible utilisation differs among individuals. The forgone utility interpretation of access 
is based on different valuations of income. This means that the poor values the utility 
from income much higher than the rich and therefore their costs of access to health care 
services are much higher. Hence their access will be less. 
Culyer and Wagstaff also show that the different interpretations of access can easily 
conflict. An obvious example for this is if access costs are equal for individuals with 
different income levels then - according to the forgone utility interpretation - access to 
services will still remain unequal (in favour of the rich). 
Culyer and Wagstaff also tried to identify all the possible definitions of health care needs 
and to show the relationships between the distributional consequences derived from the 
different possible definitions. Table 3.4 summarises the main definitions that were 
identified. 
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Table 3.4: Alternative definitions of health care needs and their illustration in the health 
production function 
Definition Explanation Problems Illustration 
Need as initial Identified with ill Irrespective of the 
health health: persons who ability to improve 
are more ill than health 
others have greater 
need 
Need as Expected capacity to Leaves unanswered 
capacity to benefit from the the question how 
benefit consumption of health much health care a 
resources person needs 
Need as Expenditure required Superior definition 
expenditures to effect the 
required to maximum possible 
exhaust health improvement 
capacity to (to reduce the 
benefit individual's capacity 
to benefit to zero) 
Need as initial health 
The first possible definition is identified with ill health, i. e. people who are more ill than 
others have greater need. In the health production function this can be illustrated as the 
initial health endowment. The main problem with this definition can be derived from the 
fact that there is no necessarily close relationship between the consumption of health care 
and the improvement in health status (for example in the case of a dread disease). People 
in greater need are not necessarily benefiting more from more consumption of 
health 
care. This definition therefore is irrespective of the ability to improve health. 
Need as capacity to benefit 
A more sophisticated definition is that defining need as the expected capacity to 
benefit 
from the consumption of health resources. This means that individuals who are more able 
to benefit from health care are considered as people with greater 
health needs. This 
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definition can be illustrated in the health production function as the difference between 
the maximum attainable health and the initial health. The main property of this 
interpretation of health care needs is that it takes into consideration the possible outcome 
of health care. However, it still leaves unanswered the crucial question how much health 
care a person needs. 
Need as expenditures required to exhaust capacity to benefit 
Another possible interpretation of the term 'need' can be the amount of expenditure 
required to effect the maximum possible health improvement, i. e. to reduce the 
individual's capacity to benefit to zero. The magnitude of the need here therefore can be 
illustrated in the health production function as the expenditure belonging to the maximum 
attainable health status. This definition of need is strongly connected with both (a) the 
individual's capacity to benefit from the consumption of health care, and the (b) 
expenditures required for that. These are the main reasons for that Culyer and Wagstaff 
regard this definition as the superior one. 
It is easy to see that all the above-mentioned definitions, because they are not including 
any normative consideration, will lead to allocations that are not Pareto optimal. 
Individual's preferences about choices between the consumption of health care and the 
consumption of other goods are not taken into account. Neglecting the fact, that the 
valuation of the benefits from the consumption of health care relative to the benefits from 
the consumption of other goods differs from person to person, will necessarily lead to a 
distribution which is not optimal in the Pareto sense. The above theories of resource 
allocation according to need are, therefore, extra-welfarist approaches. 
Need as expenditures a person ought to have 
Culyer and Wagstaff identified another definition of need, which is based on normative 
grounds. According to this definition health care need is the amount of health care that a 
person ought to have. To some extent this interpretation take into consideration that 
health care need is generated in a situation where individuals have to make choices 
between consumption of many other goods, services, and activities. But as Culyer and 
Wagstaff proves this normative assessment of need may be, in practice, incompatible 
with the technical sense of need. 
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3.8 Concepts about inequalities in health status 
Although there is a widespread agreement that inequalities in health are undesirable and 
health policy-makers have a responsibility to reduce them, there is still no clear 
agreement on how inequality in health should be defined. The WHO's influential World 
Health Report 2000, which measured health inequalities as variations in health between - 
ungrouped - individuals, provoked widespread criticisms from the health inequality 
research community. Wolfson and Rowe (2001) made a clear distinction between the 
"univariate" and "multivariate" type of definitions of inequalities in health. He associated 
the WHO's definition with the univariate approach, which is a concept that defines 
inequality as a property of a population. It assumes that each member of the population 
has an attribute (health) that is unidimensional and measurable on a cardinal scale. The 
multivariate approach, on the other hand, presents health as one among a number of 
relevant attributes of an individual. These dimensions can include income, gender, 
ethnicity, and education among others. Braveman et al. (2001) and Szwarcwald (2001) 
advocated the multidimensional approach to defining health inequalities. They argue that 
health inequalities correlated with social characteristics, such as wealth, education, 
occupation, racial or ethnic group, gender, rural or urban residence, and social conditions 
of places where people live and work are the morally important ones. Therefore, as 
Braveman et al (2001) argues, equity is the absence of systematic differences in health 
between social groups. 
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Chapter 4 
Literature review on methodology 
This chapter offers an overview of analytical tools used in the measurement of equity in 
health and health care. First, analytical tools for measuring vertical equity in the finance 
of health services will be introduced before discussing the tools for measuring horizontal 
equity in the delivery of health care. 
The aim of this chapter is to give an explanation for the key characteristics of the 
measurement tool, mainly using graphical interpretation of the concentration method. To 
avoid repetitions within the thesis, the mathematical presentation of the method is 
provided only in chapter 6. 
4.1 Measuring vertical equity in the finance of health care services 
The most widely used methods of the measurement of inequality in the finance of health 
care are the progressivity indices which are derived from concentration curves. Here, the 
Crini, Kakwani and Suits indices of progressivity will be discussed. 
In general, concentration curves and progressivity indices are used to measure the degree 
of certain types of inequalities. Inequalities can regard to several specific aspects, such as 
the inequality of health, the inequality of the provided health care, income level, or 
inequalities of taxes paid by people, etc. 
In examining vertical equity in the finance of health care specifically, the 
distribution of 
payments to the health system among people with different 
income levels is analysed. 
The question to address is that whether people with higher incomes 
(i. e. with greater 
ability to pay) contributing more to the 
finance of health care, and if yes then how much 
more are they paying. The relationship 
between people's ability to pay and their actual 
payments can be: 
Q progressive (those with higher income are paying more in proportional terms), 
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Q proportional (they are paying more in absolute terms, i. e. the same proportion of 
their income), 
Q regressive (they are paying less proportion of their income). 
Based on the income and tax concentration curves, progressivity indices try to identify 
the degree of progressivity in the finance of a health system. 
The main properties of them are that they are more sensitive to the distribution of income 
and taxes in the whole population than the tabulation methods are, and that they are more 
applicable in international comparisons. 
In order to introduce the Kakwani and Suits indices of progressivity, first, the Lorenz 
curve and the Grin coefficient need to be explained. To calculate the Grin coefficient, the 
Lorenz curve is needed to be identified as tools of measuring income inequalities. 
4.1.1 The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
The Lorenz curve, gy(p) is a function between the cumulative percentage of population 
and the cumulative percentage of the pre-tax income. Higher the inequalities in the 
income of the population, more convex the Lorenz curve is. The Lorenz curve can be 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
66 
Figure 4.1 The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
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Higher the level of inequality of income further is the Lorenz curve from the 45-degree 
line. More equal is the distribution of income in the population closer is the Lorenz curve 
to the 45-degree line. The area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line therefore 
represents the level of inequality. 
This area multiplied by two gives the value of the Gini coefficient: 
G =2 x (area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve) 
To sum up, while the Lorenz curve only illustrates the income inequality in the 
population the Gini coefficient is a concrete index giving the degree of inequality in 
income before taxes. 
The value of the Grin coefficient can vary between 0 and 1, higher the value of the Gini 
greater the inequality in income is. 
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One of the extreme cases is when the value of the Gini coefficient = 1. This means that 
there is a complete inequality in the society (only one person earns all the income). 
The other extreme case is when the value of the Gini = 0. This would mean that there is a 
complete equality, i. e. the income is equally distributed in the population. 
4.1.2 Kakwani's index of progressivity 
The Kakwani index measures how much a tax system deviates from the proportionality. 
The deviation can go towards two direction: progressivity and regressivity. The Kakwani 
index can be derived from the comparison of the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income with 
the tax concentration curve (gam (p)). If the tax system is progressive (i. e. the average tax 
rate increases with income) then the tax concentration curve lies outside the Lorenz 
curve, and if the tax system is regressive (i. e. the average tax rate decreases as the income 
increases) then the tax concentration curve lies inside the Lorenz curve. Finally, if the 
system is proportional then the two curves coincide. The tax concentration curve and the 
Lorenz curve are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The tax concentration curve and the Lorenz curve 
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The Kakwani index is based on the area between the two curves. The value of the 
Kakwani index is as follows: 
IIk=Ctax -Gpre 
Where C=2x (the area between the 45-degree line and g (p)) 
The value of the Kakwani index can vary between -2 and 1, higher the value of the index 
greater the progressivity of the tax system is. The positiveness or the negativeness of the 
value of the Kakwani index indicates that the system is progressive or regressive: 
Q ilk =0 indicates a proportional system 
Q ilk >0 indicates a progressive system 
Q Ilk< 0 indicates a regressive system 
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One of the extreme cases is when the value of the Kakwani index = 1. This is the case 
when the distribution of income is completely equal and only one person (i. e. the richest) 
pays all the taxes. 
The other extreme case is when the value of the Kakwani index = -2. This would mean 
that there is a complete inequality in the distribution of income (only one person has 
income), and at the same time only one person (the poorest) pays all the taxes. 
4.1.3 Suits index of progressivity 
While the Kakwani index is based on standard Lorenz and tax concentration curves the 
Suits index, by contrast, is based on 'relative concentration curves'. 
The relative concentration curve for pre-tax income[hh(y)] shows the cumulative 
proportion of pre-tax income against the cumulative proportion of pre-tax income. Thus 
coincides the 45-degree line (i. e. the Lorenz curve becomes the 45-degree line). The 
shows the cumulative proportion of relative concentration curve for tax payments[hta. 
pre-tax income against the cumulative proportion of tax payments. 
The Suits index can be derived from the comparison of the relative concentration curve 
for pre-tax income with the relative concentration curve for tax payments. If the tax 
system is progressive then the relative concentration curve for tax payments lies below 
the relative concentration curve for pre-tax income (i. e. the diagonal), and if the tax 
system is regressive then the relative concentration curve for tax payments lies above the 
relative concentration curve for pre-tax income (i. e. the diagonal). Finally, if the system is 
proportional then the two curves coincide. The Suits index which is based on the area 
between the two curves, measures how much a tax system deviates from the 
proportionality. The value of the Suits index can be calculated as follows: 
Its =2x (the area between the 45-degree line and the ht(y) curve) 
Where ht(y) is the tax concentration curve. 
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The value of the Suits index can vary between -1 and 1, higher the value of the index 
greater the progressivity of the tax system is. The positive or the negative value of the 
Kakwani index indicates that the system is progressive or regressive: 
Its =0 indicates a proportional system 
Its >0 indicates a progressive system 
Its <0 indicates a regressive system 
One of the extreme cases is when the value of the Suits index = 1. This is the case when 
the distribution of income is completely equal and only one person (i. e. the richest) pays 
all the taxes. 
The other extreme case is when the value of the Suits index = -1. This would mean that 
there is a complete inequality in the distribution of income (only one person has income), 
and at the same time only one person (the poorest) pays all the taxes. 
Although the Kakwani and the Suits indices are very similar in many respect there are 
some differences between them. While the Kakwani index is based on standard 
concentration curves the Suits index is based on 'relative' concentration curves. The 
possible values of the two indices are also slightly different. While the Kakwani index 
can take the lowest value of -2, the lowest possible value of the Suits index is -1. 
The interpretation of the values are very similar, however in certain cases the Kakwani 
and the Suits can give the opposite result. It is possible that in a system the level of 
progressivity change drastically with income. For example in systems where pensioners 
(usually with low income level) exempt from social insurance contributions. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that people whose income is above a ceiling also exempt from 
further contributions. This would modify a basically proportional tax system in two ways: 
the system becomes progressive in the low income tail, and becomes regressive in the 
upper income tail. 
Another difference of the two index of progressivity that the Suits index gives smaller 
values to those with lower income than the Kakwani index does. Because the two 
indices 
give different weights to groups of people with different income level, in cases when the 
concentration curves intersect the Kakwani and the Suits 
indices will show opposite 
implication about the regressivity of a tax/social insurance contribution system. 
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In conclusion, progressivity indices can be based on 'absolute' and 'relative' terms of 
concentration, giving basically the same implications. However, the choice between the 
use of the Suits or the Kakwani index might be crucial, as in certain cases they might give 
the opposite result. The choice about the applied index should depend on the aim of the 
research, i. e. if the purposes of the research require weighing the poor (lower income 
groups) more then the Kakwani index is suggested, or on the other hand if a research tries 
to give more weight to those with higher income then the Suits index suits better. 
Finally, in an analysis, it can be useful to include not only the progressivity indexes but 
also the tabulations of payments by income (or socio economic) groups. Although this 
tabulation method does not give a single measurement for inequalities, it can provide 
additional information about the pattern of inequality. 
4.2 Measuring horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care 
services 
This section discusses those methods that are suitable for measuring inequity in the 
delivery of health care. The literature discusses three main methods of measuring 
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care services: 
" Le Grand approach, 
" using statistical tools to test for any inequity, 
" using need-standardized health expenditure (or health care utilization) curves and 
concentration indices. 
4.2.1 Le Grand approach 
According to the Le Grand approach, the level of medical care received by an income 
group (or SEG, socio-economic group) should be compared to the share of 
health care 
needs of that particular income group (Wagstaff and 
Van Doorslaer 1993). This method 
reflects the Aristotalian approach 
to equity. 
Based on this idea, the illness concentration curve and the 
level of receipt of health care 
services (i. e. expenditure on those services) can 
be considered. Figure 3.3 illustrates a 
possible illness concentration and expenditure concentration 
curves. 
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Figure 3.3: Illness and expenditure concentration curves 
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Where G illness (p) is the illness concentration curve and G care (p) is the concentration 
curve of health care utilization. 
The figure can be interpreted in the following way. The above figure illustrates a case 
when there is inequality in the distribution of illnesses (favouring the rich) and inequality 
in the delivery of health care (favouring the poor). The level of inequalities is, however, 
different in the illustrated case as health care is not delivered in proportion of illness. 
The Le Grand index quantifies the relationship between illness concentration and the 
concentration of the delivery of health care: 
HIlg=Cexp - Cill. 
Where Cexp is the concentration index for health care utilization expressed as 
expenditures on health care, and C ill is the concentration index for ill health. 
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Any positive values indicate a system favouring the rich and any negative values 
indicates a system favouring the poor. The theoretical maximum value of the index is 2 
(the poorest person suffers from all the illnesses and the richest gets all health care) The 
theoretical minimum value is -2 (the richest person suffers from all the illnesses and the 
poorest gets all health care). 
The Le Grand index has a lot of merits as a single and comparable index of inequalities 
but the following problems are also associated with it. It can be shown that this index 
contains an inbuilt bias towards the detection of inequity favouring the rich, as a result of 
its implicit assumption that non-sick people do not receive care. This is a more serious 
problem if a health system is such that non-sick people still receive a lot of health care 
services. The other problem might be that the rich and the poor have different 
demographic characteristics which are reflected by the allocation of health care. Le Grand 
tried to get around this problem with using standardised values but Wagstaff et al (1993) 
found these attempts unreliable. 
4.2.2 Testing for inequalities 
Another approach is testing for inequalities (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 1993). This 
approach has the advantage that it uses simple regression analysis to test for inequalities 
and that the analysis can capture confounding variables (such as demographic 
characteristics). The disadvantage of this method is that it does not quantify the level of 
inequalities. 
A simple way of this method is looking at if the level of medical care received 
(dependent variable) is only determined by health status (and age) or also influenced by 
the income level. 
A regression equation for this could be formed as follows: 
M=ßo+ply +ß2H+ß3X+E 
where M: medical care received, Y: income, H: 
health status, X: age, and e: error term. In 
this case the zero value of ßl indicates the lack of inequality with regards to 
income. 
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This testing method can be further elaborated. For example, the interaction between age 
and income might be involved. A regression equation for this case could be formed, for 
example: 
M= ßo +ßiY+(32H+ß3X+ß4YX+E 
Where where M: medical care received, Y: income, H: health status, X: age, YX stands 
for the interaction term between age and income, and s: error term. In this case the zero 
value of ßl and 04 would indicate the lack of income-related inequality. 
Another method is to set up the above equations for different income categories (such as 
rich and poor or income quintiles by using dummy variables for them) and test whether 
the intercept terms (expected medical care of a non-sick) and the slope parameters differ 
across income groups. 
4.2.3 Need-predicted standardized health care utilization curves 
A kind of combination of the Le Grand method and the regression method is the 
calculation of standardized expenditure curves. This method calculates the health care 
utilization (as expressed in natural units or as health care expenditures) each income 
group would receive if they had the same demographic (age) and morbidity 
characteristics as the population as a whole. 
A concentration index can be calculated for this standardized concentration curve. The 
value of the index is positive when a system favours the rich (the curve lies below the 
diagonal) and negative when favouring the poor (the curve lies above the diagonal). 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer suggested calculating the health inequity index (HIwv) by 
comparing the need-predicted health care utilization level to the actual health care 
utilization level. Figure 4.4 presents a situation in which lower income individuals are in 
fact using more health care than higher income individuals with better health. However, 
the concentration of the actual utilization of health care services among lower income 
individuals is still lower than it should be if health care would be delivered in proportion 
to need. The Hiwv inequity index can be calculated as twice the area between the actual 
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and the need-predicted health care utilization curve. Its negative values indicate a health 
care delivery system that favours the poor; while positive values indicate a system that 
favours the rich. 
Figure 3.4: Actual versus need-predicted health care utilization 
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This method overcomes the limitation of the Le Grand method because it can account for 
demographic differences across income groups and it also can account for expenditures 
on medical care received by the non-sick. This method, which is used in the analysis of 
equity in the delivery of care in Hungary, is described in more details in chapter 6. 
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4.3 Measuring income-related inequity in health care status 
Despite the increasing need for information on inequalities in health status, there is a lack 
of consensus on how health inequalities should be best measured. 
Traditionally, simple indicators, such as the difference between (or proportion of) the 
health status of population sub-groups have been widely used. However, recently, there 
has been an increasing interest in indicators that capture inequalities of the overall 
population in a single index. Such health inequality indices can be especially convenient 
for use in comparative multi-country studies. 
Some researchers have argued that overall health inequality in itself is an important 
concern as it highlights the magnitude of differences in health status between individuals 
with different demographic, morbidity, social, and economic characteristics (for example, 
Murray et al. 1999, Gakidou et al 2000, Murray et al. 2000). Others believe that only 
those inequalities are important that are inequitable, i. e. those that are related to the social 
or economic status of the individual (for example, Kunst and Mackenbach 1993, 
Braveman et al. 2001). For health economists, a particular concern is the analysis of 
income-related inequalities in health status. 
The health concentration index method have become an increasingly popular approach, 
as it has been shown to be a valid measure of health inequalities, with additional 
possibility to decompose the overall index into components related to the social, and 
economic status of members of the population (Le Grand 1989, Wagstaff et al 1991, 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2002, Doorslaer and Jones 2003). 
The income-related health concentration index can be calculated in the same way as the 
concentration index for payments or health care utilization (Wagstaff et al 1991). 
Decomposition analysis can be performed to identify the extent to which different socio- 
economic factors contribute to income-related overall inequalities in health status 
(Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2002). The detailed methodology is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
Literature review on empirical evidence 
This chapter reviews the empirical evidence on income-related inequalities in health and 
equity in the finance and delivery of health care. Data presented in previous international 
studies can be relevant for the interpretation and comparison of the Hungarian results. 
5.1 Empirical evidence on equity in the finance of the health care 
The first comprehensive empirical study on equity in the finance and delivery of health 
care services was done by Doorslaer et al. (1993). This study covered ten OECD 
countries in the analysis. As discussed above, vertical equity in the finance of health care 
services can be looked at through the progressivity of the different finance methods. 
In all health care system, expenditures are raised from four main type of revenues: 
Q Out-of-pocket payments, 
Q Private insurance premiums, 
Q Social insurance contribution, and 
Q General taxation. 
According to the way of raising the bulk of their expenditures, Doorslaer et al. (1993) 
distinguished 3 groups of countries in their study: 
Q tax financed systems include Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK ; 
Q social insurance systems include France, the Netherlands and Spain; 
Q private systems, where private insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments 
exceed 50 percent, are the USA and Switzerland. 
D Italy is a country of mixed finance of taxes and social insurance. 
Doorslaer et al. reported Kakwani and Suits indeces with consistent results but here only 
the Kakwani indices are summarised below. 
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Figure 5.1 summarizes the Kakwani indices in the 10 OECD countries 
USA 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
France ý_] 
Italy 
Spain 
Denmark ý-ý 
UK 
Ireland 
Portugal - 011, 
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 
As Figure 5.1 shows, clear evidence has been found on the relationship between the way 
of raising revenues and the level of inequity in the finance of health care. 
Health care system based on out of pocket payments and private health premiums are the 
most regressive payment systems, putting relatively high burden on low income 
individuals. 
Countries with social insurance contributions have less regressive way of financing health 
care. While general taxation is the most progressive way of raising revenues. 
The final conclusion of Doorslaer et al. is that surprisingly few countries have 
progressive finance system, and even social insurance finance systems are regressive in 
terms of raising revenues. Detailed results from a series of further studies from using 
refined methodology have been reported extensively (1993,1997,1998,1999) and are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 International comparison of progressivity indices of payment methods 
Direct 
taxes 
Indirect 
taxes 
Social insurance Private 
payments 
Overall 
enmark 0.0624 -0.1126 N/A -0.2654 -0.0047 
Finland 0.1272 -0.0969 0.0937 -0.2419 0.0181 
France N/A N/A 0.1112 -0.3396 0.0012 
Germany 0.2488 -0.0922 -0.0977 -0.0963 -0.0452 
Ireland 0.2666 N/A 0.1263 -0.1472 N/A 
Italy 0.1554 -0.1135 0.1072 -0.0807 0.0413 
Netherlands 0.2003 -0.0885 -0.1286 -0.0377 -0.0703 
Portugal 0.218 -0.0347 0.1845 -0.2424 -0.0445 
Spain 0.2125 -0.1533 0.0615 -0.1801 0.0004 
Sweden 0.0529 -0.0827 0.01 -0.2402 -0.0158 
Switzerland 0.2055 -0.0722 0.0551 -0.3619 -0.1402 
0.2843 -0.1522 0.1867 -0.2229 0.051 
SA 0.2104 -0.0674 0.0181 -0.3874 -0.1303 
5.2 Empirical evidence on equity in the delivery of health care 
Doorslaer et al. were more inconclusive about the level of equity in the delivery of health 
care as the results were much more sensitive to the choice of the measurement method. 
Therefore, no clear conclusions could be drawn which health care delivery systems are 
more equitable. Here the country specific Le Grand indices are reported. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the Le Grand inequity indices in different countries 
USA 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Denmark 
UK 
Ireland 
Portugal 
The sensitivity of the inequity measurement results to the type of the indicator suggests 
that more research is needed to understand inequity in the delivery of health care. A more 
comprehensive measurement of health status or utilisation of health care, for example, 
might be helpful. 
Instead of drawing a valid conclusion about equity in the delivery of health care in the ten 
OECD countries, Doorslaer at al. made an attempt to summarize what are those 
incentives which contribute to the presence of inequity in a health care system. The 
impact of these anti-equity provider incentives were not, however quantified empirically. 
81 
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 
Table 5.2: Anti-equity provider incentives in 10 OECD countries 
AMBULATORY CARE INPATIENT CARE 
Denmark none none 
France GPs and specialists are Mixture of private and 
allowed to over-bill public services in hospitals 
Ireland Higher fees for private Fee-for-service payment for 
patients the privately insured 
Italy Fee-for-service for private Higher fees for private 
patients patients 
Netherlands Fee-for-service for private Higher fees for private 
patients patients 
Portugal Fee-for-service for private Fee-for-service for private 
patients patients 
Spain Fee-for-service for private Retrospective fee-for-service 
patients for private patients 
Switzerland Higher charges for 1st and 2n none 
class insurance cover 
UK Simultaneous employment of Simultaneous employment 
physicians at public and of physicians at public and 
private providers private providers; 
Fee-for-service for private 
patients 
USA Less reimbursement for Less reimbursement for 
Medicaid patients Medicaid patients 
To sum up, it can be said that regressive payment methods such as out-of-pocket 
payments, private insurance or social insurance system are responsible 
for inequity in the 
finance of health care services. In the provision of health care services, on the other 
hand, 
inequity can be derived from those incentives that are encouraging providers to 
differentiate between better-off and worse-off patients. These are most importantly the 
higher fees or higher reimbursement for private patients, fee-for-service payments for the 
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privately insured patients, mixture of private and public services in hospitals, and the 
possibility of over-billing by doctors. 
O'Donnell et al. (1991) measured the level of equity in the finance and delivery of health 
care in Britain based on the 1985 General Household Survey. The main methods and 
main findings of this study are summarized here. 
For measuring equity in the delivery of health care services the following data were used 
from the survey: 
" health care utilisation: GP, outpatient, accident, emergency, and inpatient care; 
" morbidity: restricted usual activities, chronic illness, subjective valuation of health 
status; 
" adjusted gross family income (i. e. equivalent income). 
The distribution of standardized expenditure on health care was analysed and 
concentration indices were reported. The key finding was that the distribution of 
standardized expenditure on NHS care was pro-poor. This was reflected by the negative 
value of the concentration index (-0.089 and -0.031). The concentration index regarding 
total health care (i. e. NHS and private) varied between -0.048 and 0.013 reflecting a more 
pro-rich pattern. The most recently published evidence on equity in health care delivery is 
summarised in Table 5.3. 
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5.3 Studies on income-related health inequalities measured by the concentration index method 
This section will introduce those empirical studies which looked at income related health 
inequalities and measured the level of inequalities with concentration curves and 
concentration indices. These results do not show directly the level of equity in the 
delivery of health care but they are important part of the measurement of equity and they 
have methodological implications as well. 
Doorslaer et aA (1997) published a study on the income related inequalities in health in 
nine countries. This study was based on the measurement of health by categorical 
variables. The applied methodology was, however, new in the sense that the analysis 
assumed that underlying the categorical health variable the variable of health has a 
standard lognormal distribution. The results showed that inequalities in health favour the 
rich in all countries (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Empirical evidence on income-related health inequalities in 9 OECD countries 
Health concentration index 
Finland -0.0566 
East Germany -0.0436 
West Germany -0.0571 
The Netherlands -0.0660 
Spain -0.0732 
Sweden -0.0347 
Switzerland -0.0696 
UK -0.1148 
USA -0.1360 
Gerdtham et aL (1999) reflected on the results of the above study but on the 
methodology that it used. Gerdtham et al. argued that it had not been empirically proved 
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that the level of health status with respect to income had a standard lognormal 
distribution. The validation of the Doorslaer et al. (1997) study was therefore needed. 
Gerdtham et al. validated the Doorslaer et al. study by using continuous and categorical 
health measures and by comparing the results of the different methods. Data were 
collected from a representative sample of 8000 people living in Uppsala County in 
Sweden. Health status was measured by three different tools: a self-assessed categorical 
measurement, which was one of the questions of the SF-36 generic quality of life 
questionnaire (and the authors refer to it as the Wagstaff-Doorslaer, WvD's method), 
rating scale method, which was a visual analog scale with anchors of death at 0 and full 
health at 100, (continuous variable), and a TTO question asking about the length of time 
in full health which would be equivalent to 20 years in actual current health state 
(continuous variable). 
By using these measurement tools, the health concentration indices were calculated to be 
-0.1166, -0.0987, and -0.1285 respectively. The hypothesis of no difference between the 
concentration indices based on continuous and the categorical health measurements could 
not be rejected on 90% confidence level and therefore the Doorslaer et al. study results 
have been validated. 
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2000) calculated income-related health concentration 
indices for Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). The concentration index values for 
QALYs were significantly lower that those reported for continuous measures of health by 
Gerdtham (1999). 
Wagstaff (1999) recently conducted another World Bank study on the inequalities in 
health in nine developing countries. Infant and under-5 mortality was examined with 
respect to the economic status of the family. Data were taken from the Living Standards 
and Measurement Study and the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey. The 
economic status of the family was measured by the consumption of the family. Data on 
consumption included consumption of food, housing, non-food items, and the rental 
value of the household's home and other durables. Concentration indices of mortality 
resulted in negative values in all countries showing inequalities across socioeconomic 
groups of the society. The inequality was larger in the case of under-5 mortality than in 
the case of infant mortality. The author also tried to find the causes of inequalities in 
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mortality with the example of the Philippines. The results showed that consumption was 
the largest contributory factor to mortality inequalities but inequalities in mother's 
education and inequalities in sanitation were also important. On the other hand, 
inequalities in water and access to medical care contributed only to a very small part to 
the overall inequality in mortality. 
From methodological aspect, this study by Wagstaff went beyond the simple application 
of concentration curves and concentration indices. It used concentration curve deviations 
diagrams and Hasse diagrams to illustrate the differences in inequalities in mortality 
between countries. It applied Weibull model to specify the causes of inequalities in 
mortality. Finally, it emphasised the importance of statistical significance of differences 
between concentration curves and indices. 
5.4 An empirical study on the progressivity of income taxes in 
Hungary 
To calculate equity in the finance of health care, the progressivity of payments for health 
care should be calculated. In Hungary, health care is mainly financed by social insurance 
contributions. However, a proportion of funds are raised from general taxation. To get a 
full picture of the overall progressivity of the finance of health care, therefore, the 
progressivity of all tax types should be known, such as income taxes, indirect taxes etc. In 
Hungary, there is no empirical study available on the progressivity of the overall tax 
system. A study by Toth (1997), however, examined the progressivity of the income 
taxation. 
The study used the data of the Hungarian Tax Authority. The overall tax rate is based on 
three components: 
Q income including salary, transfers, and other type of incomes, 
Q separately taxable incomes (such as income from capital), 
Q tax allowances. 
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Based on these data, the distribution of tax burden in the society and the tax concentration 
index was calculated. The results showed that the Hungarian tax system is regressive at 
the very low income level and progressive in the rest of income levels. The initial 
regressive pattern is due to the use of two separate tax tables (one is for people with only 
salary and the other is for people with salary and other incomes). As Toth argues people 
with the lowest incomes are facing a very high effective tax rate because the proportion 
of people among them who has non-salary income is high. 
The overall tax concentration index in 1996 was calculated to be 0.7072. This value was 
slightly larger than the tax concentration index in 1994 with a value of 0.6772. Toth also 
reported the level of the concentration of pre tax incomes. The Gini-coefficient was 0.53 
in 1996 and 0.49 in 1994. 
Toth did not report the Kakwani index of tax progressivity but it can be easily calculated 
given the tax concentration indices and the Grin-coefficients. Subtracting the two from 
eachother, the Kakwani index gets a value of 0.1772 for the year 1996 and 0.1872 for 
1994. These positive values reflects a progressive income tax system, the progressivity of 
which has slightly decreased between 1994 and 1996. 
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PART III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 
HUNGARY 
Chapter 6 
Surveys, data, instruments, and analysis 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the detailed methods and data used in this research. 
Information of the surveys, including survey characteristics, information on variables, 
instruments, and analytical tools are presented in detail. 
6.1 Surveys used in the analysis 
As Chapter 1 discussed, the objective of this research was to comprehensively analyse 
equity in three major aspects of health and health care in Hungary: income-related 
inequalities in health status and equity in the finance and delivery of health care. To 
address all these three areas, there was no single data source available that could have 
been suitable for analysis multiple data sources had to be used. 
Five surveys were used in this study. Two of these surveys, the Hungarian Household 
Budget Panel and the National Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey, formed the core 
basis of the analysis, while the others played a supplementary role. These surveys and 
their role in addressing the various research questions are summarised in table 6.1. It has 
to be noted that several additional data sources were also used in the estimation of results. 
Additional data sources included surveys, macro finance data, data in published literature, 
and other types of information sources. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of main surveys used in the analyses 
Name Research area Subjects Year 
Survey 1 Hungarian Household Equity in finance 9640 households 1998 
Budget Panel 
Survey 2 Informal Payments Equity in finance 1392 adults and their 1999 
Survey (TARKI 1999/2 household from the non- 
Omnibusz) institutionalised population 
Survey 3 National Health Inequalities in health 5503 adults from the non- 2000 
Monitoring OLEF2000 status, institutionalised population 
Survey 
Equity in delivery of 
health care 
Survey 4 Inequality aversion Professionals' 43 health care decision- 2001 
survey - decision- preferences makers 
makers concerning health 
inequalities 
Survey 5 Inequality aversion Professionals' 72 young physicians 2001 
survey - physicians preferences (equivalent to senior house 
concerning health officer level) 
inequalities 
The Hungarian Household Budget Panel database (Survey 1) is produced by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The Informal Payment Survey (Survey 2) has been 
conducted by the TARKI institute. The National Health Monitoring OLEF 2000 Survey 
(Survey 3) was organised by the Ministry of Health of Hungary. I had an agreement with 
the Ministry of Health that I contribute to the planning and analysis of health-related 
quality of life and economic aspects of the survey as part of the thesis work. Survey 4 
and 5 were organised by myself. The questionnaire used was a modified version of an 
inequality aversion instrument developed by Shaw et al (1999). 
6.2 Description of data and instruments 
Data sources used in the three main parts of the analysis are described in detail in this 
section. The description of data sources is structured into three sections. The first section 
describes data sources related to the analysis of equity in the finance of health care, 
including the Hungarian Household Budget Panel and the Informal Payments surveys. 
The second section describes the National Health Monitoring survey, which was used for 
the analysis of inequalities in health status and equity in the delivery of health care. The 
final section introduces the inequality aversions surveys. 
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6.2.1 Equity in the finance of health care 
Data for the analysis of equity in the finance of health care came from two major types of 
sources: 
> Concentration of payments was calculated by using the Hungarian Household 
Budget Survey (Survey 1) and the Informal Payments Survey (Survey 2); 
> While revenue shares of different finance methods were identified by using macro 
finance data with the exception of informal payments, which were estimated from 
survey data. 
Micro data to identify concentration of payments 
The calculation of progressivity indices was based on the Hungarian Household Budget 
Panel (Survey 1) and the Informal Payments Survey (Survey 2). This section describes 
both databases and the relevant variables. 
The Hungarian Household Budget Panel 
The history of the Hungarian Household Budget Survey goes back to as early as 1949 
when the Central Statistical Office organised the first survey to gain information about 
the consumption characteristics of the population. The survey has been run in every 
second year and on an annual basis from 1993. The Central Statistical Office has 
published a detailed description of methods used (KSH, 1997). 
The Hungarian Household Budget Survey involves 9640 households with over 26000 
individuals living at 260 locations (towns or villages) covering 1608 census districts. The 
sample is selected from the census register. The basis of sampling is the address of 
flat/house, while the basis of observation is the household. The house and the household 
are almost identical because, normally, one household lives under an address in Hungary. 
The sample is layered for the type of residence in terms of number of inhabitants. The 
sampling procedure consists of the following steps. In the case of towns or villages with 
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over 15,000 inhabitants, the basis for primary selection is the census district and the basis 
for secondary selection is the flat/house. In the case of towns or villages with between 
10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants, the basis for primary selection is the town/village, the basis 
for secondary selection is the census district and the basis for tertiary selection is the 
flat/house. In the case of towns or villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants, the basis for 
primary selection is the town/village and the basis for secondary selection is the 
flat/house. The selection rates for the various types of residences are inversely 
proportional to the size of the location. In the capital (Budapest), the selection rate is 0.5 
times of the selection rate applied in small locations with less than 10,000 inhabitants. 
This ratio is 0.6 and 0.8 in the case of locations with more than 50,000 and 10,000 
inhabitants, respectively. Six addresses are selected from each census district. This 
sampling procedure ensures that the probability of that a household is selected into the 
sample is equal across locations with different number of inhabitants. An annual rate of 
1/3 is used for sample rotation to decrease burden on households in the sample and to 
avoid loss in follow-up. 
Weighting based on residence type and demographic characteristics is used to provide 
representative sample for the total population. Weighting does not include correction for 
income characteristics, and the Central Statistical Office argues that higher income 
households are under-represented in the sample. The reason for not weighting for income 
characteristics is that the Central Statistical Office has not developed a method to perform 
the corrections (Central Statistical Office, 1997). 
Income and expenditure data are collected on a mixture of personal and household level 
basis and data collection is based on both the monthly diary and the annual interview. 
Income variable 
In the Household Budget Panel Survey, the collection of information on income is based 
on enquiries from each person living in the household. Questions on income cover 34 
types of income categories. These include gross salary; benefits provided by the employer 
(such as pension insurance; holiday benefits, company car, etc. ); income from properties; 
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transfers; among other types of income sources. Table 6.2 summarises the complete list 
of income sources that are included in the Household Budget Panel Survey. 
Table 6.2: Income sources included in the Household Budget Panel Survey 
Type of income source 
1. GROSS INCOME FROM FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT 
2. COMPENSATION AT TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
3. LIFE AND PENSION INSURANCE PREMIUM PAID BY THE EMPLOYER 
4. INCOME FROM PART-TIME JOB 
5. INCOME FROM SELF-ENTERPRISE ACTIVITY 
INCOME FROM CORPORATE ACTIVITIES: 
6. - CORPORATE LEGAL ENTITY - SALARY 
7. - CORPORATE LEGAL ENTITY - DIVISION 
8. - CORPORATE BUT NOT LEGAL ENTITY - SALARY 9. - CORPORATE BUT NOT LEGAL ENTITY - DIVISION 
REIMBURSED EXPENSES 
10. - FOOD 
11. - CLOTHES 
12. - CAR 
13. - HOLIDAYS 
14. - ACCOMMODATION 
15. - PERSONAL COSTS 
16. - TUITION FEES 
17. - OTHER 
18. INCOME FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 
19. TIPS, INFORMAL PAYMENTS 
20. INCOME FROM OCCASIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
21. INCOME FROM PRIVATE PROPERTIES 
22. INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES 
23. PENSION 
24. REGULAR SOCIAL BENEFIT 
25. NON-REGULAR SOCIAL BENEFIT 
26. MATERNITY BENEFIT 
27. SCHOLARSHIP 
28. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
29. CARE-GIVER/NURSING BENEFIT 
30. HISTORICAL COMPENSATION-RELATED BENEFIT 
31. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
INCOME FROM ABROAD 
32. -SALARY 
33. - SOCIAL BENEFIT 
34. - OTHER 
For the purpose of the calculation of concentration indices, employment-related income 
was calculated as gross-gross income. Social insurance contributions (both those paid by 
the employer and the employee) were added to the income based on official payment 
rules in 1999. This calculation method - in accordance with the methodology of the 
ECuity project - is based on the assumption that the burden of all insurance contributions 
falls on the employee, independently whether the employer or the employee pays it. The 
payment rules for health insurance contributions are summarised in Table 6.3 
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Table 6.3: Payment rules for health insurance contributions in 1999 
Component of contribution Payment rule 
Income-related contribution paid by the 11% of gross salary 
employer 
Income-related contribution paid by the 3% of gross salary; ceiling6 for salaries 
employee above annual 1.9 million HUF7 
Fix component (EHO) paid by the 3600 HUF per month 
employer 
In addition to health insurance, there are social insurance contributions to pension and 
unemployment funds. These were also added when calculating the gross-gross income. 
In the ranking of the population according to income as well as for the calculation of 
concentration indices, equivalent income was calculated. In base-case, the analysis used 
the latest formula recommended by the OECD, which was also used in the ECuity 
project. This formula uses 0.5 as weight for additional household members. The 
calculation of the equivalent income was based on the following formula: 
EQUIVALENT INCOME = INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD / NUMBER OF MEMBERS°5 
In addition to base case analysis, results were calculated for the scenarios when the 
equivalence weight was defined as 0.73 and 1. The objective of the sensitivity analysis on 
income equivalence weight was to test how the value of the concentration index changes 
when different equivalence weights are used. This analysis enables the comparison of 
results with those studies that used different equivalence weights. 
Payments for health care 
This section describes the calculation of payments for health care made by the 
households. Payments include direct as well as indirect payments for health care, such as: 
¢ Income tax 
¢ Health insurance contributions 
¢ Indirect taxes 
Out-of-pocket payments 
6 This ceiling has been removed after year 2000. 
7 GBP I is equal to around HUF 400. 
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Income taxation 
Income taxes were imputed by using the official personal income tax rules for all 
components of income earned by household members. As there is no family taxation in 
Hungary, personal income taxes were calculated for each member of the family and were 
then added up to gain total income tax paid by the household. It was assumed that each 
individual fully followed the taxation rules. For example, if someone was eligible for a 
particular tax allowance based on family or economic status (such as tax allowance after 
children) then the tax allowance was incorporated into the calculation of the income tax. 
Health insurance contributions 
Health insurance contributions have been calculated for each member of the household. 
Different rules for paying contributions after different types of incomes (by people of 
different status) have been taken into account. Again, the calculation assumed that 
employers correctly paid relevant health insurance contributions according to the official 
regulations. 
Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes paid by households have been calculated by using data on household 
consumption. There were 384 goods and services used in the analysis that are recorded in 
the Hungarian Household Budget Panel survey. Value-added taxes and excise taxes were 
calculated for each good and service purchased by the household in order to quantify the 
indirect taxes maid by the household. Value-added taxes and excise taxes paid were 
calculated by multiplying the relevant tax rates with the relevant consumption variables. 
Value added tax and excise tax rates differ depending on the nature of the goods and 
services consumed. The relevant tax rate was identified for all goods and services. 
Out-of-pocket payments 
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Out-of-pocket payments for health care were also recorded in the household expenditure 
diary. These fell into three categories: 
¢ Drugs 
> Medical devices 
¢ Private health care services 
As there are no value-added taxes on medications in Hungary, there was no problem of 
double counting out-of-pocket payments both among indirect taxes and direct payments. 
Payments for private health insurance has been excluded from the analysis, due to their 
almost non-existence in Hungary. 
Although the Household Budget Panel Survey includes a question about the informal 
payments made when using public health care services, this variable was not used in the 
final analysis. The reason for this is that the estimation of informal payments needs a 
special research approach. The Household Budget Panel Survey underestimates the level 
of informal payments due to its simplistic questioning approach on the complex issue of 
informal payments. For this reason, data on informal payments were used based on 
another survey, called the Informal Payments Survey (Survey 2). 
The Informal Payments Survey 
The Informal Payments Survey has been performed along the Omnibusz 1999 (no 2) 
Survey conducted by the Social Research Informatics Center. This survey is known to be 
the first large-scale survey on informal payments in Hungary. 
The Household Budget Panel Survey also includes a question on the amount of informal 
payments that the household make. This question directly asks about the total amount of 
informal payments. In contrast, the Informal Payments Survey contains detailed questions 
to identify cash and in-kind informal payments at GP, outpatient and inpatient services 
made both to physicians and to other staff. 
The Informal Payments Survey is based on a representative sample of 1392 non- 
institutionalised adults. The sample was taken in two steps: first a sample of 
cities/villages was taken and then addresses were selected. The database was weighted for 
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age, gender, and education level. Although the basis for the sample was that of the 
individual, questions included items on income and informal payments made by the rest 
of the members of the household. 
Income variable 
There were two questions about income in the Informal Payments Survey. The first 
question asked about the net monthly income of the respondent. The second question 
directly asked about the monthly, total, net income of the household. 
The total monthly net household income was the basis for ranking the population by 
income level. Net income means the income after income taxation and after receipt of any 
transfers. Similarly to the case of the Household Budget Panel survey, equivalent income 
was calculated with equivalence weight of 0.5 in base-case analysis. 
Informal payments 
Respondents were asked to identify their actual informal payments that they paid when 
they visited their GP, an outpatient physician, or received a treatment at a hospital. 
Different components of informal payments, such as money or in-kind payments to the 
physicians and payments to the nurses were separately asked and then added up. The 
structure of the questions on informal payments is illustrated in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Summary of questions on informal payments used in the Informal Payments 
Survey 
Health care service level 
General practitioner 
WMWý 
Outpatient specialist Inpatient care 
Did you give informal payment to Did you give informal payment to Did you give informal payment to 
your GP? And if so then how much your physician? And if so then how your physician? And if so then how 
money did you give? much money did you give? much money did you give? 
Did you give a present or did you Did you give a present or did you Did you give a present or did you 
offer other type of support to your offer other type of support to your offer other type of support to your 
GP? And if so then what was the physician? And if so then what was physician? And if so then what was 
value of the present/other support in the value of the present/other the value of the present/other 
monetary terms? support in monetary terms? support in monetary terms? 
Did you give informal payment to Did you give informal payment to Did you give informal payment to 
your nurse? And if so then how medical staff other than your physicians at other departments 
much money did you give? physicians? And if so then how than the one where you stayed? And 
much money did you give? if so then how much money did you 
give? 
Did you give a present or did you Did you give a present or did you Did you give a present or did you 
offer other type of support to your offer other type of support to offer other type of support to your 
nurse? And if so then what was the medical staff other than your physicians at other departments 
value of the present/other support in physicians? And if so then what than the one where you stayed? And 
monetary terms? was the value of the present/other if so then what was the value of the 
support in monetary terms? present/other support in monetary 
terms? 
Did you give informal payment to 
your nurse? And if so then how 
much money did you give? 
Did you give a present or did you 
offer other type of support to your 
nurse? And if so then what was the 
value of the present/other support in 
monetary terms? 
The survey asked the same questions from a second household member if there was 
anyone else in the household who visited a physician in the past year. If there were more 
than one household members who needed medical help then the respondent had to 
describe only that member about whom he or she had more information. There was no 
possibility in the survey to include more than one additional household member. The 
survey, therefore, underestimated the total informal payments made by the household in 
those cases when there were more than two people seeking medical care between January 
1998 and January 1999. 
Macro finance data to identify revenue shares 
Although the Hungarian health care system is operated mainly on the basis of a 
compulsory social health insurance system, funding for health care is raised from more 
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than one source. In addition to the national health insurance system, an important 
proportion of funding comes from general tax revenues. Supplementary out-of-pocket 
payments consist of patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals, informal payments, and 
payments for private medical care. 
Multiple data sources were used to identify the relative share of each type of source in 
total health care revenues. Macro finance data sources were used to calculate the revenue 
shares. The only exceptions were informal payments and payments for private medical 
care. These were estimated from survey data. 
Sources of macro finance data and calculation methods are summarised in Table 5.5. As 
shown in the table, revenues raised through different sources are highlighted along three 
main groups: those raised through general taxation; those raised through the compulsory 
health insurance system; and those that are out-of-pocket payments. All macro finance 
data relate to the year of 1999. 
Research assumptions and limitations in data 
Although the analysis of equity in the finance of health care in Hungary intended to be as 
comprehensive as possible, there were some limitations in data. The following section 
describes those areas where assumptions and research decision had to be made due to 
imperfect data. 
Year of data 
The analysis of equity in the finance of health care related to the year of 1999. A 
particular difficulty for the analysis was that the Household Budget Panel survey 
(Survey 
1) database involved data from year 1998 while the Informal Payments Survey (Survey 2) 
involved data from 1999. The reason for this problem was that at the time of the analysis 
the Household Budget Panel survey, the new database for 1999 had not had come out yet. 
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It was important to perform the analysis for the year 1999 because relevant changes were 
introduced in the social health insurance payment rules. The fix component of the health 
insurance contribution has increased substantially. This development was believed to 
contribute to a shift towards a more regressive finance system. 
As a solution, both income and payments have been transformed from 1998 values to 
1999 values by using consumer price indices as reported by the Central Statistical Office 
in Hungary (KSH 2000). Health care specific price indices have been used to calculate 
1999 values for health care expenditures. 
Although this procedure could lead to some distortions in data, there is no reason to 
believe that it had a major impact on the validity of results. The inflation rates were 
generally low for year 1998/99. 
Finally, the objectives of this dissertation did not include the analysis of changes in equity 
in finance of health care over a time period. The key objective was to perform a cross- 
sectional analysis in order to set up base-line data for Hungary. Therefore, results were 
calculated for year 1999 only. 
Measurement of income 
The questions on income differed between Survey 1 and Survey 2. While the Household 
Budget Survey included separate questions on a large number of potential income 
sources, the Informal Payments directly asked about the total income. In addition, in the 
Household Budget Survey gross-gross income was used while in the Informal Payments 
Survey used net income. 
Although, individual households might be ranked differently when using the two survey 
methods, there is no reason to believe that differences in ranking would be systematic in 
nature. This is supported by the findings that the Gini-coefficients were exactly the same 
(i. e. 0.36) for both databases in base-case analysis (see Chapter 6). 
The under-representation of high income households 
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A more important limitation of the analysis is that high-income households are likely to 
be underestimated in the surveys. While it is believed that the willingness to participate in 
surveys are substantially lower for high-income households, there is no evidence on the 
exact pattern of refusal rate and there is no formula developed to correct the sample by 
weighting. Due to their absence from the sample, the characteristics of refusing 
households are not well known. 
The choice of income equivalence weight 
Theoretically, income equivalence weights should be carefully selected based on the 
consumption pattern of the households in a country of question. In practice, there is no 
empirical evidence on the equivalence weight that would best reflect the household 
consumption pattern in Hungary. For practical reasons, the equivalence weight of 0.5 was 
chosen for base-case analysis to allow for direct comparison with the results of the 
ECquity project. However, "sensitivity analyses" were performed on other equivalence 
weights to test the impact of the choice on final results. 
In the case of the analysis of equity in the finance of health care, similarly to the 
calculation of equivalent income, equivalent payments have been calculated by using the 
same equivalence weights. 
"Allocation" of burden of payments for health care 
According to the methodology of the ECuity project by Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1997), it 
was assumed that the burden of all direct payments, direct and indirect taxes, and all 
health insurance contributions paid by either the employer or the employee fall on the 
household. 
Although Doorslaer and Wagstaff recommended calculating the burden of corporate 
income taxes as those falling on the owners of companies, this item was excluded from 
this research. The Hungarian Household Budget Panel database did not allow for 
identifying owners of companies and corporate taxes paid by them. This was due to the 
102 
complex ownership situation, large involvement of foreign owners, and lack of relevant 
data. Corporate income taxes account for about 18% of total central budget revenues, 
which corresponds to a 4.2% share in the finance of health care. Base-case analysis 
assumed that central revenues came only from personal income taxation (29.2%), VAT 
(47.6%), and excise taxes (23.2%). Corporate income taxes and some smaller revenue 
items were excluded from detailed analyses. This method implicitly assumed that their 
burden was distributed among the population as those of the included main taxes. As 
corporate income taxes are believed to be one of the most progressive taxes, their 
omission from the analysis underestimates the actual level of progressivity of total 
payments for health care. 
Assumption on perfect tax paying scenario 
The data analysis method explicitly assumed that all individuals in the sample as well as 
their employers did follow the official tax regulations. In the real world, however, official 
tax regulations are not always fully followed. There is a decreasing but still relevant black 
or grey economy in Hungary. It is known that unofficial economy involves high income 
as well as low-income individuals. However, there is no evidence on whether there is a 
systematic relationship between the level of income and the probability of being involved 
in unofficial economy. Therefore, it cannot be estimated how the presence of unofficial 
economy influence the validity of the study findings. 
6.3.2 Inequalities in health status and equity in the delivery of health 
care: the National Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey 
The objective of the National Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey (Survey 3) was to 
increase the understanding of the current health status of the Hungarian adult population. 
The survey was conducted in the last quarter of year 2000. As compared to the traditional 
way of generating health or morbidity 
data, the key novelty of this survey was that it 
included a number of new self-assessed health status questions, as well as questions on 
demographic and socio-economic background information. This section describes the 
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main characteristics of the survey, before introducing the details of variables used to 
measure income, health status, and utilisation of health care. 
Main characteristics of the survey 
The sample was based on 7000 randomly selected adults from the electoral registry of 
Hungary. Sample size was identified on the basis of a sample size calculation to 
determine a sample size that allows the detection of diseases with prevalence level of 
minimum 5%. Sampling included the selection of 440 locations (including towns and 
villages) before the selection of 7000 individuals. The sample was representative with 
respect to the type of living area. All counties of Hungary were represented in the sample. 
12.5% of selected people could not be found at the given address. No substitution was 
made for these individuals. 1.4% was not able to respond. 7.5 % refused to take part in 
the survey. Therefore, the overall participation rate was 78.6% with a total number of 
5533 respondents. An additional 30 individuals refused to sign a form that contained their 
agreement of allowing to use their data for public health purposes. The final database 
included data from 5503 individuals. 
55.2% of the sample population was female. 38% belonged to age group 18-39 (51% 
female), 36% belonged to age group 40-59 (54% female), and 26% belonged to age 
group over 60 (62% female). 
The final sample well represented the Hungarian population with respect to demographic, 
gender, and living area characteristics. To correct the slight deviations from the 
population characteristics, the sample was weighted for age, gender, and living area 
characteristics. 
The response rate to individual questions was generally high. The response rate to the 
key 
health status variable, i. e. health-related quality of life measured by the EQ-5D 
instrument was close to 100%. The response rate to the five dimension questions varied 
between 96 and 98%. The response rate to the visual analogue scale question was 97%. 
The response rate to the income question was 88%. The educational and occupational 
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characteristics of those individuals who refused to answer the income question differed 
from those who answered the questions. Differences of characteristics favoured the non- 
respondent group. The sample was not corrected for income response rate, as there was 
no sufficient information available on the income characteristics of non-respondents to 
develop a weighting formula. Therefore, higher income individuals were more than likely 
to be underrepresented in the final sample. 
In the analysis of concentration indices was performed on a sub-sample of 4464 
individuals with complete income and EQ-5D data. 
The survey included two main parts with respect to the questionnaire administration 
method: 
> There was a personal interview that covered most of the health and socio- 
economic background questions. 
> The interview was supplemented with an additional questionnaire that was self- 
administered but interviewer attended. The interviewers asked the respondents to 
fill in a short questionnaire during their presence by allowing for break of the 
interview. The self-administered questionnaire involved some specific health 
status questions including the EQ-5D instrument followed by questions with 
psychiatric, sexual, and suicidal content. 
Income variable 
One direct question was asked about the net monthly household income: 
"Please estimate what is the total monthly net income of individuals living in your 
household, i. e. how much is the money that is available for the household in a 
month? " 
This question was included in the interviewer-administered part of the survey. The net 
monthly income was transformed to equivalent income by using 0.5 as equivalence 
weight in base case analysis. Similarly to the analysis of equity in the finance of health 
care, 0.5 was used as equivalence weight in base-case analysis8. Sensitivity analysis was 
8 Equivalent income = Household income / N°'S where N is the number of household 
members. 
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performed on equivalence weights of 0.73 and 1 to test impact on final concentration 
indices. 
Health status measurement 
As the objective of the National Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey was to understand 
the health status of the Hungarian population, an extensive list of questions on health 
status were included in the survey. Questions covered all major disease areas (except for 
cancer) as well as health-related behaviour. 
In addition to the disease-related questions, more generic or summary measures of health 
status were also included in the survey. The analysis of inequalities in health status and 
equity in delivery of care was based on using continuous and categorical generic 
measures of health status. These variables included the followings: 
¢ The EQ-5D instrument 
> Functionality 
> Chronic illness 
> Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (WvD) continuous measure based on self-assessed 
categorical health. 
For the base-case analysis, the EQ-5D instrument was used as the measure of health 
status. The rest of this section describes these data used to measure health status. 
The EQ-SD instrument 
The EQ-5D questionnaire is a generic, utility-based HRQL instrument developed by an 
international, multidisciplinary group of researchers in order to provide a simple, generic 
measure of health for clinical and economic appraisal (EuroQol Group, 1990). 
The EQ-5D questionnaire has five domains including mobility, self-care, usual activities, 
pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. Each domain has three 
levels: no problem, some 
problem, severe problem. Therefore, altogether there are 243 
health states defined. 
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A utility weight is assigned to each health state. Utility weights are elicited from general 
population surveys that used one of the available direct utility assessment methods. The 
most frequently applied value set, the "York formula" is based on a large UK study that 
used the time trade-off (TTO) utility assessment method (MVH Group, 1995). A more 
recent formula was estimated based on the analysis of pooled data from preference 
elicitation surveys in general populations of various European countries (Weijnen et al. 
1999). The advantage of this alternative formula is that it is based on preferences of 
general population of several European countries as compared to the MVH formula, 
which is based on UK population preferences. The disadvantage of the European value 
set is that it is based on the visual analogue scale (VAS) method, which is the least 
accepted way of eliciting utilities. 
In summary, health status can be measured in three different ways by using the EQ-5D 
instrument: 
>A single utility index based on general population preference values (EQ- 
5Dindex); 
> Self-rated health based on the visual analogue scale question from zero, i. e. worst 
imaginable health state and 100, i. e. best imaginable health state (EQ-5Dvas); 
> As profile along the five dimension questions (EQ-5Dmobility, EQ-5Dself-care, 
EQ-5Dusual activity, EQ-5Dpain/discomfort, EQ-5Danxiety/depression). 
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Figure 6.1: The EQ-5D instrument 
By placing a tick in one box in each I 
describe your own health state today 
Mobility 
I have no problems in walking about 
I have some problems in walking abou 
I am confined to bed 
11 
r7l 
I have no problems with performing my usual activities Q 
have some problems with performing my usual activities Q 
I am unable to perform my usual activities Q 
Pain/Discomfort 
I have no pain or discomfort Q 
I have moderate pain or discomfort Q 
I have extreme pain or discomfort 13 
Anxiety/Depression 
I am not anxious or depressed Q 
I am moderately anxious or depressed Q 
I am extremely anxious or depressed Q 
Compared with my general. 
level of health over the past 12 months, 
my health state today is: 
Better Q PLEASE TICK 
Much the same Q ONE 
Worse Q BOX 
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...... b......... 
health state 
Regarding the calculation of the EQ-5Dindex, as there were no available utility weights 
elicited from the Hungarian general population, the analysis used two alternative value 
sets. Utility index was calculated by using the so called York formula (MVH, 1995) that 
is based on a UK population survey with TTO method, and the European VAS value set 
(Weijnen et al, 1999) which is based on a combination of general population surveys 
conducted across European countries by using the RS method. The first is referred to as 
EQ-5DindexTTO while the second variable is referred to as EQ-5DeuropeanVAS. Both 
variables are continuous measures and include the state of death. Negative values of 
health states indicate health states that are worse than death. The calculation method of 
the utility index is illustrated in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.6: Coefficients for the estimation of the EQ-5Dindex values: 
European VAS value set York TTO value set 
Constant 0.996 1 
At least one 2 or 3 -0.204 -0.081 
At least one 3 -0.191 -0.269 
Mobility=2 -0.055 -0.069 
Mobility=3 -0.180 -0.314 
Self care=2 -0.103 -0.104 
Self care=3 -0.143 -0.214 
Usual activities=2 -0.024 -0.036 
Usual activities=3 -0.071 -0.094 
Pain/discomfort=2 -0.084 -0.123 
Pain/discomfort =3 -0.139 -0.386 
Anxiety/depression=2 -0.072 -0.071 
Anxiety/depression=3 -0.111 -0.236 
To measure ill-health rather than health, variables (1 - EQ-5Dindex) were used 
in the 
measurement in inequalities. Similarly, self-rated ill-health was measured as 
1- EQ- 
5Dvas. 
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Variables of the five dimension questions were dichotomised by defining ill-health as 1 if 
someone has some or severe (level 2 or level 3) problems, and zero if someone does not 
have any problems (level 1). These variables were used in the analysis of the income- 
related inequalities along the five different problems. 
Chronic illness 
Chronic illness variable was also a dummy variable constructed from ten questions about 
major chronic diseases. Ten questions were asked about chronic diseases, including 
hypertension, myocardial infarction in the past, other heart diseases, stroke, 
hypercholesteremia, diabetes, asthma, other allergy, long-standing liver problems, 
chronic pain (due to musculosceletal problems). If the respondent indicated at least one of 
these chronic problems then the value of the "Chronic illness" ill-health variable was 1, 
otherwise it was zero. 
Functionality 
The variable of functionality is also a dichotomised variable constructed from different 
questions about limited functioning. This variable was constructed within the framework 
of the health monitoring survey program. The value of zero indicates no problem while 
the value 1 indicates problem with functionality. 
WvD's measure of health 
WvD' measure of health was constructed in the same as described by Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (1994) and as was applied by Gerdtham et al. (1999). The objective of the 
calculation of the WvD' measure of health was the generation of data for comparative 
analysis. Several previously conducted international analyses in this 
field used categorical 
variables on health status. The calculation of the concentration 
indices with the WvD' 
measure makes it possible to compare the Hungarian results with those 
international 
results that are using the same approach. 
III 
The WvD's method of constructing continuous measure of health status based on self- 
assessed categorical variable had the following steps: 
The commonly used five-point self-assessed categorical health variable (H) has the 
values between 1 (i. e. very bad health) and 5 (i. e. very good or excellent health). It is 
assumed that there is an underlying latent health variable (H*) that has a standard 
lognormal distribution. The categorical variable is related to the latent variable in the 
following way: 
1. H=1 if -oo<H`ai 
2. H=2 if ai <H*=a2 
3. H=3 if a2 <H`=a3 
4. H=4 if a3<H`a4 
5. H=5 if a4<H"<oo 
Where ai are threshold values. If the assumption was that H* had a standard normal 
distribution then threshold values could be calculated with the following equation: 
n; (1) a; =ý-1 - ,; =ß, 2,.... i-i 
Where (D"1 is the inverse standard normal cumulative density function, n; is the number of 
respondents in category j, and N is the total number of respondents. The mean values of 
the five intervals can be estimated as normal scores (ZZ): 
[0( 
--1 
)_O( 
4)1 
n; 
Where 0 is the standard normal density function. 
But assuming that the latent health variable (i. e. H*) has a lognormal rather than a normal 
distribution, then: 
(3) Z; _ -1n H 
Therefore, final values on the continuous health variable can be obtained as follows: 
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(4) H* = exp(- Z) 
This variable was used as the continuous alternative of the five-point self-assessed 
categorical health variable. 
Health care utilisation variables 
In Hungary, health care is provided at three main service level, involving primary care 
(GP), specialist care at outpatient clinics or outpatient departments of hospitals, and in- 
patient care at hospitals. Dental care traditionally belongs to primary care level services. 
However, due to that dental care is organised separately from GP practices an additional 
question was included in the analysis. 
Health care utilisation was, therefore, measured along four main types of health care 
services. These included: 
> General practitioner visits 
Outpatient specialist visits 
¢ Days spent in hospital 
> Visits to dentists 
There was a direct question asked about the number of visits the respondent had in the 
past 12 months. In the case of hospital treatment, the respondent had to define the number 
of days spent in hospital in the past 12 months. 
The calculation of the concentration indices related to health care utilisation was based on 
natural units (i. e. number of visits, days spent in hospital) rather than using a monetary 
value of the services used. The concentration index would give the same result 
independently from whether service units or the monetary value units are used, given that 
each service unit costs the same9. 
9 This is due to that the value of the concentration index is the same if there is a proportional relationship 
between the two variables. 
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In addition to four types of health care service utilisation data, total health care utilisation 
was also measured by applying the imputed expenditures computation method. The 
imputed expenditure of total health care serves used by the individuals was estimated by 
multiplying the number of services with their estimated costs. 
Unit costs of health care services was provided by the GYOGYINFOK Institute, which is 
an organisation devoted to the collection and analysis of health care cost data. The 
GYOGYINFOK is responsible for determining health care finance fees that are paid to 
health care providers. 
The average unit costs presented in Table 6.7. are representing the average fees that 
providers received for a visit during year 2000. 
Table 5.7 Average costs of each type of health care services 
Health care service Unit cost in HUF 
General practitioner visits 624 
Outpatient specialist visits 782 
One day spent in hospital 10474 
Visits to dentists 1713 
An important data limitation in the analysis of equity in the delivery of health care was 
the omission of the utilisation of medications. Although there have been data collected 
about the use of medications, these were not expressed in monetary terms or other 
comparable units. 
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6.3.3 Inequality aversion survey 
A particular problem related to the use of concentration indices in the measurement of 
equity in health and health care is the lack of understanding how concentration indices 
can be interpreted. The objective of collecting data on inequality aversion was to evaluate 
how these data can be integrated into a health-related social welfare function. Revealing 
public preferences for health inequality aversion is in itself an interesting information as 
it can support decisions which involve the consideration of trade-offs between equity and 
efficiency objectives in health care. 
To elicit preferences for inequality aversion, two experiments were conducted among 
decision-makers in the health care administration and among young practicing 
physicians. Data collection among these subgroups of health care professionals is 
interesting as the former group represent those making policies and running the health 
care system, while the latter represent those who directly provide medical care to the 
patients, The questionnaire used to measure preferences for inequality aversion was the 
modified version of the questionnaire developed by Shaw et al (2001) at the University of 
York. The rest of this section first describes the survey samples and the details of the 
instrument. 
Survey sample 
Data were collected by using the inequality aversion questionnaire with two groups of 
health care professionals. Survey 4 involved 44 health care decision-makers while Survey 
5 included 72 young physicians (equivalent to senior house officer level). Both surveys 
were conducted in Spring of 2001. 
Both surveys took place at training/conference programs for health care professionals. 
The survey with health care decision-makers had two sites: one was a workshop for 
higher level civil servants of the National Health Insurance Fund, while the other was a 
workshop for a mixed audience of health care decision-makers of public health officers 
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from different parts of the country. Although the survey covered decision-makers from a 
national level health care finance institute as well as decision-makers from the various 
counties of Hungary, the sample did not fully represent all health care decision-makers of 
Hungary. For example, civil servants of the ministry of health were not included in the 
sample. 
Survey 5 was performed at a health economics training class for senior house officer 
level physicians in the university city of Debrecen. The audience was informed about the 
objectives of the research and was asked to fill in the questionnaire. This survey included 
a sample from one of the four medical universities of Hungary and therefore the sample 
can not be called representative for young physicians of the country. 
There was 1 respondent in the health care decision-makers group who indicated difficulty 
of understanding the questionnaire from its second question. This questionnaire was 
excluded from the analysis. 
There was no data collected from the general population of Hungary. The objectives of 
Survey 4 and Survey 5 was experimental with the aim to gain understanding of 
connecting data on public preferences for health inequalities with the actual inequalities 
measured by the concentration index. 
Inequality aversion questionnaire 
The inequality aversion questionnaire was adopted from the questionnaire developed by 
Shaw et al (2001). The adaptation included two main components. 
Firstly, the questionnaire was modified to reflect realistic data on the current level of 
inequalities in Hungary. Data were taken from the Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey 
(Survey 3). Non-standardised values of the EQ-SD; ndexTTO were used to construct baseline 
data for the morbidity question. According to the survey results, the richest quintile of the 
population had a value of 0.90 while the poorest quintile had a mean value of 0.75. 
Secondly, more text-based explanation was given to each graphical question. This was 
done in order to increase the probability that respondents understand the full meaning of 
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the questions. No test of comprehension or any validation of this instrument was 
performed. Figure 6.2 illustrates the key content of the questionnaire 
Procedures 
The inequality aversion questionnaire first explained a hypothetical scenario in which 
preferences can be expressed about two health care programmes (programme A and 
programme B). Each programme covers two population sub-groups: a group with high 
income level and better current health status and a group with low income level and 
worse current health status. 
Programme A always offers a choice when both the better off and the worse off 
population sub-group can achieve the same amount of improvement of health during the 
programme. Programme B on the other hand offers a choice when the worse off 
population sub group achieves a higher improvement in health than the better off sub- 
group. Both programmes cost the same. 
The first question presents a scenario when the total amount of health gain is equal 
between programme A and B. The remaining 3 questions present scenarios when the total 
amount of health gain is smaller for programme B than for programme A reflecting an 
equity-efficiency trade-off. The questionnaire explains to the respondents that in these 
cases programme B that targets the worse-off population group leads to less overall 
health gain as it is more expensive to implement programmes for the low income 
individuals (e. g., health prevention programmes that target the poor). 
Each scenario reflects different level of loss in overall health that can be traded for 
greater equity. The level of inequality aversion is reflected by how far respondents are 
willing to go in sacrificing efficiency for equity. In fact, the last scenario offers an 
extreme scenario for those preferring reducing equity even at the expense of ensuring 
smaller health for both the rich and the poor. 
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IN COLOUR 
Figure 6.2: Summary illustration of the inequality aversion questionnaire 
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6.4 Methods of data analysis and interpretation of results 
This section provides a summary of methods used in the actual analysis in the thesis. First 
the econometric methods used for the analysis of equity in the finance of health care are 
introduced. This is followed by the discussion of methods used for the analysis of 
income-related inequalities in health and equity in the delivery of health care. 
6.4.1 Measuring inequity in the finance of health care: 
The Kakwani index can be written: 
1 
CS) Kakwani = 2f [Ltax(R) - Lpre(R)]dR =Ctax - 
Cpre 
0 
The Kakwani index can be computed as the difference between the concentration index 
of payments (C. ) for health care and the concentration index of pre-tax income (Cpre): 
2N2N 
(6) Kakwani = Cw - Cpre =± taxui -- preýR -1 Ntax ; =1 
Npre ; _1 
Where tax is the mean of payments for health care, taxi is payment for health care made 
by the it' person (ranked by income), pre is the mean of pre-tax income, prei is the pre-tax 
income of the ithperson, and R; is the relative rank of the ithperson. 
Alternatively, Kakwani et al. (1997) suggested the convenient regression method that 
automatically provides the standard error for the concentration index: 
prei c (7) ZQR2 taxi -=y+ öRi +u 
` tax pre 
where 
2 is the variance of the relative rank. 
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All analyses have been run by both methods and resulted in identical Kakwani index 
values without exception. 
6.4.2 Measuring income-related inequalities in health 
The ill-health concentration index can be quantified as 1 minus the area below the ill- 
health concentration curve, which is equivalent to twice the area between the ill-health 
concentration curve and the diagonal. This can be mathematically expressed as: 
1 
(8) CH=1-! LH(R)dR 
0 
where, LH indicates the ill-health function that gives the cumulative percentage of ill- 
health by the cumulative percentage of the population ranked (R) by income. 
The ill-health concentration index can be best computed by using the following formula: 
(9) CH=? wihiR-1 h ; _, 
where, h indicates weighted mean ill-health, h; indicates ill-health of individual i, and R; 
indicates the relative rank of individual i defined as: 
(10) =. i,. w3 +2 w; where wo=0 
Alternatively, Kakwani et al. (1997) suggested the convenient regression approach that 
makes the computation of the standard error of the concentration index simpler: 
(11) 26 R2 
hl 
_Y +SRS+ui 
where Gý is the variance of the relative rank. 
The OLS estimator of 5 is equal to: 
(12) S=? ýwi(hi-h R- 
h 1=, 2 
and this, from equation (9) makes S' equal to CH. The regression analysis of equation 
(11) automatically provides estimates for standard error for the concentration index. 
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Decomposition analysis 
The decomposition analysis helps to uncover and quantify to what degree the different 
sociodemographic determinants of health contribute to the income-related inequalities in 
health status. 1° Wagstaff et al (2003) demonstrated first how to perform the 
decomposition analysis when health status is estimated by a linear regression model that 
includes demographic and socioeconomic explanatory variables (equation 13). 
(13) h; =a+IkPkxki +6i 
Where h means health status, and Xk represents the socioeconomic and demographic 
explanatory variables used in the model. The concentration index can be decomposed by: 
(14) C=ýk(J6xxklh)Ck+GCklh 
Where, A means the estimated coefficient to Xk, xis the average health value, Ck is the 
concentration index for variable Xk, and GCk is the generalized concentration index for 
the error term. 
This shows that the overall health concentration index is the sum of the weighted 
concentration indices of the explanatory variables plus the unexplained component. The 
weights of the concentration indices present the elasticity of health status with respect to 
the explanatory variable. 
Robin Hood index-related interpretation 
Koolman and Doorslaer (2002) suggested an intuitive way of interpreting the value of the 
concentration index by quantifying the relationship between the Schutz coefficient and 
the health concentration index in large sample surveys. 
10 The decomposition analysis can also be used to analyse overall (i. e. not income related) inequalities in 
health status. In this case, the ranking of individuals is based on their health status rather than by their 
income. 
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The Schutz coefficient (equation 15) represents the percentage of the total amount of Y 
(i. e. health, or any other inequality variable measures in an analysis), which needs to be 
transferred from that part of the population which is above average income to that part of 
the population which earns less than the average income. For this reason it is also referred 
to as the Robin Hood index. 
1n 
(1 s) s=_1 lyi - Y1 2Yn 
=, 
Koolman and Doorslaer shows that in large samples, the predicted health concentration 
index value is equal to: 
(16) C. = 16F2 5 
Further they argue that because in large samples the variance of the rank is equal to 1/12; 
the health concentration index can be expressed as 3 times the Schutz index. 
Based on this approach, the predicted ill-health (1-EQ-5Dindex) concentration index 
value of -0.11 can be interpreted in the following way: 8.25% of total amount of ill- 
health measured by the EQ-5DindexEuro should be redistributed from those above the 
average income to those below that level in order to equalize the distribution of health. 
6.4.3 Measuring inequity in the delivery of health care: 
Estimation of a linear OLS model to explain GP, specialist and hospital use can be 
written - for continuous measures of health care utilization - as 
follows: 
ykxik + 
2: Sp Zip + Ei (17) y, =a+, 6 1n inc; + 
1: 
kp 
Three types of explanatory variables: income itself (lninc), need standardizing variables 
(xk) and other variables (zp ). 
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Concentration indices of all variables can be computed using the simple 'convenient 
covariance' formula for weighted data: 
ý18) C =? IN1W= (A - GO 
(A' 
2ý a2C' 
cov 
aC w(. 
yi, pi) 
where cov, denotes the weighted covariance and R; is the (weighted) relative fractional 
rank of the ith individual, defined as : 
(19) I=Ný 11 w3 +2 w1 where wo =0 
Robust estimates for C and its standard error can be obtained by running the following 
convenient regression of (appropriately transformed) y on relative rank 
(20) 
7 , yi 
= a1 +ßlß + El, i , 
where oR is the variance of R; and x61 is equal to C. 
Again, it is possible to estimate the separate "contributions" of the various determinants 
and their relative importance. The estimated (partial) demand elasticity of each 
determinant k is then defined as: 
ý21) '7k- Ykjk oC 
Where iris the mean of y and xk is the mean of xk. 
The total concentration index can be written as: 
(22) C= i7rC1ninc + 
1] 
hlkCxk + 
1] 
%7pCzp + GCE 
kp 
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where the first term denotes the partial contribution of income inequality, the second the 
contribution of need variables, the third the contribution of the other variables and the last 
term is the generalized concentration index of c. 
An index of horizontal inequity in health care use can then be computed by subtracting 
the need-expected inequality from total inequality: 
(23) A 
k 
Where the second term is the need-expected inequality. 
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Chapter 7 
Equity in the finance of health care 
Based on the analysis of the Hungarian Household Budget Panel and the Informal 
Payment Survey databases, the results on equity in the finance of the health care system 
are presented in this chapter. The first section summarizes the role of individual payment 
methods in the overall health care finance. The second section introduces the 
concentration and progressivity of each of these payments. The last section discusses the 
key findings of the analysis and provides implications for policy-makers. 
7.1 Share of payment methods in health care finance 
The share of each payment methods in the overall health care finance was determined 
from mainly macro level administrative data. As described in more details in Chapter 2, 
the Hungarian health care system is funded through a mixture of payment methods. 
In Hungary, health care is financed 61 % from social health insurance contributions, 
23.5% from general taxation (income taxes, VAT, excise taxes), and 15.5% out-of-pocket 
payments (including drug co-insurance and expenditure on OTCs, informal payments, 
and other direct payments for health care services and medical devices). 
Table 7.1: Share of each payment method in total health care finance in 1999 
Billion HUF Share 
ersonal income tax 50 0.0681 
VAT 82 0.1117 
Excise taxes 40 0.0545 
ffiformal payments 30 0.0409 
Drug co-payments and OTCs 70 0.0954 
Private payments 15 0.0204 
come-related health insurance contributions 324 0.4414 
ix component of health insurance contributions 123 0.1676 
Total 734 1 
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7.2 Concentration of income and payments 
Concentration indices have been calculated for income and for each payment method 
based on the Hungarian Household Budget Panel Survey. The concentration index for 
informal payments were calculated based on the Informal Payment Survey. An 
equivalence weight of 0.5 is used for both income and payments in the base-case 
analysis, whereas equivalence weights of 0.73 and 1 are used in a sensitivity analysis to 
test how concentration index values change when different assumptions are made on the 
level of economics of scale in household expenditure. Table 7.2 summarises Gini- 
coefficients of pre-tax income based on the Household Budget Survey and the Omnibusz 
(informal payments) database. 
Table 7.2: Gini-coefficients for pre-tax income in 1999 
Equivalence weight used 
0.5 0.73 1 
Household Budget Survey 0.3672 0.3627 0.3657 
Informal payment survey 0.3613 0.3716 0.3953 
*A11 concentration indices were statistically significantly different from zero (p<0.0001) 
The Grin-coefficient's significantly positive value reveals the level of income inequalities 
in Hungary. The richest ten percent of the population earns 40% of the total income made 
by the population. The Gini-coefficient derived from the Household Budget Survey and 
the Informal Payment survey were equal in the base-case analysis but slightly differed 
when higher equivalence weights were applied. 
Table 7.3 shows concentration indices for each payment method that play a role in 
funding health care in Hungary. Concentration index estimates when alternative 
equivalence weights are used are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 7.3: Concentration indices of payments for health care 
Concentration indices 
Income taxation 0.7465 
VAT 0.1814 
Excise taxes 0.2248 
Informal payments 0.0907 
Drug co-insurance and OTCs -0.0346 
Direct payments 0.4789 
Income-related health insurance contributions 0.4698 
Fix component of health insurance contributions 0.2860 
*A11 concentration indices were statistically significantly different from zero (p<0.0001) 
Most but one payment methods are concentrated among the higher income groups. The 
exception is payment for drug co-insurance and OTCs, which is mostly made by those 
who are the heaviest users of health care and also have lower than average income. 
7.3 Progressivity of payments for health care 
To assess how payments for health care deviate from proportionality as compared to 
income level, Kakwani indices are calculated (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: Kakwani progressivity indices of payments for health care 
Kakwani progressivity ices7 
Income taxation 0.3793 
VAT -0.1858 
Excise taxes -0.1424 
Informal payments -0.2706 
Drug co-payments and OTCs -0.4018 
Direct payments 0.1117 
Income-related health insurance contributions 0.1026 
Fix component of health insurance contributions -0.0812 
TOTAL KAKWANI 
_... .. "n .I I" 
-0.0181 
nn ni ,n nnnI\ 
*Individual Kakwani mcuces were stausucuny 51 tuLw auuy 
1u11G1GL1L 11 Vlll GG1V kF -V. VVV 1) 
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ORIGINAL IN COLOUR 
7.3.1 Progressive finance elements 
Positive values for Kakwani indices revealed that three payment methods were 
progressive. This means that the burden of these payments is concentrated among the 
higher income groups as compared to proportionality. Progressive payment methods 
included: 
" income taxation (0.3793); 
" for the income-related component of health insurance contributions (0.1026); 
" and other direct payments for health care (0.1117). 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the distribution of pre-tax income and burden of payments for health 
care across income groups. This figure helps to understand the detailed picture of the 
distribution of tax burden across income deciles. The health insurance component and the 
income taxation shows a convex nature alongside all income groups, whereas direct 
payments for health care get its progressive nature in the high income groups. This is 
probably due to that high-income people are the main purchasers of services provided by 
the small private health care market in Hungary. 
Figure 7.1: Concentration curves of pre-tax income and payments for health care" 
1 -Diagonal 
0,9 
-Income 
0,8 
Income tax 
0,7 
VAT 0,6 
0,5 -*-- Excise tax 
0,4 K -f-- Drugs 
0,3 
ý'-+- Direct payments 
0,2 
0,11 HI Contribution-fix 
0 HI Contribution - 
0 0,2 0.4 0,6 0.8 1 income-related 
11 This figure reflects results from base-case analysis when an equivalent weight of 
0.5 is used. For the sake 
of clear illustration, the concentration curves are constructed 
based on mean payments by income deciles. 
However, the calculation of actual indices was based on 
individual observations as described in Chapter 6. 
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7.3.2 Regressive finance elements 
Negative values for Kakwani indices revealed that four payment methods were 
regressive. This means that the burden of these payments is concentrated among the 
lower income groups as compared to a situation when income and payments for health 
care are proportional. 
Regressive payments included the following methods: 
" Indirect taxes such as VAT (-0.1858) and excise taxes (-0.1424) 
" Fix component of health insurance contributions (-0.0812); 
" Drug co-insurance paid by the population (-0.4018); 
" Informal payments (-0.2706). 
It can be seen from figure 7.1 that the concentration curve of indirect taxes and the fix 
component of health insurance contributions show a continuous convex pattern, whereas 
service use related payments such as drug costs are particularly affect middle income 
population. This is due to that older people (households with pensioners) who are the 
main users of health care belong to middle income groups. 
Kakwani indices of general taxation were not sensitive to the choice of equivalence 
weight used in calculations. Kakwani indices of health insurance contributions were 
slightly sensitive to choice of weight and were the most sensitive for out-of-pocket 
payments. (See Appendix B. ) 
7.3.3 Informal payments 
The presence of informal payments is a key feature of the Hungarian health care system 
as it is the case in other formerly socialist block countries. Despite the potential adverse 
impact of informal payments on efficiency and equity, little empirical evidence exists due 
to the informal nature of the issue. For this reason it is particularly valuable to analyse the 
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distribution of burden of informal payments based on the unique Informal Payment 
Survey database. 
It is also interesting to test the so called "Robin Hood hypothesis" that providers may 
price discriminate (i. e. the rich are charged more than the poor) and perform cross- 
subsidy through the informal payment system (Ensor 2000). 
First a regression analysis was run to explain the amount of informal payment given for 
health care. Results showed that income level of the individual was not a statistically 
significant explanatory factor in determining the amount of informal payment made. In 
additional progressivity indices were calculated for total informal payments and for 
informal payments made for different types of health care services. 
Kakwani progressivity indices of informal payments for primary, inpatient, and 
outpatient care were all negative, reflecting a regressive payment system (Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5: Progressivity of informal payments made for health care 
Type of medical care Kakwani indices for informal payments 
General practitioner -0.31 
Outpatient specialist -0.27 
Hospital care -0.24 
*Individual Kakwani indices were statistically significantly different from zero (p<O. 0001) 
The above results can be interpreted in the following way. The informal payment 
concentration curve lies above the income concentration curve in all the three cases. This 
means that informal payments and income are not proportional to each other. Lower 
income people spend higher proportion of their income on informal payments. 
For example, in the case of primary care, the poorest 20% of the population own less than 
5% of the total income while their share in the total informal payments is more than 12%. 
At the same time, the richest 10 percentage of the population owns almost 40 percentage 
of the total income of the population and pays less than 15% of total informal payments. 
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ORIGINAL IN COLOUR 
The Kakwani index reflected a most regressive nature for the case of primary care. Figure 
7.2 illustrates the concentration of income and the concentration of informal payments 
made to GPs. The informal payment concentration curve shows that the amount of 
payment is close to equal across income groups. 
a 
Figure 7.2: Informal payments for primary care 
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The Kakwani index had a slightly smaller value in the case of outpatient and inpatient 
informal payments (Figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3: Informal payments for outpatient specialist and inpatient care 
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When comparing primary care with inpatient and outpatient care, it can be seen that the 
level of progressivity across income groups varies more in the case of inpatient and 
outpatient care. We can see a more regressive pattern among the lower income groups 
and a less regressive pattern among the higher income groups. 
Appendix C includes the case of total informal payments and payments for official 
private care. Kakwani indices suggested that the informal payment system was slightly 
more regressive than private payments; -0.27 and -0.25, respectively. The pattern of 
inequity was also similar in the sense that both payments were more regressive among 
lower income groups and less regressive among higher income groups. 
7.3.4 Overall progressivity of the finance of health care 
The overall Kakwani index is the weighted average of individual Kakwani indices, where 
weights are the shares of each payment method in total health care funding. 
The Kakwani index for the overall health care finance system was -0.0181 reflecting a 
slightly regressive overall nature. The regressive impact of direct, indirect general taxes, 
and the fix component of the health insurance contributions is almost fully offset by the 
slightly progressive (and large revenue share) income-related social insurance 
contribution component and the highly progressive (but less revenue share) income 
taxation. Due to the very large and opposite signed progressivity values of the different 
components of the mixed finance system, this balanced situation can be changed if the 
structure of the finance system is modified. 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Implication of key findings 
In the interpretation of progressivity indices for different payment methods for health 
care, attention should be paid to the various factors that have impact on the value of the 
concentration index. Firstly, the payment rule can be such that the tax rate itself varies 
across income groups. Secondly, the proportion of individuals in different income groups 
who actually participate in a payment scheme. For example a payment method, such as 
income taxation, can be progressive because the marginal tax rate increases with income. 
On the other hand, a payment method can be also progressive because only higher 
income individuals are making that particular payment. An example for the latter case is 
direct out-of-pocket payments for private health care in Hungary, which mostly made by 
higher income individuals who are the users of the small private health care sector. 
Results show that the financing of health care in Hungary is broadly speaking 
proportionate, proportionality turns out to be the result of offsetting progressive and 
regressive elements. The finding regarding the regressive nature of informal payments is 
particularly interesting, as it is in contrast with the common belief in the "Robin Hood 
hypothesis", that physicians subsidize poor patients at the expense of rich patients. 
The close to proportionate nature of the overall finance system of the health care does not 
necessarily mean an equitable state. Different individuals may regard different level of 
progressivity of payments equitable. Those seeking a greater degree of progressivity may 
focus attention on increasing the progressive elements in the current health care finance 
system. 
7.4.2 Distribution of burden of payments among population sub- 
groups by activity status 
Another interesting aspect of discussing the results is related to the composition of 
households falling in different income deciles and their participation in each payment 
types. 
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Table 7.6 summarizes the distribution of the population by activity status along income 
deciles. Additional tables were developed to illustrate the distribution of the population in 
payment deciles for each finance method. 
Results clearly showed that the burden of policies that aim to increase out-of-pocket 
payments (i. e. drug co-payments, informal payments, and other direct payments) would 
fall on households with pensioners who are the key users of the health care system. These 
households belong to the medium income population of Hungary, including income 
deciles 2,3,4,5, and 6. This explains why payments related to health care utilization 
show a progressive feature in this portion of the income distribution scale. 
On the other hand, changes in direct and indirect general taxation and social insurance 
contributions would affect households with active workers (employees at companies and 
institutes). These households are over represented in the richest half of the Hungarian 
population. 
It is also important to emphasise that households with children below the age of 14 - who 
are representing the majority of poverty in Hungary - would not be particularly affected 
by the change of any of the payment methods, as they are currently not major 
contributors to any of those. Data on the progressivity of payment methods and the 
population structure by income status is such that any change in the finance structure 
would lead to redistribution between middle-income and high-income population sub- 
groups. 
134 
ry) 
G) 
U 
d) 
a) 
E 
3 
~ 
' r a ýO ' ý M N N M ý ý 
N oo h 
ý 
4 ti ý N Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö ý ti ý'i Ö Ö N N Ö Ö Ö Ö ý 
C) 
, -4 O O N , .; O O O --ý 
00 
O O O O - - 
O O O O VIO 
V) 
O 
Ci 
O O 
O 
W') 
C'i 
M tn 00 N Q\ N 'O M N 'O O -4 
N 
~ 
N 
O M O ' N O Id: N -- 
O 
1 
4 
N N cV O Ö Ö O O t+ý Ö O cn Ö --ý Cý Ö O O 
00 ON N 
N 
00 '--. as N N N N N O O 
N -4 
_ 
oc 
M 
-.. O O N V "t 
'. ýp cy --. O 
N M O O O O c O O O O 
RZ 
w' 
t- 
00 
00 ýO 
0ý "o lo V'1 d' ~ O r-4 N et ei' O O M O', N O N - . C'q 
N 'O "-+ N 0 
-4 ^, N 
O O O N O Oý O O O N c) O O O 
O 
. 
v 
' N l- 
tri N 
l- 
O 
to 
O 
O -4 
O 
O O, 't O 
O O et Gý 
N "- 
O 
N 
Ö 
"-" 
O 
.O 
cV 
'ý --4 
O 
t/'1 
O 
tt 
Ö 
C4) 
O 
Q 
r. + 
M V'1 ýO lý --ý N "--ý 'r M O --ý --ý 'o 
N N N N ýO M 0 
7 0 cV O O O O O --ý O O I- --ý O O O N O 
Ö O 
.Q 
~ 
lý 
00 00 
O O O 
O O O O 
O O a, v'1 --' cN d O Ö O N O 
W-) 
O O O 
06 
y. r O 
p M vi 
N 
Iý 
M 
ý-ý äO 
v'1 
O 
O O O 
00 
O 
ý 
O 
O O --ý N \ O 
N 
O 
N 
O 
l- 
N 
M 
00 
N 
0 
ON 
0 
M 
0 
00 
O 
ý 
fl 
ý" 
a 
N 
ý'ý v1 
M 
Oý 
ýO N 
lý 
--ý 
N 
Ö O 
N 
O 
N 
Ö 
to 
-r 
N 
p O O 
"-+ 
00 
cn 
00 
r-+ 
O O O 
M 
M 
'O 
Ö 
M 00 
O 
N 
O (, 
.1 -- 
"O 
N 
00 
N 
^" 
O 
O Ö O N O O :r O 
I 
Oq 
--ý 
00 00 O O O vi 00 o ýo N N 
CZ) 
tN " ý 
'Cal 0 4, 
"ý v 
om 
v O 
ý, +ý b 
C 
y ecs 
`ý 
Ü 4 " 
O O i S Q 
9 
^' Q 
%) 
N en I 
-C4 t I W. 6 
M .. v 
0 t), cc$ , a ll -,, 
! 
I 
Cý 
to) 
0, 'i 
.y 
0ý 
pq 
0 x 
h 
.ý 
z cot 
ýn 
M 
ý--ý 
7.4.2 The impact of the choice of equivalence weight 
An interesting finding from this research is the better understanding how the choice of 
different equivalence weights may influence the value of the progressivity indices for 
health care payments. Results suggest that, in Hungary, the value of the Kakwani index 
was sensitive to the choice of the equivalence weight only in the case of payments that 
are linked to the utilisation of health care. 
The sensitivity of the progressivity index to the choice of the equivalence weight is a 
function of the joint distribution of income, payments, and household size. Results show 
that payments linked to health care utilisation look more progressive when a higher 
equivalence weight is used. Data suggests that this is the case because households with 
pensioners who are the key users of health care and consist of smaller households are 
ranked among higher income sup-groups when a higher equivalence weight is made. 
Therefore, these payments are shown to be more progressive. 
7.4.3 Comparison with other Hungarian and international studies 
In Hungary, this has been the first study that measured progressivity of payments for 
health care, and therefore there is no basis for comparison with results from previous 
years or authors. 
The only study on measuring progressivity was that of Toth (1997). Toth looked at the 
progressivity of personal income taxation in Hungary in 1994 and 1996. The methods he 
used were similar to this study in the sense that he looked at Tax Authority data in a 
similar manner (i. e. same tax items have been involved in the analysis). However, his 
analysis was based on personal level data and was constrained to the adult population. 
Our different perspective (i. e. household basis) was adapted due to our primary objective, 
which was to identify level of equity in finance of health care. Toth found an income tax 
concentration index of 0.6772 in 1994 and 0.7072 in 1996 and Gini coefficients of 0.49 
in 
1994 and 0.53 in 1996. Although Toth did not report Kakwani indices, these can be easily 
reconstructed by subtracting the Gini-coefficient 
from the tax concentration index. Toth's 
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results, therefore, corresponds to a Kakwani index of 0.1872 and 0.1772, respectively. 
These values were smaller than Kakwani index of 0.3793 calculated the Household 
Budget Panel Survey. The difference is mainly due to difference in the Grin-coefficients 
that might be due to different basis of calculation (i. e. adult personal level vs. equivalent 
income on household level). 
Internationally, empirical work in this field has been done exclusively by Doorslaer and 
Wagstaff. A series of earlier results and results from using refined methodology have 
been reported extensively (1993,1997,1998,1999). Their study, however, involved 
local groups of researchers in 13 OECD countries and local results have been published 
separately in many cases (such as O'Donnell et al. 1991 and Propper 1998). 
In international comparison it can be said that results from Hungary are consistent with 
international experience of other OECD countries in the sense that mainly publicly 
funded health care systems in general show an overall Kakwani index close to zero (i. e. a 
proportional overall finance system). 
What is different from current international experience is the extreme progressivity 
values of general taxation elements in either negative or positive direction. Specifically 
direct taxes, i. e. mainly income taxation is more progressive, while indirect taxes are 
more regressive than observed in any other countries with comparable data. This is 
probably due to larger underlying income inequalities, higher marginal income tax rates, 
and slightly higher VAT tax rates in Hungary as compared to the international average. 
Table 7.7 summarises empirical evidence on payment methods from 13 OECD countries 
in comparison with results from Hungary. 
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Table 7.7: International comparison of progressivity indices for payments for health care 
Direct taxes Indirect taxes Social 
insurance 
Private 
ayments 
Overall 
Denmark (1987) 0.0624 -0.1126 N/A -0.2654 -0.0047 
Finland (1990) 0.1272 -0.0969 0.0937 -0.2419 0.0181 
France (1984) N/A N/A 0.1112 -0.3396 0.0012 
Germany (1989) 0.2488 -0.0922 -0.0977 -0.0963 -0.0452 
Ireland (1987) 0.2666 N/A 0.1263 -0.1472 N/A 
Italy (1991) 0.1554 -0.1135 0.1072 -0.0807 0.0413 
Netherlands (1992) 0.2003 -0.0885 -0.1286 -0.0377 -0.0703 
Portugal (1990 0.218 -0.0347 0.1845 -0.2424 -0.0445 
Spain (1990) 0.2125 -0.1533 0.0615 -0.1801 0.0004 
Sweden (1990) 0.0529 -0.0827 0.01 -0.2402 -0.0158 
Switzerland (1992) 0.2055 -0.0722 0.0551 -0.3619 -0.1402 
(1993) 0.2843 -0.1522 0.1867 -0.2229 0.051 
SA (1987) 0.2104 -0.0674 0.0181 -0.3874 -0.1303 
ungary 0.3793 -0.1716 0.0419 -0.2808 -0.0181 
(Source: Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 1999) 
With respect to the overall progressivity of health care finance, Hungary is between those 
countries that are funded from general taxation, such as the UK, and those where private 
payments play a highly important role, such as the US and Switzerland. Hungary is 
closest to those countries where the health care system is funded through social insurance 
or is based on a mixed finance of social insurance and general taxation. 
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Chapter 8 
Health status 
Based on the analysis of the National Health Monitoring Survey OLEF2000 database, the 
results on income-related inequalities in the health status of the Hungarian population are 
presented in this chapter. The first section summarizes the core results on inequalities in 
health status, while the second section presents a decomposition analysis that shows 
inequalities at the level of quality of life dimensions. The following sections feature the 
interpretation of the concentration index, illustrate the problems with the comparability of 
indices based on different measures of health, and their application in inequality aversion 
studies. 
8.1 Inequalities in health status 
Table 8.1 presents mean health status values of the EQ-5D measures by income deciles 
and ill-health concentration indices 
VAS EQ-5D index Reported problems (%) along the 5 dimensions 
Income decile EQ- 
VAS 
York Euro Mobility Self- 
care 
Usual act Pain/ 
Disc 
Anxiety/ 
Depr. 
Lowest 70 0,80 83 21 7 17 43 40 
2. 68 0,79 82 23 8 18 46 40 
3. 68 0,78 82 24 9 19 46 41 
4. 66 0,77 81 27 10 21 49 42 
5. 69 0,80 83 22 8 17 44 38 
6. 70 0,82 84 20 7 16 40 36 
7. 71 0,83 85 18 6 14 38 34 
8. 72 0,84 86 17 6 13 36 32 
9. 76 0,87 89 12 3 9 30 28 
Highest 82 0,95 95 3 0 1 16 15 
Standardised 
Cill-health 
-0.06 -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16 -0.10 -0.10 
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Important differences can be observed in the Hungarian population in all EQ-5D 
measures by different income groups. For example, the difference in the EQ- 
5DindexEuro between the richest and the poorest tenth of the population corresponds to a 
quality of life difference between a 50 year old and a, 80 year old person. The large 
differences in the summary index measures of health status can be derived from the 
reported problems along the five dimensions of the EQ-5D. For example, while 40% of 
the poorest tenth of the population suffers from anxiety/depression, the prevalence of this 
problem among the richest group is only 15%. 
The relationship between income and health status is reflected in the negative values of 
the ill-health concentration index. These index values cannot be compared across the 
different EQ-5D measures because the neither of the EQ-5D measures can be derived 
from each other through a linear transformation. EQ-5D measures could be compared 
across countries had there been available such data available for countries other than 
Hungary. 
Finally, Figure 7.1 illustrates the concentration curves graphically12. It can be seen that 
decrease in health by income is slightly inconsistent among the poorest four income 
deciles groups. It is unclear from the model used in the analysis what was the reason for 
this phenomenon. A hypothesis could be the differences in reporting income level among 
the low-income groups. 
12 For practical reasons the illustration is based on mean ill-health values by income 
deciles. 
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Figure 8.1: Ill-health concentration curves based on the EQ-5D health status measures 
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8.2 Decomposition analysis 
Table 8.2: Results of the decomposition analysis by sociodemographic factors 
Pk Xk It Ck Components 
Age 0,38 46,7 15 -0,035 -0,0414 
Gender -3 0,48 15 0,048 -0,0046 
Education -4,48 0,39 15 0,31 -0,0361 
Income -0,00005 49408 15 0,29 -0,0478 
Unexplained -0,0501 
Total -0,1800 
Pk values show how health status changes with a unit of change in the explanatory 
variable. The direction of changes in health status is consistent with the positive or 
negative sign of the concentration index of the explanatory variable: being older, being 
female, having low education, and having low income contribute to worse health. Figure 
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8.2 illustrates the final contributing portions of each of the explanatory factors to income- 
related health inequalities. 
Figure 8.2: The contribution of sociodemographic factors to income-related health 
inequalities 
Unexplained 
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The largest portion of income-related health inequalities was explained by income level 
itself The second and third most important factors were age and education level. Gender 
had the smallest fraction in total income-related health inequalities. 
A particularly useful property of the EQ-5D instrument that income-related inequalities 
can not only be decomposed into sociodemographic components but also into health- 
related quality of life domain components. Table 8.3 describes the results of the 
decomposition analysis that is based on a regression model in which the dummy variables 
along the EQ-5D five domains explain the EQ-5Dvas score. The five dummy variables of 
the reported problems along the EQ-5D domains explained close to 50% of the variations 
in reported EQ-5Dvas values (R2=0,46). 
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Table 8.3 Results of the decomposition analysis by the EQ-5D domains 
13k Xk oc Ck Components 
Mobility 9,60 0,19 29,3 -0,2291 -0,0143 
Self-care 6,60 0,06 29,3 -0,3167 -0,0043 
Usual act 8,01 0,15 29,3 -0,2718 -0,0111 
Pain/Disc 12,47 0,40 29,3 -0,1612 -0,0274 
Anxiety/Depr 7,58 0,30 29,3 -0,1687 -0,0131 
Unexplained -0,0292 
Total -0,0994 
The model could explain 71% of income related inequalities in the EQ-5Dvas score. This 
result is based on calculations that do not account for sociodemographic characteristics, 
i. e. both the EQ-5Dvas and the dummy variables of reported problems along the five 
dimensions were actual rather than predicted values. Figure 8.3 graphically illustrates the 
share of each EQ-5D domains in income-related inequalities in ill-health measured by the 
EQ-5Dvas. 
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Figure 8.3 The contribution of EQ-5D domains to income-related health inequalities 
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Problems with pain and discomfort are the major contributor to income-related health 
inequalities in Hungary, while self-care has the smallest component. Problems with 
mobility, anxiety/depression, and usual activities have around the same share in 
explaining the income-related health inequalities. 
8.3 Robin Hood interpretation of the concentration index 
Koolman and Doorslaer (2002) suggested an intuitive way of interpreting the value of the 
concentration index by quantifying the relationship between the Schutz coefficient and 
the health concentration index in large sample surveys. 
The Schutz coefficient (equation 19) represents the percentage of the total amount of Y 
(i. e. health, or any other inequality variable measures in an analysis), which needs to be 
transferred from that part of the population which is above average income to that part of 
the population which earns less than the average income. For this reason it is also referred 
to as the Robin Hood index. 
Mobility 
20% 
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Based on this approach, the predicted ill-health (1-EQ-5DindexEuro) concentration index 
value of -0.11 can be interpreted in the following way: 8.25% of total amount of ill- 
health measured by the EQ-5DindexEuro should be redistributed from those above the 
average income to those below that level in order to equalize the distribution of health. 
8.4 Illustration of the incomparability of health concentration 
indices 
This section provides an illustration and then a justification why health concentration 
indices based on different measures of health status are not comparable across studies or 
over time. The illustration is based on the Hungarian EQ-5D survey data and also 
involves a comparison with a Swedish (Gerdtham et al. 1999) study results. The 
comparison with the study by Gerdtham et al is interesting because this Swedish tested if 
the value of the concentration index differs when different measure of health is used. 
They used the comparison of the concentration index for the validation of a new 
continuous health measure of health (i. e., the WvD measure). 
First, Table 8.4.1 describes mean ill-health values of continuous variables for the five 
response categories of the self-assessed health question when constructed from the 
Hungarian survey data as compared to the Uppsala study. 
Table 8.4: Mean ill-health values of continuous health variables for the five response 
categories of the self-assessed health question 
Hungarian study Uppsala study 
WvD EQ-5D 
vas 
EQ-5D 
indexTTO 
WvD RS TTO 
Poor health 9.63 61 0.69 10.08 55 0.3 8 
Fair health 3.77 51 0.46 3.89 33 0.23 
Good health 1.40 32 0.18 1.60 19 0.12 
Very good health 0.47 18 0.05 0.67 10 0.06 
Excellent health 0.14 9 0.02 0.24 5 0.05 
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All of the continuous measures were consistent in showing higher values for disease 
categories of worse health. There was also a tendency of increasing differences in mean 
in-health values with increasing level of ill-health categories. The only exception was the 
difference between "poor" and "fair" health in the case of EQ-5D mean values in the 
Hungarian study13. On the other hand, there have been some differences in mean ill- 
health values between different continuous measures used in the study populations. 
Nevertheless, the concept and methodology of constructing the WvD variable and 
comparing its health concentration index with concentration indices of other continuous 
measures of health was identical across the two studies. 
Table 8.4.2 summarizes concentration indices for continuous and categorical assessment 
of health status. Results from the Hungarian survey are also compared to the Swedish 
Uppsala study results. Concentration indices are measuring ill-health rather than health. 
This means that continuous measures of health are subtracted from the value of full 
health. For comparability reasons, the concentration indices presented in the table are not 
standardized for demographic or socioeconomic characteristics. 
Results show that concentration indices had negative values along all health measures. 
This confirms that there are significant income-related inequalities in health status 
favouring the rich. 14 
Appendix D shows T-test results. According to the results, most variables (both 
categorical and continuous) lead to statistically significantly different concentration 
indices. 
13 This might be partly due to the slightly different wording of the Hungarian categorical question. The 
closer translation of health states were: "very bad", "bad", "fair", "good", and "very good". 
la Sensitivity analysis on income equivalence weights showed that income-related health inequalities get 
consistently smaller values by using 0.73 or 1 equivalence weights. Similarly, the calculation of age and 
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Table 8.5: Ill-health concentration indices 
Measure of health Ill-health 
concentration 
index (CH) 
Standard 
error 
95% confidence 
interval 
Hungary study 
EQ-5D_index (TTO) -0.2128 0.0119 -0.2366 -0.1890 
EQ-5D_vas (RS) -0.0994 0.0058 -0.1110 -0.0878 
EQ-5D_european (RS) -0.1857 0.0104 -0.2065 -0.1649 
EQ-5D_mobility -0.2291 0.0172 -0.2635 -0.1947 
EQ-5D_self care -0.3167 0.0319 -0.3805 -0.2529 
EQ-5D_usual activities -0.2718 0.0201 -0.3120 -0.2316 
EQ-5D_pain/discomfort -0.1612 0.0103 -0.1818 -0.1406 
EQ-5D_anxiety/depression -0.1687 0.0114 -0.1915 -0.1459 
Functionality -0.1867 0.0015 -0.1897 -0.1837 
Chronic illness -0.0647 0.0069 -0.0785 -0.0509 
WvD measure of health -0.1398 0.0096 -0.1590 -0.1206 
Uppsala study 
WvD measure of health -0.1166 0.0095 -0.1356 
1 -0.0976 
RS -0.0987 0.0082 -0.1151 -0.0823 
TTO -0.1285 0.0172 -0.1629 -0.0941 
In case of continuous measures, the t-value for testing the hypothesis that difference 
between the concentration index for WvD measure of health and for the EQ-5Dindex, 
EQ-5Dvas, and EQ-5Deuropean is equal to zero was 4.77,3.60, and 3.24, respectively. 
This means that the hypothesis about equivalence could be rejected at 99% confidence 
level. The only hypothesis about equivalence of concentration indices that could not be 
rejected at 90% confidence level was the equivalence of concentration index based on the 
EQ-5DindexTTO and the EQ-5DmdexEuro measure of health status. 
The reason for no statistically difference between the EQ-5DindexTTO and the EQ- 
5DindexEuro was that the two formulas lead to almost identical health status values. The 
gender standardised indices lead to consistently smaller (by about one third of the index) inequalities shown 
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reason for this is that the coefficients used in the formula - despite different elicitation 
method and data sources - are very close to each other for level 2 problems (see Table 1). 
More differences can be found in level 3 coefficients as the EQ-5DindexTTO 
coefficients' values are always larger in negative direction. However, in general 
population surveys, there are only few people reporting level 3 problems, and therefore 
the two formulas lead to very similar values. 
The following section provides an explanation for incomparability of health 
concentration indices. 
8.5. Explanation of incomparability of concentration indices 
based on different health status measures 
The use of concentration curves and concentration indices in the measurement of 
inequalities and inequity was adapted from the literature of income distribution (Lorenz, 
1905) and taxation (Kakwani, 1977) to health and health care (Wagstaff, Paci and van 
Doorslaer, 1991). In the original literature everything was expressed in money terms, 
which is a straightforward cardinal type of measure. The measurement of health, 
however, is not as straightforward as the measurement of money and this leads to a 
number of challenges in the adaptation of methodology across disciplines. 
First, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1994) discussed the limitations of comparability of ill- 
health concentration indices. They emphasised that categorical questions might vary 
across surveys and their dichotomization can lead to confusing conclusions in cross- 
country comparisons. They also emphasised difficulties of comparing the commonly used 
chronic illness data as the method of asking the question (for example open or list type in 
nature) may influence responses. In addition, the findings of O'Donnell and Propper 
(1991), i. e. the poorer are more likely to have multiple chronic conditions and more 
severe types of diseases, were also used to explain the limitations of a yes-or-no dummy 
variable in expressing the level of inequalities. 
in the case of all variables. Table 4, later in the paper, includes the standardized index values. 
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To overcome some of the limitations of using dichotomised categorical health variables, 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer suggested the construction of a continuous health measure 
based on the five point categorical self-assessed health. 
Other researchers, such as Gerdtham et al (1999) or Gerdtham and Johannesson (2000) 
started to use newer continuous measures of health status, such as the visual analogue 
scale or the time trade-off methods and compared health concentration index results 
across different health status measures. Gerdtham et al. (1999) even performed the 
validation of the WvD measures of health status by comparing its health concentration 
index with health concentration indices based on two direct utility measures. 
The rest of this section demonstrates that the positive validation results by Gerdtham was 
an "accident" and, in fact, health concentration indices based on different measures of 
health status can not be directly compared" 
Lets assume first that there is a proportional re-scaling between the two health measures: 
(24) h` = bh 
By using the convenient regression method, the value of the concentration index will be 
the following. 
N 
25 2 
(bh, 
- bh)(R- 
Ch. =N '-' bh 
By re-arranging equation (25), equation (26) shows that concentration indices are 
identical. 
bE(h, -h)Ri- (26) 2- 2) 
= 
ch C) 
i- bh 
15 This demonstration is derived from a consultation with Professor Andrew Jones. 
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This can be typically observed when a 0-100 VAS values are re-scaled to values between 
0-1. 
In most cases, however, there is a more complex relationship between different health 
status measures due to reasons listed above. 
Let assume that one health measure (h*) can be predicted from another health measure 
(h) by the following linear transformation (27). 
(27) h* = a+ bh 
By replacing h with h* in equation (8), we get equation (28). 
(a + hh, - (a + hh)) R, -2 
(28) 
h' Na+ bh 
By re-arranging equation (28), equation (8) makes Ch= equal to: 
bh 
(29) C"- = C" 
a+ bh 
Equation (29) means that if a or/and b differs from zero then Ch* will also differ from Ch. 
This finding is relevant for both continuous and categorical measures of health status. In 
general, it is argued that incomparability of different continuous generic health measures 
is due to variations in the properties of individual health status assessment methods (Van 
Doorslaer and Jones 2003). 
There is substantial empirical evidence (for example a review of studies by Green et al, 
2000) on various reasons why different continuous (such as utility-type) health measures 
can lead to different results if used on the same population sample: 
" The SG method normally gives higher values than TTO method that again gives 
higher values than the RS method. This means that ill-health values (i. e. 1-health) 
will also vary across methods. This can be seen from Table 2 by comparing EQ- 
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5Dvas values from the Hungarian study and RS values from the Uppsala study 
with the TTO values from the Uppsala study. 
" It is also known that people evaluate health states worse when they answer 
hypothetical questions compared to that when they have to directly evaluate their 
own health. This can also explain differences between utility-based quality of life 
questionnaires (that are based on weights elicited by using hypothetical questions, 
such as the EQ-5Dindex or the EQ-5Deuropean index) and direct utility 
measurement methods. 
" Finally, the role of including or excluding the state of death from utility 
measurement should also be explored. In the Hungarian study concentration index 
based on the EQ-5DindexTTO and the EQ-5DindexEuro lead to significantly 
higher values than the EQ-5Dvas or the WvD measure. 
Unfortunately, this means that concentration indices based on different continuous 
measures of health are not directly comparable unless exactly the same method is used. 
This, however, highlights how important role the EQ-5D instrument could be as a 
standardized cross-culturally validated measure of health status could play in analyzing 
differences in health inequalities across countries. Section 5 reviews and illustrates the 
potential methods of analyzing and interpreting health inequality concentration indices 
based on EQ-5D data. 
8.6 Social preferences for health inequality aversion and the 
health-related social welfare function 
A practical use of the health concentration index values could be related to the analysis of 
societal attitudes concerning health inequality. 
For this purpose a separate survey was conducted with leading health care decision- 
makers in Hungary about their attitude to inequality aversion. The results of this survey 
were then used on the Hungarian EQ-5D database to simulate how the health 
concentration index value changes at different scenarios of inequality aversion. 
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The questionnaire used to measure preferences for inequality aversion was a modified 
version of the questionnaire developed by Shaw et al (2001) at the University of York. 
Data were collected from 44 health care decision-makers at conference programs at two 
occasions. One was a workshop for higher level civil servants of the National Health 
Insurance Fund, while the other was a workshop for a mixed audience of health care 
decision-makers of public health officers from different parts of the country. There was 
one respondent in the health care decision-makers group who indicated difficulty of 
understanding the questionnaire from its second question. This questionnaire was 
excluded from the analysis. 
The adaptation of the questionnaire included two main components. Firstly, the 
questionnaire was modified to reflect close to realistic data on the current level of health 
inequalities in Hungary. Data were taken from the Health Monitoring OLEF2000 Survey. 
Non-standardised values of the EQ-5DindexTTO were used to construct baseline data for 
the morbidity question. According to the survey, the richest quintile of the population had 
a value of 0.9016 while the poorest quintile had a mean value of 0.75. Secondly, more 
text-based explanation was given to each graphical question. This was done in order to 
increase the probability that respondents understand the full meaning of the questions. No 
test of comprehension or any validation of this instrument was performed. 
The questionnaire first describes the current situation of inequalities in health status in 
Hungary. It explains that the richest quintile of the population have better health related 
quality of life. 
The questionnaire then describes that there are alternative health care programmes (A and 
B) that can lead to the improvement of health status of the population. The programmes 
differ with respect to their targeting of individuals with different income levels. The 
alternatives highlighted in the questionnaire represent trade-offs between efficiency 
(overall level of health in the population) and inequalities in the population. The 
questions represent situations when the involvement in the health care programme is 
more and more expensive when targeting low-income people (an example 
is given that 
16 This is somewhat an overestimated value for the rich for the sake of better understanding the questions. 
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inviting low income people to prevention programmes can be more costly than involving 
higher income people to the same program). 
The last programme among those ones when the respondent still chooses the targeting 
intervention (Programme B) represents the final willingness to sacrifice efficiency for 
inequality aversion. Table 8.6 represents the options included in the questionnaire and the 
results. 
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Table 8.6: The relationship between social preferences and the value of the concentration 
index 
Health improvement programmes Number of Ill-health Mean Health- 
A and B respondents concentrati health related 
preferring on index after social 
(in each choice, programme A and B cost the same) this option after program welfare 
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Total 43 
There were 9 out of the 43 respondents preferred not to target low-income individuals. 6 
respondents preferred to target but was willing to pay no scarifies (i. e. any 
loss in total 
health) for that. 19 preferred to target low-income people even if this led to lower total 
health improvement in the population. This group was the median voter group. 9 other 
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respondents wanted to target the reduction of inequalities even at the price of no or lower 
health improvement for the poorer group. 
A simulation was then performed on the database assuming that the health improvement 
programs were implemented. In this analysis, it was assumed that only the highest and 
the lowest income quintiles were affected by the programs. 
According to the median voter preferences, the value of the desire to reduce inequality 
expressed as change in the health concentration index of 0,034 was equivalent to the 
value of 0,004 unit average EQ-5D utility in the population. 
A further potential application of the health concentration index could be its 
incorporation of a social welfare function used in priority setting processes. Approaches 
to a social welfare function used in the income redistribution literature can be borrowed. 
For example, Atkinson (1980) and Kakwani (1980) proposed that the preference between 
two income distributions depend together on the level of inequalities and the mean 
income. 
The direct application of this approach to the construction of a "health-related social 
welfare function" would mean that welfare is greater in a population if: 
the average level of health is greater 
and inequalities are smaller. 
The most simple health-related social welfare function can be expressed as: 
h 
(30) Health - related - SWF =- Cill-health 
As the last column of Table 8.7 shows, the use of this social welfare function always 
leads to the prioritization of `Programme B' in this particular Hungarian example, 
contradicting to the preferences of health care decision-makers expressed by the 
inequality aversion survey. Nonetheless, the objective of the example was to highlight the 
potential possibility of incorporating health inequality indices into social welfare 
functions, and hence into priority setting processes. The use of the EQ-5D utility index in 
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this context can be particularly relevant due to its property of expressing health status 
itself as valued by the society. 
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Table 8.7: Inequality aversion: the physicians' view 
Chapter 9 
Delivery of health care 
9.1 Main results for equity in delivery of care in Hungary 
Summary results for inequality indices for GP, specialist, dentist visit, inpatient care, and 
total health care utilization and their variance are presented in Table 9.1. Detailed results 
including the concentration of health care utilization and health care utilization after 
standardizing for health need are presented in Appendix E 
It can be seen from the tables that most types of health care utilization is concentrated 
towards the lower income groups. This is reflected in the negative values of the health 
care utilization concentration indices of -0.1376, -0.013, and - 0.1782 for GP, outpatient 
specialist visits, and hospital days, respectively. The distribution looks particularly 
skewed to the left for GP and hospital care. For outpatient specialist care, the 
concentration index values are close to zero, indicating a more equal distribution of visits. 
The only type of care that was concentrated towards the higher income groups was the 
annual dentist visits (Crr=0.1464). 
Due to the relatively high cost of hospital care as compared to other types of care, the 
distribution of total health care utilization is driven by hospital care and therefore is 
highly skewed to the left (Cm= - 0.1782). 
If health need were distributed equally among the lower and higher income groups then 
the concentration of health care among the poor would mean that inequity in overall 
health care utilization would favour the poorer groups. However, as Chapter 8 indicated 
ill-health was also concentrated among the lower income groups. For this reason, the 
need-based estimated utilization of health care should also be concentrated among the 
lower income groups 17 . 
17 Concentration index values for estimated utilization of dental care based on health needs were close to 
zero, indicating that dental care should be distributed equally in the population irrespective of socio- 
economic status (at least when using generic health measures for estimating need for dental care). 
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Inequality indices presented in Table 9.1 indicate whether the distribution of health care 
service utilization is proportional to health needs. HIwv indices are calculated for GP, 
outpatient specialist, dental care, inpatient care, and total health care utilization. Each row 
in Table 9.1 show results for the HIw, index and its variance depending on which health 
status measure was used in estimating health needs. 
With the exception of the H wv index for GP and outpatient specialist care estimated by 
using the EQ-5D European index formula, all indices were statistically significantly 
different from zero. These results indicate that there is significant inequity in the 
utilization of health care in Hungary. Negative values of the HIwv index for GP and 
inpatient care shows that people in lower income groups use proportionally more health 
care of these types of services based on their health status. On the other hand, positive 
values of the HIwv index for outpatient specialist and dental care indicates inequity 
favouring the rich. Again, the inequity index for overall health care delivery is driven by 
the distribution of outpatient care and therefore indicates a pro-poor inequity pattern. In 
summary, higher income individuals with similar need tend to be making more use of 
outpatient specialist care and dental care, while lower income individuals with similar 
need tend to make more use of GP and inpatient hospital care. 
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The distribution of need-based (here, EQ-VAS) estimate for and the actual utilization of 
total health care among the whole population are illustrated in Figure 9.1. It can be seen 
that the actual utilization of total health care is proportionally higher than the estimated 
utilization based on need among the 70% of the population in the lower income groups. 
Among the 30% richest population, actual health care utilization is close to proportional 
or falls slightly below the level of health care utilization that would be estimated based on 
health care needs. 
Figure 9.1: Utilization of total health care: actual vs. expected utilization based on need 
as assessed by the EQ-VAS instrument 
Cum. Dist. of egvas m/ N" Cum. Dist. of ossz - m/ 
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HIwv index values vary according to the health status measure used in the model. It can 
be generally observed that continuous measures of health, such as the EQ-5Dindex and 
the EQ-VAS, leads to indices that reflect smaller pro-poor inequity. This finding is in line 
with the results of Doorslaer et al. (2000) that health measures with more extensive 
specification used to predict need decrease the likelihood of finding inequity favouring 
the poor. However, HIwv index values remained statistically significantly different from 
zero when different health status measures were used to predict need, and this could be 
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observed for all health care services. The only exception was the EQ-5D index with using 
the European formula to estimate health utilities. Its value was not statistically different 
from zero for GP and outpatient specialist care. 
HIwv index values were moderately sensitive to the income equivalence weight used. The 
HIwv index depends on the value of the concentration indices for actual and need-based 
estimated utilization of health care. With selecting higher income equivalence weights 
both indices decreased for all types of health care services. The direction and magnitude 
of change in the HIwv index is subject to these two components. A general tendency was 
found that the HIwv index values increased with choosing a higher income equivalence 
weight. This means that detected pro-poor inequity becomes smaller and pro-rich 
inequity becomes larger when using higher income equivalence weights. The direction of 
detected inequity only changed from pro-poor to pro-rich in the case of GP care when the 
equivalence weight of 1 was used. HIwv index values for dental care showed a different 
tendency. When using higher income equivalence weights, pro-rich inequity became 
smaller. 
In general, the impact of the income equivalence weight on the concentration index value 
is influenced by the joint distribution of income and the household size. However, no 
consistent connection between income level and household size could be observed in this 
representative Hungarian population sample. Therefore, the most likely explanation 
remains that the method of using "1" as an income equivalence weight can not 
discriminate between higher and lower income individuals as efficiently as a lower 
equivalence weight does. In other words, the use of an equivalence weight of 0.5 can 
better reflect the "true" income status of the individuals as it takes into account the 
decreasing marginal cost of living in larger households. Therefore, the use of 0.5 as 
income equivalence weight can also better reflect income-related inequalities in health 
and health care both within lower and higher income groups. 
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9.2 Decomposition analysis of inequity in delivery of care 
To understand whether income-related inequalities in health care delivery are directly 
linked to income level or income-level itself is linked to other socio-economic 
characteristics, such as education level or activity status, a decomposition analysis was 
performed. Potential explanatory variables included in the model were: 
9 Income itself 
" Education level 
" Activity status 
9 Region 
" Size of location 
9 Roma minority status. 
Table 9.2 summarises the results of the decomposition analysis, while Figure 9.2 
illustrates the contribution of each of the explanatory variables to the overall income- 
related inequity index. 
Table 9.2 Results of the decomposition analysis of equity in delivery of care 
Inequity index income 
Education 
level 
Activity 
status 
Region 
Size of 
location 
Roma 
P visits -0,044 -0,001 , 
008 -0,054 0,012 -0,006 -0,004 
Specialist visits , 
035 0,019 0,043 0,069 0,016 0,026 1000 
Hospital nights -0,074 0,008 0,017 0,105 , 
042 -0,023 -0,013 
Dental visits , 
124 0,057 0,038 , 002 
0,014 0,008 0,005 
As Figure 9.2 highlights, income itself plays a significant role in income-related inequity 
in delivery of care only in the use of dental and specialist care. 
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Figure 9.2 Composition of the inequity index by type of health care 
® Income 
Dental visits ® Education level 
Q Activity status 
Q Region 
Hospital nights ® Size of location 
  Roma 
Specialist visits 
GP visits 
-0,15 -0,1 -0,05 0 0,05 0,1 0,15 
A significant part of income-related inequity in delivery of care is not directly linked to 
income-level but to other social, economic, and living area characteristics that are, 
however, related to income. 
Having medium or higher education level always has an impact towards pro-rich 
inequity, meaning that higher income individuals who also have higher average income 
tend to use proportionally more health care as compared to their health needs. This is true 
for each type of health care services, although the impact is small in the case of GP visits. 
Similar impact can be observed for the regional factor. Living in the "Middle Hungary" 
region, which includes the capital of Hungary, Budapest, has a pro-rich inequity impact 
on the use of health care services. This means that people who live in the capital of 
Hungary and have also generally higher income level use proportionally more health care 
services then their health status would explain. This phenomenon is undoubtedly linked 
to the over capacities in health care services in the capital of Hungary. 
The size of the location of the living area, which is also a proxy for the distance to health 
care facilities, is another important factor in determining income-related inequity in 
health care delivery. Results suggest, that pro-rich inequity can be observed for specialist 
and dental care services, meaning that higher people living in larger locations and also 
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have generally higher income tend to use proportionally higher level of care from these 
services. On the other hand, individuals living in smaller locations, and who also have 
generally lower income level, tend to use proportionally more GP and hospital care 
services. 
Activity status is a major factor in explaining income-related inequity in delivery of care. 
Results suggest that disabled individuals and pensioners, who generally have lower than 
average income level, tend to use more health care that would be explained by their 
health status. Results should be handled with caution due to the assumption that disabled 
individuals may need more health care than the applied linear model between health 
status and utilization predicts. With respect to retired status, attention should also be paid 
to the fact that health care, and hospital care in particular, still plays a substitute for 
alternative social care. This means that retired people with less severe health condition 
often use hospital care because there is a lack of nursing homes and home care facilities 
in Hungary. 
Finally, the Gipsy minority status was proved to contribute little to the overall income- 
related inequity in health care delivery. Data shows that the Gipsy population, who also 
tend to have lower than average income level, uses slightly more hospital services than 
non-gipsy individuals with the same need characteristics. 
9.3 Discussion 
Hungarian results show similarities with other countries in terms of presenting some 
inequity in GP and hospital care delivery favouring people in the lower income groups 
and some inequity in outpatient specialist and dental care favouring people 
in the higher 
income groups. Table 9.3 presents a summary of empirical evidence 
for inequity indices 
in selected OECD countries as compared to the Hungarian results. 
Although inequity 
indices from different surveys cannot be compared to each other, they are informative in 
understanding main patterns across countries. 
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Limitations in direct comparison of the HIwv index values across surveys are due to that 
the value of the index can be very sensitive to variations in methodology and variables 
used. Regarding methodological differences, the Hungarian survey used a simple OLS 
model to estimate need-adjusted utilization of services, while one of the international 
studies (Doorslaer et al. 2002) used a two-part logit model to handle the skewed 
distribution of health care cost. Doorslaer et al (2000) found that although the two 
methods gave similar results for Dutch survey data, some minor differences could be 
observed for (the particularly skewed) hospital care. In the Hungarian and the 
international studies (Doorslaer et al 2002, Koolman and Doorslaer 2002, and Doorslaer 
et al, 2000), HIwv index values have been shown to be highly sensitive to the method of 
measuring health status and slightly sensitive to other variables used in the 
standardisation, such as demographic characteristics, region of living, and insurance 
status. 
Nevertheless, despite some differences in methodology and variables used across 
surveys, a similar pattern in inequity can be observed in most OECD countries. People in 
lower income groups tend to use proportionally more GP and hospital care services then 
individuals in higher income groups with similar health needs. Contrary, individuals in 
higher income groups tend to use proportionally higher level of specialist and dental care 
services as compared to lower income individuals with similar health needs. 
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PART IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 10 
Review and future directions 
This research was the first to explore equity in the health care system in Hungary. Results 
revealed that in Hungary, health care is financed 23.5% from general taxation (income 
taxes, VAT, excise taxes), 61% from social health insurance contributions, and 15.5% 
out-of-pocket payments (including drug co-payment and expenditure on OTCs, informal 
payments, and other direct payments for health care services and medical devices). This 
finance structure is usual in most transitional countries of Central Europe who shifted to a 
social health insurance system. 
Kakwani progressivity indices of individual payment methods were positive for: 
" income taxation (0.3793); 
" for the income-related component of health insurance contributions (0.1026); 
" and other direct payments for health care (0.1117). 
Regressive payments included: 
" Indirect taxes such as VAT (-0.1858) and excise taxes (-0.1424); 
" Fix component of health insurance contributions (-0.0812); 
" Drug co-payments by the population (-0.4018); 
" Informal payments (-0.2706). 
The regressive nature of informal payments refutes the common 
belief in the "Robin 
Hood hypothesis", that physicians subsidise poor patients at the expense of rich patients. 
The overall Kakwani index for the health care finance system was -0.0181 
indicating a 
slightly regressive overall structure. The regressive 
impact of direct, indirect general 
taxes, and the fixed component of health insurance contributions was almost 
fully offset 
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by the slightly progressive income-related social insurance contribution component and 
the highly progressive income taxation. 
Although estimates show that the financing of health care in Hungary is broadly speaking 
proportionate, proportionality turns out to be the result of offsetting progressive and 
regressive elements so that those seeking a greater degree of progressivity may focus 
attention on increasing the progressive elements. 
Important income-related inequalities exist in the health status of Hungarians. These 
inequalities exist irrespective of the health status measure used. For example, the 
difference in the EQ-5D index for the richest and the poorest tenths of the population 
corresponds to a quality of life difference for a 50 year old and an 80 year old person. 
Forty percent of the poorest tenth of the population suffer from anxiety/depression, 
whereas the prevalence is only 15% among the richest tenth. 
The relationship between income and health is revealed by the negative values of the ill- 
health concentration index. 111-health concentration indices were found to be -0.2128 for 
the EQ-5DindexTTO; -0.0994 for the EQ-VAS; -0.1857 for the EQ-5Deuro; -0.2291 for 
EQ-5Dmobility; -0.3167 for EQ-5Dself care; -0.2718 for EQ-SDusual activities; -0.1612 
for EQ-5Dpain/discomfort; -0.1687 for EQ-5Danxiety/depression; -0.1867 for 
functionality; -0.0647 for chronic illness; -0.1398 for WvD continuous measure of health. 
The chapter demonstrates that the indices are highly sensitive to choice of measures of 
health. It is shown that two measures of health will always result in different 
concentration indices unless one measure is a linear transformation of the other. The 
implication of the sensitivity of the concentration index to the measure of health is that 
previously published comparative studies have an inherent bias that may lead to false 
references about relative inequalities across health care systems. 
This is the first analysis which used the EQ-5D health-related quality of life questionnaire 
for the analysis of income-related health inequalities. The EQ-5D is a powerful tool for 
the analysis of health inequalities. A major reason why this is the case is because the 
inequalities can be seen at the level of each of the five quality of life dimensions. The 
decomposition has revealed that problems with pain/discomfort are the principal 
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contributor to income-related health inequalities in Hungary. Thirty-nine percent of 
inequality can be explained by this dimension alone. This finding has a major implication 
for health policy-making by highlighting the potential role of pain management 
programmes. 
Another distinctive feature of this research is the analysis of public preferences 
concerning income-related health inequality. A recently developed inequality aversion 
questionnaire (Shaw 2000) was adapted to study health inequality aversion in Hungary, 
using actual data on the health status of the population from my survey. Results revealed 
(for a relatively small sample) that a majority of health care decision-makers were willing 
to trade efficiency for greater equity. The main implication of this finding is that there 
appear to be a desire to reduce social health inequalities in Hungary. 
By contrast, physicians were less willing to trade efficiency for greater equity. The 
contrast between the views of health policy-makers and physicians suggests that the 
implementation of health inequality reduction programmes may be difficult in practice. 
The idea that it might be morally acceptable to sacrifice some health gain in order to have 
a fairer distribution of health is one that physicians are likely to resist strongly, and any 
strategy to change this culture will be a major challenge. 
The lower income groups are the main users of health care. This is reflected in the 
negative values of the health care utilisation concentration indices of -0.1376, -0.013, and 
- 0.1782 for GP, outpatient specialist visits, and 
hospital days respectively. For outpatient 
specialist care, the concentration index values are close to zero, 
indicating a virtually 
equal distribution of visits. The only type of care that was concentrated towards the 
higher income groups was annual dentist visits (CM=0.1464). 
However, as Chapter 8 has shown, ill-health was also concentrated among the 
lower 
income groups. For this reason, in an equitable state, utilisation should also 
be 
concentrated among the lower income groups. 
With the exception of the HI index for GP and outpatient specialist care, all 
indices were 
statistically significantly different 
from zero. This indicates that there is significant 
inequity in the utilisation of health care in Hungary. Negative values of the HI 
index for 
170 
GP and inpatient care show that people in lower income groups use proportionally more 
health care of these types than would be predicted by their health status. On the other 
hand, positive values of the HI index for outpatient specialist and dental care indicate 
inequity favouring the rich. 
We sought to determine whether income-related inequalities in health care delivery were 
directly linked to income or more fundamentally to socio-economic characteristics, such 
as education level, which affect income. Explanatory variables included in the model 
were: 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Income 
Education 
Activity status 
Region 
Size of location 
Roma status. 
A significant part of income-related inequity in delivery of care turns out not to be 
directly linked to income but to other social, economic and geographical characteristics 
that are, however, associated with income level. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Roma minority status proved to contribute little to the overall 
income-related inequity in health care delivery. The Roma population, which also tends 
to have lower than average income level, uses slightly more hospital services than non- 
Roma individuals with the same need characteristics. 
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Appendix A 
Sensitivity analysis on equivalence weight 
Concentration indices of payments for health care 
0.5 0.73 1 
Income taxation 0.7465 0.7463 0.7410 
VAT 0.1814 0.1798 0.1943 
Excise taxes 0.2248 0.2171 0.2164 
Informal payments 0.0907 0.1267 0.1814 
Drug co-payments and OTCs -0.0346 -0.0082 0.0591 
Direct payments 0.4789 0.4787 0.8176 
Income-related health 
insurance contributions 
0.4698 0.4609 0.4471 
Fix component of health 
insurance contributions 
0.2860 0.2714 
L 
0.2564 
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Appendix B 
Sensitivity analysis on equivalence weight 
Kakwani progressivity indices of payments for health care 
0.5 0.73 1 
Income taxation 0.3793 0.3836 0.3753 
VAT -0.1858 -0.1829 -0.1714 
Excise taxes -0.1424 -0.1456 -0.1493 
Informal payments -0.2706 -0.2449 -0.2139 
Drug co-payments and OTCs -0.4018 -0.3709 -0.3066 
Direct payments 0.1117 0.1160 0.4519 
Income-related health 
insurance contributions 
0.1026 0.0982 0.0814 
Fix component of health 
insurance contributions 
-0.0812 -0.0913 -0.1093 
TOTAL KAKWANL -0.0181 -0.0211 -0.0129 
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Appendix C 
Total informal payments for public health care 
Direct payments for private health care based on data from the Informal Payment Survey database 
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Appendix E 
Decomposition analysis: delivery of care 
GP care 
Mean CI ME Contrib sum 
F 
0,501 0,334 0,006 
isit 4,969 -0,101 -0,101 
hat 4,972 -0,062 -0,106 
I -0,044 -0,044 
nc 10,452 0,028 -0,017 -0,001 -0,001 
-5Dindex 85,267 0,030 -0,089 -0,046 -0,046 
let 0,093 0,018 0,299 0,000 
e3 0,151 -0,099 0,763 -0,002 
le4 0,047 0,032 1,406 0,000 
ale5 0,022 -0,039 0,574 0,000 -0,002 
male l 0,155 0,155 0,479 0,002 
emale2 0,091 -0,022 1,077 0,000 
emale3 0,170 -0,099 2,185 -0,007 
emale4 0,070 -0,079 5,139 -0,006 
emale5 0,044 -0,168 2,009 -0,003 -0,014 
oma 0,024 -0,535 1,701 -0,004 -0,004 
et2 0,509 -0,002 0,964 0,000 
et3 0,315 -0,188 0,510 -0,006 -0,006 
D2 0,551 0,048 0,336 0,002 
D3 0,135 0,475 0,510 0,007 0,008 
nactive 0,022 -0,485 7,611 -0,017 
ousework 0,049 0,031 0,547 0,000 
etired 0,333 -0,136 3,774 -0,034 
em lo ed 0,046 -0,414 0,344 -0,001 
tudent 0,002 -0,476 -0,196 0,000 
elfem l0 0,060 0,253 -0,552 -0,002 -0,054 
egion2 0,100 -0,123 0,380 -0,001 
egion3 0,104 0,072 0,584 0,001 
egion4 0,267 0,256 0,970 0,013 
egion5 0,132 -0,103 0,405 -0,001 
e ion6 0,165 -0,215 -0,113 0,001 
egion7 0,138 -0,132 0,137 -0,001 
0,012 
-0,106 -0,106 
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Specialist care 
Mean CI ME Contrib sum 
0,501 0,334 0,008 
visitgp 2,554 -0,020 -0,020 
that 2,557 -0,063 -0,028 
1 0,035 0,035 
Inme 10,452 0,028 0,166 0,019 0,019 
Q-5Dindex 85,267 0,030 -0,067 -0,067 -0,067 
le2 0,093 0,018 -0,038 0,000 
le3 0,151 -0,099 -0,082 0,000 
le4 0,047 0,032 -1,184 -0,001 
le5 0,022 -0,039 -1,433 0,000 0,000 
emale 1 0,155 0,155 0,759 0,007 
emale2 0,091 -0,022 0,437 0,000 
emale3 0,170 -0,099 0,257 -0,002 
emale4 0,070 -0,079 0,390 -0,001 
emale5 0,044 -0,168 -0,116 0,000 0,005 
oma 0,024 -0,535 0,066 0,000 0,000 
et2 0,509 -0,002 -0,847 0,000 
et3 0,315 -0,188 -1,124 0,026 0,026 
D2 0,551 0,048 1,448 0,015 
D3 0,135 0,475 1,111 0,028 0,043 
inactive 0,022 -0,485 7,000 -0,030 
ousework 0,049 0,031 1,927 0,001 
etired 0,333 -0,136 2,095 -0,037 
em lo ed 0,046 -0,414 0,009 0,000 
tudent 0,002 -0,476 1,593 -0,001 
elfemploy 0,060 0,253 -0,533 -0,003 -0,069 
egion2 0,100 -0,123 -0,181 0,001 
egion3 0,104 0,072 -0,227 -0,001 
egion4 0,267 0,256 0,380 0,010 
egion5 0,132 -0,103 -0,311 0,002 
egion6 0,165 -0,215 -0,277 0,004 
e 'on7 0,138 -0,132 -0,064 0,000 0,016 
-0,028 -0,028 
185 
Hospital stay 
Mean CI ME Contrib sum 
0,501 0,334 0,009 
i sit 2,486 -0,163 -0,163 
that 2,489 -0,098 -0,171 
I -0,074 -0,074 
c 10,452 0,028 0,067 0,008 0,008 
Q-5Dindex 85,267 0,030 -0,099 -0,102 -0,102 
le2 0,093 0,018 0,279 0,000 
le3 0,151 -0,099 0,251 -0,002 
le4 0,047 0,032 0,238 0,000 
le5 0,022 -0,039 0,419 0,000 -0,001 
le l 0,155 0,155 0,079 0,001 
emale2 0,091 -0,022 0,712 -0,001 
emale3 0,170 -0,099 -0,027 0,000 
emale4 0,070 -0,079 -1,905 0,004 
emale5 0,044 -0,168 -0,430 0,001 0,006 
oma 0,024 -0,535 2,513 -0,013 -0,013 
et2 0,509 -0,002 1,023 0,000 
et3 0,315 -0,188 0,951 -0,023 -0,023 
D2 0,551 0,048 0,569 0,006 
D3 0,135 0,475 0,420 0,011 0,017 
ctive 0,022 -0,485 11,909 -0,052 
ousework 0,049 0,031 1,161 0,001 
etired 0,333 -0,136 2,920 -0,053 
em lo ed 0,046 -0,414 -0,032 0,000 
tudent 0,002 -0,476 -0,178 0,000 
elfemploy 0,060 0,253 -0,205 -0,001 -0,105 
egion2 0,100 -0,123 -0,267 0,001 
egion3 0,104 0,072 0,504 0,002 
e ion4 0,267 0,256 1,206 0,033 
egion5 0,132 -0,103 0,239 -0,001 
e ion6 0,165 -0,215 -0,408 0,006 
egion7 0,138 -0,132 -0,238 0,002 
0,042 
-0,171 -0,171 
186 
Dental care 
Mean CI ME Contrib sum 
0,501 0,334 0,003 
isitgp 1,036 0,136 0,136 
hat 1,038 0,009 0,133 
I 0,124 0,124 
c 10,452 0,028 0,206 0,057 0,057 
Q-5Dindex 85,267 0,030 -0,003 -0,008 -0,008 
le2 0,093 0,018 -0,315 -0,001 
le3 0,151 -0,099 -0,348 0,005 
le4 0,047 0,032 -0,407 -0,001 
le5 0,022 -0,039 -0,714 0,001 0,004 
male l 0,155 0,155 0,276 0,006 
emale2 0,091 -0,022 0,548 -0,001 
emale3 0,170 -0,099 0,000 0,000 
emale4 0,070 -0,079 -0,330 0,002 
emale5 0,044 -0,168 -0,721 0,005 0,012 
oma 0,024 -0,535 -0,392 0,005 0,005 
et2 0,509 -0,002 0,078 0,000 
et3 0,315 -0,188 -0,144 0,008 0,008 
D2 0,551 0,048 0,187 0,005 
D3 0,135 0,475 0,541 0,033 0,038 
naetive 0,022 -0,485 0,119 -0,001 
ousework 0,049 0,031 0,306 0,000 
etired 0,333 -0,136 0,075 -0,003 
employed 0,046 -0,414 -0,085 0,002 
tudent 0,002 -0,476 0,055 0,000 
elfem l0 0,060 0,253 0,276 0,004 0,002 
egion2 0,100 -0,123 0,035 0,000 
egion3 0,104 0,072 -0,121 -0,001 
egion4 0,267 0,256 0,129 0,008 
egion5 0,132 -0,103 -0,007 0,000 
egion6 0,165 -0,215 -0,163 0,006 
egion7 0,138 -0,132 -0,053 0,001 
0,014 
0,133 0,133 
187 
